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SUMMARY 
 
Over the last two decades, Vietnam accomplished rapid economic growth under the 
transitional economy. Significant developments in the agricultural sector brought in by the 
renovation policy have propelled the country to the rank of the second largest rice exporter in 
the world. The steady economic growth along with increasing population has led to a rise in 
demand for agricultural products in the domestic market. Furthermore, Vietnam‟s accession 
to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007 is seen to have boosted the country‟s 
economic reforms resulting in greater integration with the global economy.  
Despite these massive political and economic changes, Vietnam is still struggling with high 
poverty levels, particularly in the remote North West region. The country‟s income poverty 
rate stands at 15.5% while its reaches a 39.4% in the North West Region of the country (GSO 
2007). The North West region, with its mountainous topography and temperate climate, is 
one of the main and historical tea cultivation areas in Vietnam. Its surrounding big cities offer 
steady demand for high quality tea produced in this region.  
In 1999, the Vietnamese government implemented a development plan for tea production for 
the period of 2005-2010 (Decision 43/1999 QD-TTg) with an aim to increase production, 
export and create employment. The implementation of this policy was expected to alleviate 
poverty in the uplands tea producing areas, which are often poor mountainous regions with 
small scale farming, and limited off-farm income opportunities. Other important public 
policies measures adopted by Vietnam to stimulate the development of the tea value chain 
and promote greater access to market for the rural poor farmers include “the law of Private 
Enterprise” which was promulgated in 1990, and “the Enterprise Law” which was enacted in 
1999 and revised in 2005.  
In addition to such public policies, vertical coordination in tea supply chain is required to 
ensure greater small-scale farmers participation to market. Tea being a perishable agricultural 
commodity which needs early processing after harvesting, vertical coordination can reduce 
production and marketing risk faced by small-scale farmers.  Contract farming is a type of 
vertical coordination that encourages small-scale farmers‟ participation in tea production. It 
refers to an arrangement between producers and processors to exchange inputs and outputs 
with pre-agreed price, time, quality and quantity (Singh, 2002). It is also applied widely in 
the tea sector of North-Western Vietnam.  
The role of contract farming as a rural development tool has been discussed in many 
empirical studies. One major thread of that literature is that contract farming permits to link 
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producers with agricultural markets especially in less developed countries. It is argued that 
contract farming offers advantages for small-holder farmers in ensuring their access to inputs, 
credit, insurance, information, technology and markets. In economics theory, particularly in 
the framework of new institutional economics, contract farming is often explained as an 
institutional response to market failures such as information asymmetric with respect to price 
and/or quality and the incompleteness or imperfections in the markets for credit, inputs and 
agricultural services.  
Transaction cost is one of the important elements in the analysis of market institutions. 
Empirical studies reveal that high transaction costs discourage small-holders to participate in 
markets. In tea production, sunk costs associated with high initial investments, and 
commodity‟s perishable and time specific processing characteristics, heighten their asset 
specificity. This high degree of asset specificity in tea production emphasizes the need for 
contract farming. Furthermore, contracting is one way to divide risks associated with 
production and marketing between the firm and the producer. In short the method of contract 
farming provides a foil for the shortcomings in both parties.  
The objective of this study is to investigate the importance of income from tea production for 
the household income of poor small-holder farmers in North West Vietnam. More 
specifically, given the importance of vertical coordination in agricultural production, the 
study‟s main focus is to investigate the involvement of small-holder farmers in the integrated 
agro-food channels and evaluate its impact on their livelihood.  
There are three specific research questions included in the study: 
1. Does contract farming enhance production efficiency compared to non-contract 
farming?  
2. What are the differences in socio-economic characteristics of contract and non-contract 
farmers? 
3. How strong is the impact of contract participation on household income? 
 
For this study, Moc Chau district, one of the traditional tea producing areas in Vietnam, was 
selected as the research site. The district has 3,200ha of tea producing area with a total of 
6,726 households engaged in tea production. Moc Chau is located 950m above sea level, and 
has tropical monsoon climate, which is ideal for tea production. Three types of organizational 
arrangements are found in terms of production and marketing where tea producer were 
involved: 
1. via state-owned enterprise 
2. via private company  
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3. and via direct spot market  
 
The population is stratified into four clusters: 
1. tea farmers contracting with state-owned enterprise (SOE) 
2. tea farmers contracting with private firms or cooperative  
3. tea farmers with no contract  
4. and non-tea farmers  
 
A sample of 40 households was randomly drawn from clusters 1 and 2 each. A larger sample 
was obtained from each of the clusters 3 and 4, since they serve as control groups with higher 
heterogeneity and variance with respect to socio-economic and farming characteristics. 
Overall the samples from the four clusters consisted of 245 farm households. The survey 
questionnaire included modules on household demography, other socio-economic 
characteristics and tea production. The socio-economic modules of the questionnaire were 
based on Living Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS) methodology. These modules aim 
to measure and understand the living standards of households. The tea production modules 
aim to obtain information on production, costs and production efficiency, and the market 
module consisted with the questions on contract participation associated with socio-economic 
characteristics of households. In addition, quantitative and qualitative surveys at the village 
level and on a few selected tea firms were conducted to understand institutional changes in 
the village and to investigate socio-political factors influencing tea production. The entire 
survey was conducted during the period between June and November 2007.  
The first research question was investigated using the Stochastic Production Frontier 
Function (SPFF) model to estimate the technical efficiency associated with socio-economic 
characteristics of households, and to assess the difference among the clusters. The results 
showed high coefficient estimates of partial production elasticity associated with land size 
and material costs (a sum of costs of fertilizer, manure and pesticide). The SPFF model also 
identified significantly higher technical efficiency estimate of the group which is in contract 
with the SOE by applying non-parametric tests. This observation is associated with three 
different household characteristics: age, education and number of farm income source. 
Contrary to our initial expectation, living standard of households was not a determining factor 
for achieving higher technical efficiency. This result threw light on one concern: there might 
be a selection bias if contract participation is associated with household characteristics. To 
deal with the problem of homogeneity in the model, a treatment effects model was applied to 
control selection bias, and estimate and assess the technical efficiency with reduced-bias 
samples. 
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The second research question was investigated using the Binary Outcome model to find the 
probability of participation. Ten variables obtained from household survey were included in 
the model to determine contract participation in a contract farming scheme. The results 
revealed that six out of ten variables associated with household characteristics are statistically 
significant determinants of participation in contract farming. The six variables are average 
age of adults, squared average age of adults, proportion of adults who finished secondary 
school, years of experience in tea production, number of years of residence in the village, and 
number of memberships in organizations of adults.  
The results indicated that older farmers participate more in contracts than younger farmers; 
perhaps to avoid risks associated with marketing and production. Also, those farmers who 
have more experience in tea production tend to participate more in a contract farming scheme. 
Access to information also might be one of the important determinants for farmers to decide 
to participate in a contract. Longer residence in the village negatively affects contract 
participation because it broadens farmers‟ social networks where they can acquire more 
market information which enables the establishment of their own marketing channels. On the 
other hand, farmer‟s membership in any kind of organizations positively affects contract 
participation. By being members of an organization, farmers are more exposed to positive 
information on contracting which might enhance their participation. 
To assess the impact of contract farming participation on income, the propensity score 
matching method was applied to reduce the bias in the estimation of the treatment effect of 
contract farming participation. The estimation revealed a statistically significant, but very 
small impact of contract farming participation on daily per-capita income of about 900 
Vietnamese Dong (VND). The technical efficiency estimate after matching revealed a 
statistically significant difference between farmers who contract with SOE and non-contract 
farmers, but there was no statistically significant difference between farmers who contract 
with private firms and non-contract farmers. Hence, it can be assumed that the SOE provides 
more precise and experienced extension service or technical advice than the private firms.  
The empirical study shows that production efficiency and income of households could be 
increased through participation in contract farming. It also highlights that government can 
play a crucial role in linking resource-poor farmers to market, particularly in developing 
countries. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
 
Seit Beginn der wirtschaftlichen Öffnung vor zwei Jahrzehnten verzeichnet Vietnam ein 
rapides Wirtschaftswachstum. Die Erneuerungspolitik führte zudem zu einer sehr positiven 
Entwicklung des Landwirtschaftssektors, was Vietnam zum zweitgrößten Reisexporteur 
aufstiegen ließ. Neben dem stetigen Wirtschaftswachstum führte die Zunahme der 
Bevölkerung zu einer steigenden Binnennachfrage nach landwirtschaftlichen Produkten. Des 
Weiteren wird der WTO-Beitritt 2007 als positiv angesehen, die ökonomischen Reformen 
voranzutreiben und Vietnam stärker in die globale Wirtschaft zu integrieren. 
Im Gegensatz zu den drastischen politischen und ökonomischen Veränderungen hat Vietnam 
immer noch eine landesweite Armutsrate von 15,5 %, mit der höchsten Rate in der Nordwest 
Region von 39,4 % (GSO, 2007). Mit seiner bergigen Topographie und dem gemäßigten 
Klima ist die Nordwest Region eines der Hauptanbaugebiete von Tee in Vietnam. 1999 führte 
die Regierung den Entwicklungsplan der Teeproduktion für den Zeitraum von 2005 – 2010 
ein (Decision 43/1999 QD-TTg), mit dem Ziel, die Produktion zu verbessern, Exporte zu 
erhöhen, und Arbeitsplätze zu schaffen.. Die politischen Maßnahmen zur Verbesserung der 
Teeproduktion sollen zur Armutsminderung in den Bergregionen beitragen, in denen 
kleinbäuerliche Betriebe und unzureichende Einkommensmöglichkeiten außerhalb der 
Landwirtschaft vorherrschen. Die Entwicklungsstrategie ist dahingehend Erfolg versprechend, 
dass Tee als traditionelle Kulturpflanze und Genussmittel in der nördlichen Bergregion 
Vietnams beheimatet ist und in den größeren Städten der Region einen stabile Nachfrage 
herrscht. Daher könnte die Ausweitung der Teeproduktion ein geeignetes Mittel zur 
ländlichen Entwicklung in den Bergregionen Vietnams darstellen. Im Zuge des 
wirtschaftlichen Wandels wurden mehrere politische Maßnahmen durchgeführt, die einen 
Einfluss auf die Verbesserung der Teeproduktion haben. In diesem Zusammenhang sind 
besonders zwei treibende Kräfte zu nennen. Zum einen förderten das Gesetz des privaten 
Unternehmens (bekannt gegeben 1990) und das Unternehmensgesetz (verordnet 1999 und 
2005) die Entwicklung privater Unternehmen im Markt. Zum anderen  sollte die oben 
erwähnte Politik (Decision 43/1999 QD-TTg) die nötigen Rahmenbedingungen zur 
Verbesserung und Erhöhung der Teeproduktion schaffen. Tee ist eine mehrjährige Pflanze, 
die eine lange Vegetationsperiode benötigt. Die unbedingt notwendige direkte Verarbeitung 
der frischen Teeblätter bedarf eines hohen Kapitaleinsatzes für Verarbeitungsanlagen. Da 
Kleinbauern solche Investitionen nicht tätigen können, kommt der vertikalen Koordination in 
diesem Zusammenhang eine besondere Bedeutung zu. Hierbei sind auch institutionelle 
Interventionen wie die Preisfindung und Vertragsbindung zu erwähnen. 
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Vertragsanbau wird als Übereinkunft und Verbindlichkeit zwischen dem Produzenten und 
dem Verarbeiter angesehen, bei dem Produktionsmittel und Erzeugnisse unter einem vorher 
vereinbarten Preis, Zeitpunkt, Qualität und Menge bereitgestellt werden. Vertragsanbau ist im 
nordwestvietnamesischen Teesektor weit verbreitet, und verschiedene Arten der 
institutionellen Gestaltung sind zu beobachten. Die Anwendbarkeit und Notwendigkeit von 
Vertragsanbau als Mittel der ländlichen Entwicklung wurde in vielen empirischen Studien 
erkannt und diskutiert. In diesem Zusammenhang ist speziell die Rolle der Verknüpfung von 
Produzenten, besonders aus weniger entwickelten Ländern, mit den Agrarmärkten zu 
erwähnen, die durch den Zugang zu Produktionsmitteln, Krediten, Versicherungen, 
Informationen, Technologie und Absatzmärkten profitieren können. Beweggründe und 
Theorie, die zur Verbreitung von Vertragsanbau führen, werden häufig als institutionelle 
Antwort auf unvollkommene Märkte gesehen, die die ökonomische Effizienz beinträchtigen. 
 Daher wird Vertragsanbau im Rahmen der Neuen Institutionenökonomie analysiert. Diese 
beschäftigt sich vornehmlich mit Problemen, die durch unvollkommene 
Transaktionsinformationen und anderes Marktversagen entstehen, und unterstreicht die Rolle 
der Institutionen auf verschiedenen Ebenen dieses Problemfelds. Transaktionskosten sind ein 
wichtiges Element der Analyse von Marktinstitutionen, der zentralen Komponente 
Organisationsstudien. In empirischen Studien wurde gezeigt, dass hohe Transaktionskosten 
Kleinbauern am Marktzugang hindern. Bei der Teeproduktion wirken die versunkenen 
Kosten verbunden mit hoher Kapitalinvestition und die Produkteigenschaften, wie die 
Verderblichkeit und Notwendigkeit der zeitnahen Verarbeitung, zusätzlich erschwerend. Dies 
bestärkt die Notwendigkeit der intensiven vertikalen Koordination der Teeproduktion. Des 
Weiteren helfen die vertraglichen Vereinbarungen das Risiko, das mit dem Anbau und der 
Vermarktung von Tee einhergeht, zwischen der Firma und dem Produzentenzu verteilen. 
Das Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es, die Bedeutung des Einkommens aus der 
Teeproduktion für das Einkommen von Kleinbauern in Nordwest Vietnam zu untersuchen. 
Betrachtet man die Wichtigkeit der vertikalen Koordination bei der Produktion von 
hochwertigen Agrarprodukten, lag der Fokus der Arbeit besonders auf der Beteiligung der 
Kleinbauern an den integrierten Agri-Food Kanälen und dessen Einfluss auf deren 
Lebensstandard. Es gibt drei spezielle Forschungsfragen in der vorliegenden Studie; 1) 
Erhöht Vertragsanbau die Produktionseffizienz gegenüber Nicht-Vertragsanbau? 2) Was sind 
die Unterschiede in den sozioökonomischen Charakteristika zwischen Vertragsanbauern und 
Nicht-Vertragsanbauern? 3) Wie stark ist der Einfluss der Vertragsbeteiligung auf das 
Haushaltseinkommen? 
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Zur Beantwortung dieser Fragen wurde der Distrikt Moc Chau, eines der traditionellen 
Teeanbaugebiete Vietnams, als Forschungsregion ausgewählt. In der gesamten Provinz wird 
Tee auf rund 3,200 ha angebaut, und es sind insgesamt 6,726 Haushalte in die Teeproduktion 
involviert. Moc Chau liegt auf 950m über der Meereshöhe und ist durch ein tropisches 
Monsun Klima gekennzeichnet, welches ideal für den Teeanbau ist. Es gibt hauptsächlich 
drei Arten von organisatorischen Regelungen für die Produktion und Vermarktung, an denen 
Teeproduzenten teilhaben können; über staatseigene Betriebe, über private Firmen, und über 
den direkten Spotmarkt. Neben diesen drei Arten der vertikalen Koordination wurde die 
Bevölkerung zuerst in vier Cluster eingeteilt; 1) Teebauern mit Vertrag mit Staatsbetrieb, 2) 
Teebauern mit Vertrag mit Privatfirma oder Kooperative, 3) Teebauern ohne Vertrag, und 4) 
Nicht-Teebauern. Es wurden circa 40 Stichprobenhaushalte der Cluster 1 und 2 einbezogen; 
von Cluster 3 und 4 wurden mehr Haushalte ausgewählt, da diese als Kontrollgruppe dienen 
sollten. Insgesamt wurden quantitative Daten von 245 landwirtschaftlichen Haushalten 
erhoben, die sowohl demographische Haushaltsdaten als auch Daten über die Teeproduktion 
beinhalteten. Die demographischen Haushaltsdaten basieren auf den LSMS 
Haushaltsbefragungen, die darauf abzielen den Lebensstandard zu messen und zu verstehen. 
Zudem wurden die Einflussfaktoren der Produktionseffizienz und der Beteiligung am 
Vertragsanbau, die mit den sozioökonomischen Haushaltscharakteristika assoziiert sind, 
untersucht. Außerdem wurden quantitative und qualitative Befragungen auf Dorfebene und in 
ausgewählten Teefirmen durchgeführt mit dem Ziel den institutionellen Wandel im Dorf 
sowie die sozialpolitischen Faktoren mit Einfluss auf die Teeproduktion zu verstehen. Die 
gesamte Untersuchung wurde zwischen Juni und November 2007 durchgeführt. 
Für die erste Forschungsfrage wurde die stochastische Produktionsgrenzfunktion angewendet, 
um die mit den sozioökonomischen Haushaltscharakteristika einhergehende technische 
Effizienz abzuschätzen und die Unterschiede zwischen den einzelnen Gruppen zu bestimmen. 
In den Ergebnissen werden hohe Koeffizientenschätzer der partiellen Produktionselastizität in 
Verbindung mit Landfläche und Materialkosten durch die Anwendung der stochastischen 
Grenzproduktionsfunktion abgeleitet. Im Model der technischen Effizienzabschätzung 
werden signifikant höhere Schätzer für die Gruppe mit Vertrag mit Staatsbetrieben durch die 
Awendung nichtparametrischer Tests identifiziert. Diese Beobachtung hängt mit drei 
verschiedenen Haushaltscharakteristika Alter, Ausbildung und Anzahl der 
Einkommensquellen zusammen. Entgegen der Erwartungen hat der Lebensstandard des 
Haushalts keinen positiven Einfluss auf die technische Effizienz. Dieses Ergebnis ruft ein 
Bedenken hervor; es könnte sich eine Auswahlverzerrung ergeben, falls die Teilnahme am 
Vertragsanbau mit den Haushaltscharakteristika zusammenhängt. Um mit dem 
Homogenitätsproblem im Modell umzugehen, wurde ein Behandlungseffektmodell zur 
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Kontrolle der Selektionsverzerrung angewandt, und die technische Effizienz wurde mit 
reduzierter Verzerrungs-Stichprobe abgeschätzt und bestimmt. 
Für die zweite Forschungsfrage wurde das binäre Outcome-Modell gewählt, dass die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit der Teilnahme am Vertragsanbau ergibt. Zehn Variablen aus der 
Haushaltsbefragung wurden für das Modell ausgewählt, die als entscheidend für die 
Teilnahme am Vertragsanbau angesehen werden. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass sechs der zehn 
mit den Haushaltscharakteristika zusammenhängenden und im Modell angewandten 
Variablen einen signifikanten Einfluss auf die Teilnahme am Vertragsanbau haben: 
Durchschnittsalter der Erwachsenen, quadratisches Durchschnittsalter der Erwachsenen, 
Anteil der Erwachsenen mit Mittelschulabschluss, Jahre an Erfahrung im Teeanbau, Jahre der 
Dorfansässigkeit und Anzahl der Mitgliedschaften der Erwachsenen in Organisationen. Die 
Ergebnisse zeigen außerdem, dass mehr ältere Bauern am Vertragsanbau teilnehmen als 
jüngere Bauern. Ein Grund könnte eine niedrigere Risikobereitschaft, die mit dem Anbau und 
der Vermarktung des Tees einhergeht, sein. Es scheint, dass der begrenzte Marktzugang der 
Anbauregion die Entwicklung eigener Vermarktungskanäle selbst für erfahrene Produzenten 
erschwert. Die durch eine längere Dorfansässigkeit entwickelten individuellen sozialen 
Netzwerke und daraus resultierenden individuellen Vermarktungsmöglichkeiten mögen die 
geringere Beteiligung der etablierten Familien am Vertragsanbau erklären. Des Weiteren 
kann angenommen werden, dass die Mitgliedschaft in Organisationen zu einem breiten 
Netzwerk führt, das den Zugang zu Information, auch jene über den Vertragsanbau, 
erleichtert. Zugang zu Information ist einer der Entscheidungsfaktoren für oder gegen den 
Vertraganbau. Jene Bauern, die mehr Information bekommen, sind eher davon überzeugt, am 
Vertragsanbau teilzunehmen. 
Der Einfluss der Teilnahme am Vertragsanbau auf das Einkommen als dritte Forschungsfrage, 
wurde mit Hilfe der Matching Methode bestimmt. Propensity Score Matching wurde 
angewandt um den reduzierten Verzerrungseffekt der Beteiligung am Vertragsanbau auf 
Einkommen und technische Effizienz zu erhalten. Die Schätzung offenbarte einen 
signifikanten Einfluss des Vertragsanbaus auf das Einkommen von ungefähr 900VND pro 
Kopf. Die Schätzer der technischen Effizienz nach dem Matching zeigten einen signifikanten 
Unterschied zwischen den Vertragsanbauern mit Staatsbetrieben und den Nicht-
Vertragsanbauern und einen nicht signifikanten Unterschied zwischen privaten Anbauern und 
Nicht-Vertragsanbauern. Es ist anzunehmen, dass die Staatsbetriebe einen präziseren und 
erfahreneren Beratungsservice und angepasstere technische Hilfe bieten als die privaten 
Firmen, was einen Einfluss auf die technische Effizienz haben kann. Ein signifikanter 
Einfluss der Beteiligung am Vertragsanbau auf die Produktionseffizienz und das 
Haushaltseinkommen konnte nachgewiesen werden. Die empirische Studie zeigt, dass es ein 
  
xi 
 
signifikantes Potential gibt, die Produktionseffizienz und das Einkommen der Haushalte 
durch die Beteiligung am Vertragsanbau zu erhöhen. Jedoch wurden verschiedene politische 
Maßnahmen, die im Zusammenhang mit dem vorliegenden Fallbeispiel stehen, nämlich 
Förderung der Privatisierung, Intensivierung der Teeproduktion und Verbreitung des 
Vertragsanbaus, landesweit auf verschiedenen strategischen Dimensionen durchgeführt. Es 
kann festgestellt werden, dass die Effekte dieser Maßnahmen teilweise einen starken Einfluss 
auf die ländlichen Haushalte hatten, wie die Ausweitung des Anbaugebiets, steigende Zahl 
der privaten Teefirmen und die zunehmende Beteiligung von Teeproduzenten am 
Vertragsanbau, jedoch einige dieser Maßnahmen fehlschlugen. Für die Entwicklung 
spezieller landwirtschaftlicher Sektoren wird deutlich, dass nicht einzelne sondern ein Bündel 
abgestimmter, multi-dimensionaler politischer Maßnahmen nötig ist, um effiziente 
komplementäre Effekte zu erhalten. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Background of the study 
 
1.1.1. Background of marketing system in Vietnam 
 
Since the launch of the “Doi Moi” economic reform, the Vietnamese agricultural sector 
underwent dramatic transformation aimed at boosting growth and efficiency. The evolution 
of its overall economic policy can be categorized into two broad periods. First, in the 1970s, 
the policy focus was on the promotion of the unification of the country.  Second, in the early 
1980s, Vietnam economic policies introduced market-oriented reform such as trade and price 
liberalization to encourage economic efficiency.  However, most of these reforms performed 
below expectations mainly due to the inconsistency in their applications (Cho, 2001). The 
performances of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and collective enterprises were often poor, 
and many critics denounced central planning of agricultural production which ignored market 
conditions and farmer‟s decisions (Dieu, 2006).  
 
In the late 1980s, Vietnam initiated the process of “decollectivization”, market reform, and 
trade liberalization (Minot and Goletti, 2000). The first significant reform in agriculture was 
implemented in 1981 with the introduction of contracts for agricultural commodities between 
agricultural cooperatives and farming households. The terms of the contract system allowed 
farmers to produce determined amount of commodities on publicly-owned agricultural land 
and sell them to cooperatives at a fixed market price. The input materials and extension 
services, such as land preparation and irrigation system, on the other hand, were provided by 
the cooperatives (Cho, 2001). However, the reform reached a limited number of agricultural 
households as contract farming was restricted to farming households that previously worked 
with cooperatives. Although this initial type of contract system was effective in increasing 
yield and income for the participating farmers, it discouraged agricultural production to a 
great extent as it proved disadvantages on many grounds. Those were: high rental prices of 
farm lands, limited rights for farmers to make decisions on land use and crops to be produced, 
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inefficient central planning, untimely input supply, and increased amount of outputs that have 
to be sold to the government. These aspects of the reform negatively impacted the incentives 
which severely impaired agricultural production.   
 
In 1986, the Sixth Party Congress adopted a comprehensive economic reform known as Doi 
Moi. It aimed at bringing about a fundamental change in the economic system by replacing a 
centrally planned economy with a market-oriented economic system. Meanwhile, in the year 
1988, the agricultural sector saw the implementation of the “Resolution No.10” policy that 
reformed and restructured the marketing system, the land tenure system, and lifted the 
institutional restrictions that had been constricting the private sector to participate in 
agricultural markets. For the private sector, it provided more rights to free enterprise similar 
to that of SOEs. 
 
Price liberalization was initiated in order to strengthen the market-based economic system 
through the reform of SOEs that came into play with the implementation of Doi Moi. It 
stimulated private sector‟s investments in profit-making activities. This reform process 
removed state subsidies for SOEs enabling fair competition between SOEs and private firms 
in the market (Mekong Economics, 2002). In addition, foreign direct investments law was 
amended several times to attract foreign investments (CIEM, 2006). In the case of the 
Vietnamese tea sector, these institutional changes paved way to an increase in the number of 
private firms, and foreign investments that stimulated further market competition. In the 
agricultural sector, land reform policy extended the length of agricultural land tenure and 
reduced the tax rate of agricultural land. These reforms introduced a long-term crop 
production plan for households, with free choice over cropping decisions.  
 
Following these comprehensive reforms, Vietnam recorded rapid economic growth in the last 
two decades. Significant progress was observed in agriculture as well. For instance, the 
renovation policy made the country the second largest rice exporter in the world (FAOSTAT 
2011).   
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Despite these massive political and economic changes, Vietnam still faces high poverty levels. 
The average national poverty rate is estimated at 15.5%, with the North West region 
recording the highest at 39.4% (GSO, 2006).  
 
1.1.2. Tea production in the world 
 
Tea (camellia sinensis) is one of the most popular and commonly-consumed beverage in the 
world. It has been cultivated and consumed for 2000 to 3000 years in South East China (Eden, 
1976). Tea is a perennial crop which can be grown in tropical or sub-tropical environments. 
Tea was first consumed in South and South East Asian cultures, and later spread all over the 
world. In the last century, the increasing demand in the European countries has further 
pushed the production in South Asia and some parts of Africa. Figure 1.1 shows the amount 
of tea harvested in the world and in Asia in the last two decades. The total amount of tea 
produced in the world in 2007 was about 4 million tonnes. South Asia represented by India 
and Sri Lanka used to lead the world‟s tea market, but East Asia has remarkably increased its 
production mainly in line with China‟s economic growth. In comparison, South-East Asia, 
headed by Indonesia and Vietnam, has only marginally increased its production.    
 
  
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
4 
 
Figure 1.1 Tea production in the world and in Asia 
 
Source: FAOSTAT, 2011   
 
Figure 1.2 shows the yield (kg/ha) of tea in the world and Asia. Southern Asia shows the 
highest yield compared to the other regions of Asia and the world average. Tea yield varies 
among countries depending on factors like varieties, site condition, climate, soil type, and 
scale of production (den Braber et. al, 2011). Weather plays a vital role in ensuring optimal 
yield (Wijeratne, 1996). The relationship between yield and the temperature in particular has 
been studied by many researchers who revealed that an increase in temperature of up to  
25-26
o
C increases tea yield (Carr and Stephans, 1992, and Wijeratne, 1996).  
 
Figure 1.3 shows tea production and yield in eight major countries in 2007. India and Sri 
Lanka achieved higher yield than China, Vietnam and Indonesia. One of the reasons for 
China‟s low yield could be due to its low temperature relative to Southern and South-East 
Asian countries.  
 
The high yield of South Asian countries could be attributed to the production techniques, 
which vary among countries (den Braber et. al, 2011). For example, Mendis (1992) studied 
tea production in Southern Asia and indicated that tea produced in large-scaled plantations 
obtains higher yield due to the scale of economy, availability of labour and processing units. 
These large-scaled tea plantations in Southern Asia were established over 100 years ago, 
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during the colonial era, for the purpose of exporting tea to United Kingdom (Sivaram, 2000). 
On the other hand, most tea production in Eastern and South-East Asian countries are carried 
at household level (Senapati et.al., 1999). Thus, the type of producing operations seems to 
influence the yield of tea production. 
 
Figure 1.2 Yield of tea in the world and Asia 
 
Source: FAOSTAT (2011) 
 
Figure 1.3 Tea production and yield of eight major countries in 2007 
 
Source: FAOSTAT (2011) 
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1.1.3. Tea production in Vietnam 
 
The North West region, with its mountainous topography and temperate climate, is one of the 
main tea cultivation areas in Vietnam. In 1999, Vietnamese government adopted the 
development plan for tea production for 2005- 2010 (Decision 43/1999 QD-TTg) with the 
aim to increase production, export and create employment in this primary commodity sector. 
Over the last decade, Vietnam became an important supplier of tea in the world market. In 
2007, Vietnam was ranked the 7
th
 biggest exporter of tea accounting for 6.7% of total 
production export in the world (FAOSTAT, 2011).  
 
Boosting tea production is expected to alleviate poverty, especially in the upland tea 
production regions. In these areas, agricultural production is dominated by small scale 
farming systems with limited off-farm income sources. In addition, the promotion of upland 
tea production in northern mountainous areas has its own advantages. Since tea is one of the 
traditional crops of these areas, required initial costs for land preparation might be lower than 
other unfamiliar crops, and existing technical know-how might make production 
intensification easy. Therefore, tea production has a high potential of being stable income 
source for upland regions. Hence, enhancing tea production is expected to have a positive 
impact on livelihood of rural households.  
 
Since tea is a perishable cash crop, its production system requires some degree of vertical 
coordination. For instance, in the production stage, stable and timely inputs supply and access 
to technical advice is crucial for efficient cultivation. In the harvesting stage, timely 
processing is quite important in order to prevent oxidation of plucked tea leaves, thereby 
protecting the quality of the final product. It is also important to ensure organized system of 
grading, labeling and packing of the product to retain the level of quality during the supply. 
In the marketing stage, farmers often prefer to stick to a certain buyer, trader or a contract to 
ensure a good sale and to reduce associated marketing risks. In response to these 
requirements, there is growing awareness for value chain development in the Vietnamese tea 
sector, which has improved the efficiency of supply channel since the implementation of Doi 
Moi (CIEM, 2006).  
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The participation of smallholders in the new agricultural marketing system is an important 
consideration for rural development in the course of Vietnam‟s ongoing economic growth. In 
fact in the North West region, although SOEs used to control marketing and pricing of the 
final products in the tea sector, an increasing number of private companies are creating new 
marketing channels that are encouraging smallholder farmers‟ participation. This is also 
bolstered by government policies such as Decision 80 implemented in 2002, which aims to 
provide incentives to smallholders to participate in contract farming via technical support, 
information dissemination for building awareness and coordination with contract partners 
with the support of provincial Departments of Agriculture and Rural Development (ADB, 
2005).  
Since tea is one of the traditional export commodities which has been contributing 
substantially to the economy of Vietnam (ADB, 2009), Vietnamese government recognizes 
its important role in the country‟s economy. In 2007, tea was ranked the 7th largest export 
commodity of Vietnam, accounting for 2.3% of the country‟s total export value of crops and 
livestock products (FAOSTAT, 2011). Various rural development policies mentioned above 
were implemented to impact tea production and to integrate smallholders into supply chains. 
The various policy tools implemented in Northern uplands have ensured that tea production 
under contract farming holds strong potential for intensifying production and broadening 
marketing opportunities for smallholders. Therefore, the aforementioned reasons form the 
basis for the assumption that the development of contract farming promises improved 
livelihood of agricultural households in the poorest region of Vietnam. 
 
1.2. Objectives of the study 
 
The overall objective of this study is to investigate the contribution and importance of income 
from tea production for the livelihood of poor smallholder farmers in North West Vietnam. 
Considering the importance of vertical relationships in the production of perishable 
agricultural commodities, the main focus of the study is to investigate the degree of 
involvement of smallholders in integrated agro-food channels and evaluate its impact on their 
livelihood. 
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In the North West region, the first agricultural reform in the late 1980‟s initiated contract 
arrangement between farmers and processors or traders in the tea sector restricted only to 
plantation workers. In the 1990s, due to the expansion of the private sector, contract 
arrangement included private firms and any tea producer in the region. Therefore, the study 
considers contract farming as a new institutional arrangement introduced in the course of the 
development of agro-food system and investigates the effect of incentives on production and 
income of resource poor farmers in North West Vietnam.  
 
Three main research questions are investigated: 
1. Does contract farming lead to greater production efficiency compared to non-contract 
farming?  
2. What are the differences in socio-economic characteristics of contract and non-
contract farmers?  
3. What is the impact of contract participation on farm household income?  
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2. CONTRACT FARMING 
 
This chapter provides an overview of contract farming, including a review of contract 
evolution and a review of different typologies and arrangements of contract farming in the 
context of agriculture in developing countries. The study attempts to define contract farming, 
and trace its history and emergence. The onset of contract farming can be attributed to the 
production and marketing benefits it yields that can be explained in the context of the study 
of new institutional economics. In addition, contract enforcement mechanism is reviewed by 
referring to the different relationships that exist between firms and farmers.  And finally, the 
present study refers to how the contract theory can explain the existence of contract farming 
in tea sector. 
 
2.1. Definition of contract farming 
 
Contract farming is an organizational or institutional arrangement, which enables especially 
smallholders to access input and output markets. For C. Eaton, and A. Shepherd (2001), 
contract farming can be defined as: “An arrangement between farmers and processing and/or 
marketing firms for the production and supply of agricultural products under forward 
agreements, frequently at predetermined prices.” 
Therefore, contract farming refers to an arrangement and commitment between producers and 
processors to provide inputs and outputs with pre-agreed price, time, quality and quantity. 
Contract farming is applied especially for the perishable agricultural commodities that need 
to be processed, such as vegetables, fruits and dairy (Bijman, 2008). Its applicability and 
necessity as a rural development tool has been recognized and discussed in many empirical 
studies in the context of its role of linking producers with agricultural markets, especially in 
developing countries.  
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2.2. Evolution of contract farming 
 
In neo-classical economics, institutions and organizations play practically no role as standard 
economic assumptions such as the existence of complete set of markets, full and perfect 
information hold. However, since contract farming often emerges as a response to missing 
markets (Key and Runsten, 1999), it has been analyzed in the framework of the new 
institutional economics, which focuses on problems caused by imperfect information and 
other market failures (Kirsten, et al., 2009). Therefore, this study investigates contract 
farming in relation to the framework of the new institutional economics. 
 
The reasons for the limited or failure of farmer‟s participation in trading or market can be 
attributed to various constraints associated with high transaction costs, imperfect information, 
and uncertainty. These aspects form the core issues address by the new institutional 
economics framework. Thus, it is appropriate to apply the theory of new institutional 
economics to investigate and understand the logic behind the economic institutions and 
arrangements such as contract faming, since it is perceived as one of the responses to market 
imperfections.  
 
2.3. Advantages of contract farming 
 
There are strategic advantages in participating in a contract. Contract farming draws in on a 
combination of benefits of the plantation system (such as strict quality control, close 
coordination of interdependent stages in production and marketing) and smallholder 
production system (such as superior incentives and equity considerations) (Glover, 1987, and 
Williams and Karen, 1985). According to Simmons (2002), there are mainly four areas of 
strategic advantages that allow cost savings for smallholders participating in a contract: 
 
1. Smallholders may have access to product markets where high transaction costs 
effectively prevent their access. 
2. Smallholders may have access to relatively inexpensive credit where, for a range of 
reasons, smallholders face high interest rates or have no access. 
3. Contract farming may provide services for managing on-farm risk. 
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4. Contract farming may provide information on extension, logistics and marketing at 
relatively low cost.  
 
To better understand the theoretical background and the existence of contract farming, one 
needs to look into the constraints that smallholders face. 
 
2.3.1. Reducing transaction costs 
 
Transaction costs are an important element in the course of analysis of market institutions, 
which is a central component of the study of organizations. A number of studies have pointed 
out that high transaction costs discourage smallholders to participate in markets. When both 
farmers and firms face high transaction costs market functioning is impaired; moreover, 
transaction costs have an adverse impact on activities like searching, negotiating, monitoring 
and enforcing in contract farming, thus affecting the exchange and flow of commodities. In 
addition, transaction costs raise the prices of inputs and reduce profits from the sale of output 
by lowering its price (Ouma et al., 2010). One of the advantages of the participation of both 
parties in contract farming is that the transaction costs are minimized, thus enabling economic 
efficiency. Firms in particular, while choosing their management style, must consider the 
factors that are associated with transaction costs given as follows (Silva, 2005, Hobbs, 1996).  
 
There are three factors contributing to transaction costs: 
1. bounded rationality  
2. opportunism  
3. and asset specificity 
 
The first two aspects are based on behavioral assumption, a theory on which transaction cost 
analysis relies on, making this approach different from the neo-classical approach 
(Williamson, 1981). Asset specificity can originate from site specificity, physical asset 
specificity, human capital specificity, and time specificity (Williamson, 1981, Silva, 2005). In 
tea production, sunk costs associated with high initial costs which are driven by commodity 
characteristics like perishability and dependency on time specific processing, heighten their 
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asset specificity. Thus, commodities with a higher degree of asset specificity require an 
involvement in vertical coordination to reduce costs and risks. 
 
Key et al. (2000) categorize transaction costs into fixed and variable transaction costs, 
whereas the former include the costs associated with market action. Fixed transaction costs 
do not vary with the size of the transaction whereas variable costs do. Fixed transaction costs 
include costs associated with searching sellers or markets, costs for negotiating and 
bargaining, and costs for screening, enforcing and supervising (Key et al., 2000). Also in tea 
production, fixed costs emerge when producers decide in which market to participate, or to 
whom they wish to sell their products. Those who participate in a contract would face 
relatively less fixed transaction costs than the non-contracted producers because of their 
secure marketing channel. 
 
Goetz (1992) examined the Senegalese food marketing behavior of both sellers and buyers, 
and revealed that high fixed transaction costs prevent farmers from participating in the coarse 
grain market. The study included the variables associated with transportation, distance to the 
market, and household characteristics assumed to affect market participation in the form of 
fixed transaction costs. Renkow et al. (2004) estimated the size of fixed transaction costs 
using household survey data of Kenyan maize farmers. They developed a framework of 
estimating the size and determinants of fixed transaction cost which includes costs for 
searching markets, bargaining, screening and monitoring of transactions, and those are 
invariant to the quantity of the amount exchanged. Their analysis throws light on the 
magnitude of transaction costs, associated with variables such as mode of transportation and 
distance to the market. Their results empirically prove that transaction costs act as deterrents 
to market participation of agricultural households.  
 
However, the final assumption underlying transaction cost economics is that, even though 
important dimensions of transaction costs can be identified and measured, and although each 
of these transactions is distinct (Macher and Richman, 2006), it is difficult to define and 
empirically measure transaction costs, as they are often associated with endogeneity bias of 
influential variables (Kirsten et al., 2009). Hence, transaction costs could not be measured in 
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the present survey. However, variables such as distance of transportation, which influence 
fixed transaction costs, were measured in order to investigate the determinants of production 
efficiency and contract participation.   
 
2.3.2. Reducing production and marketing risks 
 
Contracting is one way to divide risks associated with production and marketing between the 
firm and the producer (Glover, 1984), by offsetting deficiencies in each other. The players in 
each level who are involved in contract farming try to increase their economic efficiency by 
sharing risks in supply chains. Agricultural risks are associated with negative outcomes 
derived from predictable and measurable biological, climatic, and price variables (The World 
Bank, 2005). They are a source of uncertainty for agricultural producers. The level of 
uncertainty rises with human behavior which is influenced by opportunism and bounded 
rationality, leading to differences between firms and farmers. Firms face uncertainty in 
procuring the necessary amount of raw material at the right time, in farmers violating 
agreements, and in the limitations they face in monitoring farmers‟ work effort; whereby 
firms sometimes incur ethical dilemmas.  
 
Furthermore, imperfect or asymmetric information results in problems pertaining to product 
information. For example, in the absence of sophisticated test techniques or the lack of 
official inspections, firms may run the risk of farmers showing the best quality products on 
top while hiding under them poorly-harvested products (Grosh, 1994). This typical problem 
of information asymmetry leads to inefficient function of markets (Akerlof, 1984, Grosh, 
1994). On the other hand, contracts based on social networks, which depend on the reputation 
of both the firms and farmers result in long-term relationships and therefore may reduce 
opportunism of producers and help raise efficient resource allocation (Williamson, 1979). It 
is more rational for the producer to secure future market opportunities instead of engaging in 
opportunistic behavior (Grosh, 1994). And, efficiencies are often gained more accurately by 
sharing information between parties in the chain (Gray and Boehlje, 2005). 
 
In agricultural supply chain, both firms and farmers face the production risk of crop failure 
caused by climate factors or farmer‟s socio-economic factors. Furthermore, uncertainties 
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around availability of inputs, overuse of chemicals due to lack of experience and knowledge, 
and unaffordable costs of inputs, mechanized equipment and transportation add to production 
risks faced by farmers. Farmers are also vulnerable to marketing risks such as price 
fluctuations and market accessibility 
  
Producers also face various kinds of institutional and price risks along with production and 
marketing risks such as changes in governmental laws and regulation, decreasing yields, and 
price of output. The research on supply chain risk sharing in agriculture has often been 
focused on the impact on producers (Gray and Boehlje, 2005). Gray and Boehlje (2005) 
explain the relation between the ability to manage risk and transaction costs while 
differentiating between internal and external transaction costs (figure 2.1). Internal 
transaction costs are associated with agency and influence costs increased production risks 
and employee risks. External transaction costs are associated with producer‟s moral hazard 
(shirking behavior) which is the result from misalignment of incentives and producer‟s risk 
averse (adverse selection) nature. 
 
Figure 2.1 Conceptual framework for external transaction costs of risk sharing versus 
internal transaction costs of vertical relationship 
 
Source: Gray and Boehlje 2005 
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In figure 2.1, the external transaction costs line represents the additional risk sharing costs 
which are borne by processors. These costs increase when processors interact with producers 
who are more risk averse or less capable of managing risks. Internal costs are assumed to be 
higher than external costs, and they will not change relative to producer risk aversion because 
only the risk sharing transaction costs of market-based exchange increase. The participation 
of market exchange of producers varies depending on the degree of risk management 
capability or preference of producers. Risk takers or those who are capable of managing risk 
might choose spot market-based exchange. Those who are risk averse or less capable of 
managing risks would prefer to participate in a tighter and vertically integrated chain where 
the channel partner absorbs most of the risk and a larger share of overall return.  Since 
contract farming often provides services to manage on-farm risk, it is advantageous for risk-
averse poor smallholder farmers to seek vertical integration through engaging in contract 
farming so that they can diversify their risk. 
 
2.4. Contract enforcement 
 
Contract enforcement is often an issue in contract farming because contracts are seldom 
legally enforceable in practice (Grosh, 1994). Since smallholders have a weak or no voice 
against contracted firms, particularly state-owned enterprises, it is nearly impossible for them 
to assert their rights to force obligations on firms. This kind of situation occurs especially in 
countries where political instability and lack of institutional settings prevails. In the case of 
tea production, for instance, contract breach can occur at the stage of product delivery. Firms 
or farmers must arrange suitable transportation for the delivery of products. This is an 
important factor for timely processing of qualified products. Often farmers fail to meet 
product quality standards and delivery timelines, which lead to breaching of the contract. In 
addition, contract breach can occur at the stage of sale of output due to opportunistic pricing 
behavior of producers. Producers in such a scenario sell their product to other traders or at the 
spot market which may offer a higher price than the contract‟s pre-agreed price. These 
enforcement issues often arise in countries with weak economic governance systems. Such 
cases require incentive-compatible self-enforcement institutions (Gabre-Madhin, 2009). 
Without enforcement, it mostly results in corruption of the contract system and leads to 
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significant losses for both producers and firms. Hence, contracting can be successful in 
countries where enforcement costs are low and are supported by a functioning legal system or 
in the case of a monopolistic processing firm (Key and Runsten, 1999).  
 
There are several ways to overcome contract enforcement issues for smallholders. Coulter et 
al. (1999) discussed effective mechanisms that could possibly resolve the contract default 
problem by, for example, lending through groups, promoting good communication and close 
monitoring. Contracting through groups by forming farmer‟s associations is one of the 
important strategies for the rural poor in Vietnam (M4P, 2006) to exploit economies of scale 
or to raise selling power in product sales. Establishing close relationship with producers is 
based on social and relation-specific incentives. For example, “reputation mechanism” 
(MacLeod 2007, and Bijman, 2008) works for producers to keep the expected future benefits 
of contracts for themselves and prevents foreclosing of future trade with other buyers. In 
addition, more services will attract producers as they offer more benefits and can increase 
trust between firm and producer. Providing incentives to producers is also important to 
maintain contracts. For example, rewarding good behavior of producers or threatening to 
punish their bad behavior (Key and Runsten, 1999). Cooperation with the buyer is one way to 
tighten the producers at products sales, which can reduce the risk faced by firms in the 
procurement of raw material.  
 
Although there are institutional systems working towards legal contract enforcement, 
Fafchamps and Minten (1999) found that trust-based relationships play a dominant role in 
contract enforcement mechanisms in Malagasy grain market. Trust is established primarily 
through repeated interaction with other traders providing referrals. However, Fafchamps and 
Minten could not clarify the reason for trader‟s little use of justice system in contract 
enforcement. They only assumed that legal costs are more problematic for traders than legal 
risk such as non-payment. 
 
Gabre-Madhin (2009) developed a typology of contract enforcement based on two 
parameters which determine the degree of private and public enforcement and attempts to 
capture the specificities of the products and market (figure 2.2). The parameters are: the 
availability and ease of obtaining information about market behavior, and the extent to which 
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market actors are willing to engage in collective action (collective sanction/ punishment). 
This typology of contract enforcement will help to understand the difference in degree of 
contract enforcement between SOE and private firms in Moc Chau tea sector. Exchange 
based on trust only takes place among agents who have formal and long-lasting relationships 
(Fafchamps 2004). This type of contract-enforcement mechanism is often observed in small 
scaled private firms who newly participate in Moc Chau tea production. But in the case of 
SOE where information about cheaters can be more easily transmitted (Gabre-Madhin2009), 
multilateral punishment strategy based on reputation (Greif 1993) prevails in contract 
enforcement. In this type of enforcement, network-based exchange may dominate in markets 
where market actors are willing to collectively sanction or punish the cheater.  
 
Figure 2.2 Typology of contract enforcement 
 
Source: Gabre-Madhin (2009) 
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detailed description of contract arrangement and vertical coordination of our study are 
discussed in chapter 4. 
 
Minot (1986) classified contracts into three types, namely Market Specification Contract, 
Resource Providing Contract and Production Management Contract.  
Market Specification Contract is a pre-harvest agreement where firms often provide 
information on demand on price, timing, location and form of products. Sale of products is 
the main focus of this type of contract where the firms often specify quality, price and timing 
of products (Runsten and Key, 1996). 
 
Resource Providing Contract mandates firms to provide production inputs partly to producers, 
under the agreement of procurement of products with pre-agreed price. Inputs are often 
supplied on credit, and their values are subtracted from crop sales. This type of contract is 
often applied to situations with substantial purchased input requirements and a long 
production cycle.  
 
Production Management Contract restricts the producer to follow specific production 
methods or an input regime planned by firms, under the marketing agreement of producers or 
resource provision of firms.  
 
According to the classification by Minot, our cases of contract farming applied by private 
firm, cooperative, and one part of SOE which we define as SOE II in chapter 4, are classified 
as Resource Providing Contract. On the other hand, contract farming managed by the other 
part of SOE which we define as SOE I in chapter 4, is mainly similar to Production 
Management Contract under resource provision of firms.  
 
Singh (2002) suggests modifications to the three types of contracts;  
1. procurement contract wherein only sale and purchase conditions are specified 
by firms  
2. partial contract where some of the inputs are supplied by firms and products 
are bought at pre-agreed prices, and  
3. total contract wherein firms supply and manage all the inputs and farmers 
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become no more than suppliers of land and labor.  
 
These types are not mutually exclusive, and its relevance and appropriateness varies from 
product to product (Singh, 2002, and Key and Runsten, 1999).  
 
Furthermore, Eaton and Shepherd (2001) classify contract farming into five models.  
 
The centralized model is one of the classic types of contract farming with tight arrangement 
and strict quality control and quantity determined at the beginning of the production. This 
type of contract is often applied to products that need a high degree of processing, like tree 
crop, to ensure large economies of scale in the processing stage. It is also called “outgrower 
scheme”. 
 
The nucleus model is a variation of the centralized model: contractors own the production 
facilities and manage an estate plantation located closely to the processing plant. Contractors 
are often state-owned farmers, and the arrangement in this model commonly includes a 
period of demonstration or trial followed by firms introducing technology and management 
techniques to growers. 
 
The multipartite model normally involves a joint venture between a statutory body and 
private firms, and might have separate organizations responsible for credit provision, 
production, management, processing and marketing. Although the arrangement is 
characterized by poor management due to lack of economic interest or knowledge leading the 
contractor into difficulties, there are significant advantages that come with this model, as in 
sharing of marketing risks and the firm‟s costs in dealing with individual farmers.  
 
The informal model is applied to individual entrepreneurs or small companies who normally 
enter into simple, informal production contracts with farmers on a seasonal basis, particularly 
for crops such as vegetables, watermelons and tropical fruits. These crops normally require 
minimum processing, and material inputs are often limited to the provision of seeds and basic 
fertilizers, and technical advice for grading and quality control. This model is the most 
transient and speculative among the five models, with risks of contract default by both firms 
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and farmers. Hence, if the support services are rendered by governmental agencies, it will 
result in an increase of informal initiatives and thereby encourage contract enforcement.  
 
The intermediate model includes traders or collectors between producers and processing firm 
who have their own informal arrangement with farmers. This type of contract is quite 
common in Southeast Asia. The model comes with strong disadvantages mainly due to the 
company‟s weak control over intermediaries, which results in either lower commodity price 
received by farmers or lower quality of products received by the company.  
 
This detailed classification by Eaton and Shepherd provides a clearer view of models of 
existing contract farming. In our case, SOE I is partly similar to the nucleus model since its 
production takes place close to the processing plant, and producers used to be state-owned 
farmers in the past. The other three contract farming types applied by private, cooperative and 
SOE II can be classified into the informal model due to their limited provision of material 
inputs and simple and informal contracts.  
 
Although production takes place in the same area with the same commodity, we can find two 
different types of contract farming in Moc Chau tea production within the categorizations of 
existing studies. An interesting finding is that the informal model described by Eaton and 
Shepherd can be the case for contract applied by private, cooperative and SOE II in our study, 
which is often provided for seasonal crops such as vegetables. Although tea is not a seasonal 
product, this type of contract emerges perhaps due to the fact that tea is a perishable crop, 
similar to vegetables. Yet, since it was noted that this type of contract is most transient and 
speculative with a high risk of contract default by both firms and farmers,  the informal 
model contract might not suitable for tea production. A Contract which provides tight 
arrangements such as the centralized model might be more reasonable for tea production, 
since tea requires a high degree of processing to ensure large economies of scale, and tea 
production is not seasonal but a year- round activity.  
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2.6. Vertical coordination and institutional arrangements in tea sector 
 
In this section, the studies of vertical coordination and institutional arrangement in tea sector 
are reviewed to provide the backdrop for a better understanding of existing contract farming 
in tea production. We first draw characteristics of tea production, which are assumed to be 
the important factors involved in vertical coordination. Later, we look at studies which refer 
to vertical coordination and institutional arrangement in tea production. 
Tea is a tree crop with an estimated economic life of about 40 to 60 years. It requires a long 
time to mature before harvesting (Eden, 1976, and Minot, 1986). Tea can be harvested four to 
five years after planting, and during that time it requires continuous investment of inputs and 
labour. The process of tea harvesting requires certain skills and timing for plucking the right 
leaves in order to obtain high quality tea (Minot, 1986). Due to its high perishability, tea 
needs to be immediately processed; preferably in large processing facilities to ensure 
economies of scale. Because of its commodity characteristic, tea production necessitates 
vertical coordination. This is because smallholders have to bear initial investments associated 
with the non-harvest period, where they often need input provision in advance from the 
contract suppliers. In addition, integrated large-scaled processing management is preferred to 
enable efficient processing operation. Therefore, the initial stages of tea production often 
involve tightly aligned coordination such as plantation production system or outgrowers 
scheme which refers to production with tight arrangement and strict quality controlby firms 
(Glover and Kunsterer, 1990, and Baumann, 2000).  
 
Establishing vertical arrangement in tea production requires institutional intervention in 
pricing and legal enforcement of contract. 
 
The case study by Chirwa and Kydd (2009) about the institutional changes and its driving 
forces associated with socio-political factors in the Malawian tea sector is one example. It 
addresses the history of Malawian tea sector starting from the establishment of Smallholder 
Tea Authority (STA), which was initially funded by the government and which provides 
services to smallholders. Along with the expansion of production, there was a need for the 
establishment of a wider scaled organization to facilitate tea processing. After the 
establishment of a joint venture estate, financial instability caused by inefficient management 
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together with political confusion in the country resulted in the corruption of the whole system. 
According to their study, contract enforcement of state enterprise is the biggest issue, since 
the state did not draw up a legally written enforceable contract. Producers lost trust in the 
state enterprise, and alternative institutional arrangements emerged under the initiative of 
elite producers while the state enterprise was being restructured by the government. In the 
end, there are three ways for smallholders through which they can be integrated into vertical 
coordination: 
1. Through a state enterprise,  
2. through a commercial enterprise,  
3. through a farmer‟s association  
Corruption of the state enterprise system started gradually due to its disruption from different 
dimensions at the same time. At the farm level, corruption starts due to the delay in delivery 
service and payments which causes fatal damage to tea leaves and livelihood of farmers. 
These failures in contract enforcement occur due to negative events at the management and 
political level. State failure in tea sector led to the growing need for producers to change 
vertical coordination both in terms of their decision making and establishment of alternative 
processing organizations. This case study of Malawian tea sector by Chirwa and Kydd (2009) 
indicates the importance of functioning legal systems and institutional settings to enable 
contract enforcement at both levels of enterprises and producers. 
 
Herath and Weersink (2009) investigate the role of policy in Sri Lankan tea sector, in the 
transition from vertically integrated plantation system (complete management of production 
and land by firms with hired labor) to independent traders‟ purchases from individual 
producers. They revealed three cost factors affecting this change; transaction, production and 
management costs. Transaction costs are reduced due to the decrease of uncertainty 
associated with final products pricing which is guaranteed by policy intervention. Production 
costs, which are dominated by labour cost, are raised especially in accordance with the 
plantation type. This is due to the fact that after the establishment of labour unions plantation 
farmers have gradually obtained a stronger voice for insisting on labour rights instead of 
being exploited with low wage rates. The management costs for plantations have increased 
for larger and integrated production schemes because of the complexity of supervisory tasks 
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and the greater risk of shirking (work). The investigation by Herath and Weersink (2009) is 
based on the plantation type of production. Production in plantations was dominant before the 
economic reforms took place in Vietnam. However, after the economic reform, this type of 
production decreased because the nationwide decentralization of state-owned enterprises 
gave farmers no chance to enhance their power.  
 
We found that tea requires vertical coordination in its production due to its special 
characteristics like perishability, requirement of processing and long non-harvest periods. 
Production often starts either in large scale plantation production or in outgrower scheme 
with tight production and management control, or small scale individual tea production 
contracted with state owned enterprises. To make these arrangements work, a functioning 
legal system play an important role for reducing transaction costs, pricing and contract 
enforcement. This draws implications for the importance of a legal pricing system and an 
institutional contract enforcement mechanism of the Vietnamese tea sector. For example, the 
tea price of SOE is defined once a year by VINATEA which is the national representative of 
SOE of tea, and its pricing mechanism is non-public. This price is disseminated to all tea 
SOEs in the country, and farmers contracted with SOE need to accept this price even if the 
market tea price is higher. Furthermore, there are no existing legal contract enforcement 
supports or services for private firms or cooperatives. In any case of contract default, it is 
difficult for both firms and farmers to deal with worst case scenario such as failure in 
procurements or sales of tea leaves.  
 
2.7. Summary 
 
This chapter attempts to provide the theoretical understanding of evolution of contract 
farming in Moc Chau tea sector. Figure 2.3 summarizes underlying economic aspects in the 
evolution of contract farming in Moc Chau which we discussed in this chapter. There are 
high fixed transaction costs in tea production such as market searching and screening, high 
production risks due to crop failure or long non-harvest periods, high marketing risks due to 
the geographical difficulties or uncertainty in trading, and high asset specificity characterized 
by the perishability of tea. Those economic constrains of tea production are the motives of 
emergence of contract farming in Moc Chau tea sector. Thus, the evolution of contract 
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farming in Moc Chau and the phenomenon of contract enforcement mechanisms can be 
explained in the context of new institutional economics. Attributes of farmers such as 
opportunistic, risk averse, and moral hazard in contract farming lead the incidence of 
different mechanisms of contract enforcement and types of contract arrangements.  
 
In contract enforcement, as Gabre-Madhin (2009) noted, the relationship between firm and 
farmer is a considerable factor to decide on the degree of contract enforcement when the 
firm‟s accessibility of information on farmer‟s behavior is given. A trust based relationship 
which is the case for contracts by privates and cooperatives, does not involve strong 
collective sanction in the case of contract default. On the other hand, SOE applies a 
multilateral punishment strategy with more given information of producers. As a result, there 
are some considerable differences in contract enforcement between SOE and others, which 
may affect actions in contract default.   
According to the studies on typologies of contract farming, we find that the informal contract 
model (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001) or resource providing contract (Minot, 1986) is wide 
spread in Moc Chau tea production. However, SOE applies a different type of model which 
involves a tighter arrangement with the centralized management.  
Eaton and Shepherd (2001) point out the informal model bears the highest risks of contract 
default due to the limited production management in input provision and technical advice. 
When looking at contract enforcement mechanisms in Moc Chau tea production, it can be 
summarized that trust based informal contracts are widely applied. Those contracts provide 
minimum production management by firms and their degree of collective sanction is weak. 
On the other hand, the centralized model with a tighter contract arrangement is applied in the 
cases of SOE under the contract enforcement of multilateral punishment strategy based on 
reputation with collective sanction or punishment in contract default.  
 
In the last section, studies of vertical coordination and institutional arrangement in tea 
production are reviewed. Those reviews aim to understand the backdrop of the evolution of 
contract farming especially in tea production, and investigate the role of institutions in tea 
production. 
The existence of vertical coordination in tea production can be explained by the commodity 
characteristics of the tea plant, such as high perishability, requirement of processing, and high 
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initial costs which are not bearable for small scaled farmers. Therefore, as Glover and 
Kunsterer (1990), and Baumann (2000) noted, the initial stages of tea production often 
involve tightly aligned coordination with tight arrangements and strict quality control by 
firms. This also holds true for Moc Chau tea production, since tea production in that area 
started from a vertically integrated plantation system (which is with complete management of 
production and land by firms with hired labor) under SOE, and gradually has increased the 
number of individual tea producers after the economic reform.  However, the study of Herath 
and Weersink (2009) revealed that the production costs associated with labor and 
management increased in the transition of the production scheme from plantation system to 
individual production in Sri Lanka‟s tea sector. This implies the possibility of higher costs in 
management of private firm and cooperatives compared to SOE in Moc Chau tea production. 
Furthermore, their empirical study revealed that policy intervention plays an important role 
for reducing transaction costs associated with pricing final products. Similarly, Chirwa and 
Kydd (2009) pointed out an importance of functioning legal system to ensure contract 
enforcement in Malawian tea sector. 
 
Figure 2.3 Underlying economic aspects in the evolution of contract farming in Moc 
Chau tea sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adopted from Key and Runsten, 1999, Silva, 2005, Hobbs, 1996, Williamson, 
1981,Glover, 1984, Gray and Boehlje, 2005, and Ray,1998. 
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
3.1. Tea production in the research area   
 
Over the last decade, Vietnam became an important supplier of tea in the world market, and 
production has increased significantly (Figure 3.1). In 2007, Vietnam was the 6
th
 largest tea 
producer in the world in both quantity and value base (FAOSTAT 2011), with a major chunk 
of its production coming from the areas of Northern midlands and mountain areas, North 
central and central highlands (Figure 3.2). Development history varies across the regions in 
the Northern mountainous areas where tea has been grown and consumed as a native plant, 
and after 1975, it was planted in central highlands with the support of former Soviet Union 
(MPI, 2006).  
 
Figure 3.1 Tea production and area harvested with tea in Vietnam 
 
Source: FAOSTAT(2011) 
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Figure 3.2 Areas under tea production in Vietnam in 2002 
 
Source: Agrifood Consulting International 2004  
 
The North West region is one of the tea growing areas of Vietnam. Tea is a native plant of the 
region, and has been grown and consumed for many years. One of the major varieties grown 
in the region called Shan Tuyet thrives in the climatic condition and mountainous topography 
of the North West region (MPI, 2006). According to our qualitative interviews, Shan Tuyet 
variety is popular with the Vietnamese consumers and has represented the North West region 
as a high quality tea production area for a long time. In addition, North West region is heavily 
populated by ethnic minorities, who are potentially targeted for reducing poverty and 
minimizing the income gap between the urban and the rural populations. 
 
Various policy measures implemented with respect to tea production are expected to reduce 
the income difference between the Kinh and the ethnic minorities (MPI, 2006). This is 
because tea is predominantly cultivated by rural poor farmers including a large proportion of 
ethnic minorities. In addition, tea production in Vietnam is led by smallholders whose land 
area on an average is less than one (1) hectare (ha). The comparative advantages of 
smallholders relative to large scaled commercial farms lies in their low transaction costs of 
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family labour (Poulton et al., 2005, 2010,  Gebremeghin et al., 2009). These transaction costs 
pertain to monitoring labour, supervision, motivation, and local knowledge. Tea production is 
known for its labour intensiveness (Sivaram, 2000), especially at the stage of plucking which 
is a year round activity and needs skilled labour for high-quality production (Minot, 1986). In 
addition, the availability of low cost labour in Vietnam is one of the comparative advantages 
of the country. These characteristics associated with tea production especially in terms of its 
labour requirement and the advantages the size of Vietnam‟s population renders are the 
motivating factors for this crop to be chosen for the current case study. 
 
What encourages farmers to engage in tea production? Figure 3.3 and figure 3.4 show 
qualitative questions to our sample households asking about the reasons for engaging in tea 
production. 77% of farmers enjoy tea production because of its stable price. In this 
assessment, the distinction between guaranteed stable price through contract and the price 
stability of tea itself compared to other crops could not be clearly ascertained. However, 10% 
of producers recognize the profitability of tea production relative to producing other crops. 
Provision of timely inputs is not only an important reason in selecting crops but also in 
selecting contacts for those who have poor access to markets. Among non-tea farmers, nearly 
50% state the issue of lack of cultivable land as their reason for not engaging in tea 
production.  
 
After the latest land reform in 2003, liquidity of land market in Moc Chau rose except for the 
areas located in steep hills. Now the possibility of land use in mountainous regions might 
influence producers in considering expansion into these areas. 27% of non-tea farmers face 
non-availability of labour which is a fundamental problem in producing tea since it requires 
year round harvest. Since tea cultivation is not seasonal in nature peasant households do not 
face difficulties over their subsistence (Otsuka et al., 1992). Furthermore, it is difficult 
participating in tea production while cultivating another crop on the side since it is not 
possible for farmers heavily engaged in other crop production to allocate their family labour 
into tea production. 4% of non-tea farmers cite lack of access to credit for not participating in 
tea production. Access to credit for tea production is important because of high initial costs 
due to long vegetation period for enabling harvest, and as a cash crop, it often requires 
intensive input regime (Key and Runsten, 1999) relative to that of traditional crops. Although 
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physical access to credit in the region is not constrained, other deterrents like high interest 
rate, prolongation of payment and limited payback period, make it all the more difficult to 
start producing tea for smallholders. Hence, most of the contract arrangements in Moc Chau 
include initial support for beginning tea production in terms of providing free seeds, inputs 
subsidies, and free extension supply.  
 
Figure 3.3 Reasons for engaging in tea production (N=163) 
 
Source: Own data 
 
Figure 3.4 Reasons for not engaging in tea production (N=75) 
 
Source: Own data 
 
In line with the economic development of the country, several specific policies for enhancing 
tea production have been implemented following two important legislations.  One was the 
law of Private Enterprise (promulgated in 1990), and the Enterprise Law (enacted in 1999 
and 2005) that encouraged private sector‟s participation in the market. The other was the 
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Prime Minister‟s decision of Tea Development Plan for 2005-2010 (Decision 43/1999/QD-
TTg) formulated in 1999 for the purpose of increasing production, productivity, exports and 
creating job opportunities. As it can be seen in Figure 3.1, area under tea cultivation in the 
country dramatically increased after 1999. This increase in production was supported by 
direct investment by the government in transport infrastructures, construction of processing 
units in rural mountainous regions, and technology transfer of new high-yield varieties. The 
government also provided political support, widely initiated by private firms that contributed 
in stimulating the market in both pricing and quality of tea.  
 
3.2. Description of the research area 
 
Moc Chau district, located in Son La province of the North West region, is about 195km far 
from Hanoi with an area of about 3200 ha under tea cultivation (2007) (figure 3.5). It is 
located about 950m above sea level, and the tropical monsoon climate is characterized by 
cool winters and summers with light rain. Moc Chau consists of two towns including a 
district capital Moc Chau town, and 29 communes. It is 36 km away from the border of Laos. 
Since the province is less than 200km from the capital city of Hanoi, and has sixth national 
road going across the region, there is access to bigger cities despite its mountainous location. 
The district‟s total area of 205,530 ha is mainly devoted to agricultural production, which 
accounts for 42% of its GDP (2006). The GDP per capita in the year 2006 was on an average 
4.95 million VND. The population of 147,000 consists of seven different ethnic minorities: 
Thai, Muong, H‟mong, Kinh, Dao, Sinh Mun and Kho Mu. 85% and 72% of the population 
are supplied with electricity and sanitary water respectively.   
 
Tea is one of the major agricultural products in Moc Chau. Hence, both central and local 
governments have initiated technological development and institutional arrangements 
especially to encourage private sector investments to enhance production in the region after 
Doi Moi. The condition of soil, especially which is under active production, is characterized 
by red and yellow humus on limestone which is most suitable for tea production in terms of 
water drainage. Moc Chau is blessed with natural conditions that are necessary for growing 
tea such as soil, rainfall and temperature. Thus, tea production supported by comparative 
advantage of natural conditions and the natives‟ deep rooted specialization in its cultivation is 
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expected to alleviate poverty through creating job opportunities and enhancing production 
with the help of the local government and existing tea firms. In Moc Chau, 13 communes out 
of 31 (two towns and 29 communes) are growing tea. Four communes are traditionally 
growing tea.  Not only in these areas, but tea production has been introduced and adopted in 
other areas for income generation supported by new private firms across communes. Table 
3.1 shows planted area of tea and number of tea companies in Moc Chau in 2007.  
 
Table 3.1 Tea production in Moc Chau in 2007 
Commune
a)
 
units 
Planted area: ha Number of tea companies 
 (planted with Shan Tuyet) State-owned  Private/ Cooperative 
Moc Chau town 974 (740) 1 1 
Chieng Son 280 (270) 0 1 
To Mua 489 (484) 1 0 
Chieng Khoa 243 (243) 1 0 
Phieng Luong 193 (190)  0 2 
Tan Lap 321 (113) 0 1 
Van Ho 328 (215) 1 1 
Long Luong 49 (49) 0 1 
Xuan Nha 13 (13) 0 1 
Suoi Bang 3 (3) 0 1 
Chieng Yen 166 (166) 0 1 
Dong Sang 18 (18) 0 1 
Cho Long 71 0 1 
Total in whole 
province 3,159 (2515) 1(HQ
b)
)/3(Branch offices) 12 
a)
 Commune is the administrative level below district. 
b)
 Abbreviation of Head Quarters. 
Source: Interview with provincial office in Moc Chau 
   
There is only one state-owned enterprise in the district that was established in 1958, along 
with three cooperatives and nine private firms that include joint ventures and three companies 
owned by foreign investors. The state-owned enterprise has three branch offices in the whole 
district that are closely linked with farmers for supplying inputs and collecting fresh leaves. 
In Moc Chau, cooperatives and private firms function similarly in terms of their management 
system. When a new company is established for tea production, it has to separate its targeted 
households from those which are already in contract with other companies. For this reason, 
most of the communes prefer to have only one company in their area to avoid conflicts 
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between companies. In Phieng Luong commune, two companies agreed on specific villages 
that they can target and seek contract. And in Van Ho commune, a foreign investor company 
implemented plantation-style tea farm and sought no contract with the surrounding individual 
tea farmers. This is aimed to avoid any conflict in terms of taking away contracted producers 
of state-owned enterprise. In Moc Chau, there is less chance for a new company to work 
solely based on market demand; instead its success is driven by the trust of the individual 
participating in the business. Also, since all the foreign investor companies in Moc Chau hold 
lands for their own production, and their entry is arranged by the local or central government, 
the tea farmers in Moc Chau stand to gain no direct benefit from the establishment of a 
foreign investor company. 
 
3.3. Methods used for sampling 
 
In 2007, a total of 6,726 households were engaged in tea production in Moc Chau. As stated 
in the introduction, the main objective of this study is to investigate the impact of contract 
farming on production and income of tea farmers. Therefore, the population was first divided 
into the following four groups:  
1. tea farmers in contract with a state-owned enterprise  
2. tea farmers contracting with private firms or cooperatives 
3. tea farmers with no contract (independent tea farmers)  
4. non-tea farmers.  
As stated in the previous section, the study excluded foreign investor companies, since they 
do not offer contracts to tea farmers. After the pre-survey, the state-owned enterprise group 
was divided into two sub-groups due to fact that after 1996, tea farms located around the 
headquarters of state-owned enterprises have been converted to peasant farms. These farmers 
lease land from a state-owned enterprise for a period of 50 years, and these lands are 
restricted to producing tea only. Land rent is deducted from payments for tea delivery. In 
contrast, lands in the villages located far from the headquarters are leased by the government, 
and are not restricted in their use.  
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Assuming that those who had been plantation workers might be more skilled at tea 
production than others, the present study sampled households from each of the following five 
groups:  
1. tea farmers contract with a state-owned enterprise including land lease  
2. tea farmers contract with a state-owned enterprise not including land lease  
3. tea farmers contract with a private firm or cooperative 
4. tea farmers with no contract (independent tea farmers) 
5. non tea farmers 
 
The sampling was aimed at representing each of the five groups. The total number of 
households of each group in Moc Chau district is unknown, and due to limited time and 
budget, the two stage sampling method was applied. This procedure involves random or 
stratified sampling within the identified clusters (Black, 1999). The clusters referring to the 
elements of the contract scheme were first identified, and then probability proportional was 
applied to size sampling within the cluster to randomly select the households. 
 
3.4. Identifying clusters and sampling households 
 
First, one company is selected from each of the three clusters: 
1. cluster 1 is state-owned enterprise with land lease in the production contract (SOE 
type I),  
2. cluster 2 is state-owned enterprise without land lease (SOE type II),  
3. and cluster 3 is private firms/ cooperatives.  
One company from each cluster was selected rather than randomly sampling households from 
the whole population. This is mainly because most of the companies in the region are in 
contract with households located in the same or neighboring communes. As only one SOE 
type I exists in a given region, the next step was to randomly select one company out of three 
from the second cluster (SOE type II). The reason behind the selection of these two clusters is 
that private firms or cooperatives in Moc Chau outnumber SOEs as can be seen in table 3.1. 
Furthermore, three companies were randomly selected from the third cluster (private 
firm/cooperative) from the neighboring communes where SOE type I and type II are located.  
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Figure 3.5 describes the geographical location of the research site and the selected communes 
in Moc Chau district. 
Figure 3.5 Location of the research area 
 
Source: Adapted from Vietnam Administrative Atlas (2005) and Google Earth (accessed in 
Jan 2010 ) 
 
After selecting the company, the lists of the communes and villages where contracted 
households reside, were obtained from each company. One or two villages were randomly 
selected from the list of each of the three clusters, and the list of the whole population was 
obtained from each village representative. This process aims to identify smaller groups 
(cluster of subjects), and to obtain successive samples from clusters (Black, 1999).  Figure 
3.6 describes simplified geographical locations of sampled villages and clusters held in these 
villages.   
• Hanoi   
0      100    200   300 km 
Moc Chau district 
 
Moc Chau district and sampled 
communes 
Map of Vietnam 
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Figure 3.6 Geographical location of sampled villages and clusters 
 
Source: Own data. 
 
Finally, samples within the cluster are randomly selected with respect to the relative 
frequency of the elements in the population of selected villages. Table 3.2 shows the number 
of samples in each cluster. The target was to obtain 40 samples from each of the clusters 1 to 
3, and relatively more samples were drawn from clusters 4 and 5, since those serve as 
controls for later analyses. Since not many non-tea households exist in the villages Ban 
Muong and Suoi Khem, an additional village called Ban 83, which has similar socio-
economic conditions as the other two villages, was selected. Since the non-tea households 
group is used as a control group in the analysis for relative poverty status, its sample size is 
larger than that of the other groups. As mentioned by Zeller et.al., (2006), the larger sampling 
size for non-tea farmers captures the presumably larger variance among non-tea farmers with 
respect to any poverty indicator that exists among tea farmers. 
 
  
 
Lien Hung/ Khua Ngua 
Cluster 2/4/5 
Ban Muong 
Cluster 3/4/5 
TK69 
Cluster 1 
Ban On 
Cluster 3/4/5 
Suoi Khem 
Cluster 3/4/5 
Ban 83 
Cluster 5 
Main paved road 
Paved road 
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Table 3.2 Number of sampled households by villages and clusters 
Commune  Village 
Selected 
Cluster 
 Number of samples in the cluster 
1 2 3 4 5 
SOE  
type I 
SOE  
type II 
Private/ 
Cooperative Independent Non tea 
Moc Chau 
town 
TK69 1 40 - - - 0 
Ban On 3, and 5 - - 8 0 21 
   
  
   Phieng Luong Ban Muong 3, 4 and 5 - - 19 14 15 
 
Suoi Khem 3, 4 and 5 - - 11 17 - 
 
Ban 83 5 - - 0 0 28 
   
  
   
To Mua Lien Hung 2, 4 and 5 - 33 - 19 13 
 
Khua Ngua 2 - 7 - - - 
Total 
  
40 40 38 50 77 
Source: Own data 
 
3.5. Methods used for data collection 
 
The data used for this study consists of two survey parts: one attained from the household 
survey and the other from the survey of village and organization. The following sections 
explain the methods used for data collection and describe the data in detail. 
 
3.5.1. Households data 
 
The procedure of sampling and pre-testing was followed by a household survey between 
August 2007 and October 2007. Quantitative data of 245 farm households was collected 
using a questionnaire based on household demographics and tea production. A demographic 
survey was only applied to non-tea farmers. The household demographic questionnaires are 
based on LSMS type household survey data, which aims to measure and understand the 
living standard of households, and to investigate factors which determine production 
efficiency and contract participation associated with socio-economic characteristics of 
households. The questionnaire consists of seven parts pertaining to household roster, housing, 
assets, basic food consumption, basic expenditure, social capital and land use, and income 
source. The second part of the questionnaire is about tea production, including qualitative 
information about participating in a contract, costs of inputs, contract details, land 
information, access to credit, technology transfer and transportation. Table 3.3 shows the 
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number of indicators collected in each part. The reporting period of the survey was the last 12 
months using September 2007 as a reference. Data were collected on a total of 145 indicators 
of socio-economic characteristics of households and 80 indicators of tea production. 
 
Table 3.3 Number of indicators in household survey questionnaire 
Contents of data Number of indicators Total 
Household roster 25 
145 
Housing  17 
Assets 29 
Food consumption 15 
Expenditure 14 
Social capital 38 
Land use and income source 7 
Tea production 80 80 
Source: Own data. 
 
3.5.2. Village and organization data 
 
In addition to the household quantitative survey, quantitative and qualitative surveys of 
villages and selected tea companies were conducted in order to understand institutional 
changes in the research area and to investigate socio-political changes in the region 
influencing tea production.  
 
Interviews of village heads were conducted with the help of specially designed quantitative 
questionnaires with the objective of gathering village information in terms of its demography, 
governance, access to facilities, infrastructure, land use and prices. Qualitative interviews 
focused on the institutional framework and poverty levels of each village and its history with 
respect to the development of tea production.   
 
For the survey on tea companies, four companies were interviewed by using structured 
questionnaires consisting of qualitative questions. Due to political reasons, the interview 
could not take place at the headquarters of Moc Chau Tea Company, whose information is 
controlled by the central government. Instead, qualitative and quantitative interviews were 
conducted with the technical and administrative representative of Moc Chau Tea Company in 
the village, where the implementation of the land reform, particularly allocation of land is 
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controlled by the company. Furthermore, due to the unavailability of the tea company‟s 
branch office representative, the person in charge of the management of contracted tea farms 
in the village was interviewed. The quantitative questionnaires aimed at drawing information 
regarding contract arrangements such as input supply, technical support, transportation of 
fresh tea leaves, and price fluctuations during the past 12 months. The qualitative interviews, 
on the other hand, obtained information about the history of the company, contract 
arrangement, processing, marketing and general working calendar of the tea production. 
These interviews helped the study to gain a thorough understanding of the region‟s history, 
particularly the development of tea sector and the socio-political issues faced by households. 
 
3.6. Summary 
 
This chapter presented the tea production and description of the research area, as well as 
methods used for the field research. The research area is Moc Chau district in Son La 
province. The area is blessed with geographical and climatic condition which is suitable for 
tea production. Tea production in the area is heavily engaged by poor and ethnic minorities. 
Hence Moc Chau has targeted by government to enhance tea production through policy 
implementations, and to thereby reduce income differences between Kinh and ethnic 
minorities. A total of 13 tea firms are located in Moc Chau district. In order to measure the 
impact of contract farming, we first divided the population into five groups which are:   
1. tea farmers contracting with a state-owned enterprise including land lease (SOEI), 
2. tea farmers contracting with a state-owned enterprise not including land lease (SOEII) 
3. tea farmers contracting with a private firm or cooperative 
4. tea farmers with no contract (independent tea farmers) 
5. non tea farmers. 
As only one SOE type I exists in a given region, a random selection of one company out of 
three from the second cluster (SOE type II) was made. Furthermore, three companies were 
randomly selected from the third cluster (private firm/cooperative). The latter are located in 
the neighboring communes of SOE type I and type II. After obtaining the household lists 
from each firm, samples within the cluster were randomly selected with respect to the relative 
frequency of the elements in the population of selected villages.  
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Quantitative data of 245 farm households was collected using a questionnaire based on 
household demographics and tea production. In addition, quantitative and qualitative data of 
the village and tea firms was collected to capture an overview of the village‟s  demography, 
governance, access to facilities, infrastructure, land use, and prices. Qualitative interviews 
focused on the institutional framework and poverty levels of each village, and its history with 
respect to the development of tea production.   
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4. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
 
 
4.1. Socio-economic characteristics of sampled households 
 
This section presents the socio-economic characteristics of sampled households by 
differentiating the five groups. Table 4.1 shows the socio-economic characteristics of 
households.  
The number of income source of SOE Type I is significantly lower than any other in the four 
clusters. On the other hand, SOE Type I has a significantly higher number of non-farm 
income sources at 1% of error level than any other of the four clusters. Since farmers in SOE 
Type I do not have land use rights certified by the government, their use of land is limited to 
tea production, and this kind of contract constraints their crop diversification strategy 
resulting in reduced income diversification. In addition, it is necessary for farmers to 
diversify their non-farm income activities to manage the risk associated with mono-crop 
production. 
It is interesting to see the difference in distribution of ethnic groups among the clusters. Kinh 
makes up the majority of Vietnamese population, and it is the most populous ethnic group in 
the two clusters contracting with the SOE. It accounts to more than 80% of the sampled 
population. The sample villages taken for the cluster SOE Type II are located about 60km 
away from the district center. The governmental migration program, aimed at diversification 
of ethnic groups and development of the area, also brought into the picture migrants who 
added to the Kinh population. Hence, in the case of SOE Type II, it could be assumed that 
SOE allocated contracts pertain to the area of the Kinh group, although its geographical 
location is not easily accessible. This may be due to the fact that the government intends to 
develop the mountainous region through implementing migration programs. The private 
sector would hardly consider expanding business in the region. Population compositions of 
other clusters are well distributed among the different ethnic groups. These ethnicity 
differences are considered in the econometric analyses.  
Data of agricultural land, differentiating between irrigated and non-irrigated land, was 
collected. In table 4.1, it can be observed that the area of non-irrigated land is tremendously 
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larger than that of irrigated land. Since the geographical landscape is conducive only for rain 
fed cultivation, maize production dominates the land use in northern mountainous region. 
However, this type of land use causes landslides and soil degradation, which is one of the 
serious problems concerning sustainable land use in the area. Apart from “Decision 80” 
implemented by the central government in 2002, the provincial level or local policy aimed at 
promoting intensification of tea production for sustainable land use and income. In addition, 
the government also implemented a credit program, which makes it possible to provide a 
credit of up to 2,000,000 VND to households towards purchasing inputs. Since “Decision 80” 
was criticized on the grounds that it provided advantages only to the State-Owned Enterprises 
(ADB, 2005), the provincial level initiative taken by the regional government is likely to 
encourage private sector participation and prove favorable for rural development in the true 
sense of its term.  
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Table 4.1 Socio-economic characteristics of sampled households 
  Household cluster 
Characteristics SOE I SOE II Private Non contract Non tea 
Number of household 
members 
3.5 4.5 5.1 4.4 4.0 
Mean education year of adult  8.5 6.9 6.7 6.6 6.0 
Female head in the cluster (%) 37.5 5.0 5.3 5.8 20.0 
Year of residence 16.4 20.3 19.2 17.2 15.4 
Number of income sources 1.9 2.4 3.3 2.9 2.3 
Source of non-farm income  0.6 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 
Ethnicity (% in the cluster) 
     
Kinh 95.0 80.0 18.4 38.5 36.0 
Thai 5.0 20.0 44.7 21.2 28.0 
Dao 0.0 0.0 28.9 34.6 26.7 
Muong 0.0 0.0 7.9 5.8 9.3 
Area of agricultural land (m
2
)    
     
Irrigated (% under land title) 0 (0) 25 (100) 1081.6 (76.3) 378.9 (60.7) 209.3 (50.0) 
Non-irrigated  3402.5 (0) 7656.3 (94.1) 12671.1 (65.1) 10865.9 (68.9) 7739.9 (39.6) 
By crops 
     
Tea 3382.5 4075.0 4479.4 4020.0 316.0 
Rice 0.0 50.0 1908.8 1366.0 608.0 
Maize 12.5 4217.0 7235.3 6436.0 139681.3 
Number of samples 40 40 34 50 75 
Source: Own data      
      
 
4.2. Living standard of sampled households 
 
4.2.1. Application of a poverty line 
 
In 2006, Moc Chau district reached a regional total GDP of 611.53 billion VND (USD 
38,447,700 proxy in 2006), comprising of agriculture and forestry (42%), industry and 
construction (34%), and services and others (24%). GDP per capita in Moc Chau is USD 262, 
which is far below the national average of USD 723 at market price (IMF, 2010). North West 
region, which is characterized by ethnic diversity and mountainous topography, holds the 
highest poverty rate in the country. The absolute poverty rate of the whole of North West 
region measured by monthly income per capita was 38.1%, with a national poverty line of 
260,000 VND for urban and 200,000 VND for rural area in 2006 (GSO, 2006). The absolute 
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poverty line has been adjusted for every national living standard survey. According to the 
village and commune representative, the national poverty line for the villages is derived from 
village discussions, or imposed by the commune decision. Since 2005, a commune level new 
poverty line that takes into account the difference in living standards has been calculated. By 
this measure, the number of poor households that will receive poverty certificates is decided 
at the commune level. In the current study, To Mua commune located in the mountainous 
area farthest from the district center has a lower poverty line compared to the other two 
communes (Moc Chau city, and Phieng Luong). This is understandable because households 
in To Mua commune have less job opportunities than others, which makes their living 
standards lower, which then again also sets their poverty line lower.  
 
In order to have an overview of the living standard of the research site, the general poverty 
line was applied on the expenditure data which was obtained from household survey. Due to 
the constraints of survey time and budget, 12 short-cut questions were applied on household 
expenditure together with per capita daily clothing expenditure derived from demography to 
measure total consumption expenditure. These 12 questions have been tested in four different 
countries by the University of Maryland together with University of Göttingen. They 
obtained a very high correlation coefficient between the per capita daily expenditures 
(measured with an LSMS type questionnaire) and the per-capita daily expenditures derived 
from the 12 short-cut expenditure questions ranging from 0.55 to 0.79 in the four different 
countries (See Zeller et.al, 2005a and 2005b, Zeller and Alcaraz, 2005a and 2005b).  The 
questionnaire comprised of questions shown in table 4.2.   
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Table 4.2 Short-cut questions on expenditure  
Time period Questions 
Last 7 days 
Total food consumption of household purchased and home 
produced 
Average 7 days 
Total food consumption of household purchased and home 
produced 
Average 30 days Expenditures of utilities, transport, fuel, and goods 
Last 12 months total 
Expenditures of  education, health, furniture and appliances, 
remittances sent, and others 
Note: Recall period is last 12 months for average expenditures. 
Source: Adopted from own questionnaire.  
 
On the basis of derived per capita daily expenditure, two poverty lines, adapted to different 
villages that are 180,000 and 250,000 VND per capita monthly expenditure, were applied.  
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of estimated per capita monthly expenditure across clusters. 
All estimated expenditures are above poverty lines of 180,000 and 250,000 VND. In 
conclusion, the absolute poverty status is not applicable to capture comparable living 
standards in this study, so the relative poverty status of households was used by applying an 
alternative method. 
 
Figure 4.1 Distribution of per capita monthly expenditure  
 
Source: Own data. 
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4.2.2.  Constructing a poverty index  
 
Since poverty status measured by poverty line does not obtain accurate comparable living 
standards of household, the relative poverty status of households is assessed by applying the 
statistical method of Principal Component Analysis (PCA). PCA is one of the poverty 
assessment tools developed by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) with 
technical and financial support from the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP), in 
order to obtain immediate, low-cost and accurate measurement of the poverty status in the 
field of microfinance (Zeller et.al., 2006). This approach seemed ideal due to its applicability 
for our data, since there are limitations of time and budget in our survey which affects the 
data quantity in terms of measuring expenditures. 
 
Technically, the Principal Component Analysis is used to extract the components pertaining 
to the different dimensions of poverty and to create an indicator such as a poverty index. The 
current study followed the technical instruction for constructing a poverty index developed by 
Henry et.al. (2003). 
 
In the process of reducing indicators, correlation coefficients between the poverty benchmark 
variable (expenditure per capita) and various other variables are measured. Only those which 
show a high linear correlation are chosen as a component unit. These variables are used in the 
application of PCA, to construct the components attributed to different dimensions of poverty. 
PCA extracts information from various indicators and creates components that capture 
common underlying attribute of households. In our analysis, four dimensions of poverty were 
created: human resources, dwelling, assets, and food security (see table 4.3). After obtaining 
the poverty index, control groups were defined for relative comparison among the groups. 
The poverty group was divided into three clusters: lower, middle and highest. Among the 
three clusters, the control group sample is divided equally to enable relative measure of 
poverty status. In our measure, the group of non-tea farmers serves as the control group.  
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Table 4.3 Variables consisted in the poverty index 
Dimension of 
poverty Variables Component Matrix 
Human resources Percentage of adults who can write 0.235  
Birth of own child - in the last five years -0.377  
Dwelling Area (m
2
) per capita (area covered by roof) 0.477  
Type of toilet facility 0.316  
Assets Total resale value of dog 0.608  
Value of assets per capita 0.693  
Land area (m2) owned per capita 0.503  
Food security Borrowing food in the last 365 days (times) -0.510  
Benchmark variable is daily expenditure per capita 
KMO: Measure of sampling adequacy = 0.691 
Significant at the 1% level 
Source: Own data 
 
Table 4.3 shows wealth variables used to construct the poverty index. To test the sampling 
adequacy of PCA, the statistical test of Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) was applied. KMO is an 
index which compares the magnitude between observed and partial correlation coefficients 
(Henry et al., 2003). The bigger the value, the more accurate it is. Hence, our result of 0.691 
is acceptable.  
 
Human resources include two variables; the ratio of literate adults, and the number of births 
in the last five years. The sign of component matrix of those two is as expected. The 
households comprising more literate adults have a higher ranking in the poverty index, and 
households with more than one child birth in the last five years rank low. As for the dwelling 
component, households that have more area under the roof (per capita) rank higher on the 
poverty index. The types of toilet facilities range from 1 to 7 in ordinal measure: 1 
corresponding to a natural source (at a bush or a field), 7 to a flush toilet. It is with a positive 
sign, which is against our expectation. This might be the result of unevenly distributed 
variables: 85% of the households own a kneel-down toilet, or a shared sit-down toilet, which 
correspond to 3 and 4 respectively on the indicator. The component of assets includes total 
resale of dog, total value of assets and area of land owned per capita. All three variables show 
a positive coefficient to the poverty index. The component measure for food security of a 
household is comprised of the variable of frequency of food borrowing in the last 365 days. It 
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shows a negative sign as expected and household borrowing more food ranks lower on the 
poverty index.  
Figure 4.2 shows distribution of relative poverty status of tea farmers among the four clusters.  
 
Figure 4.2 Distribution of poverty status by clusters 
 
Source: Own data 
 
Non-tea farmers constitute the control group for relative poverty status. From figure 4.2, the 
proportion of middle and lowest poverty levels in non-contract farming reveals to be higher 
than in other clusters. The clusters of SOE I and II have a similar structure, where the 
majority of the households belongs to the middle level, and nearly 45% of households that are 
contracting with private firms,  rank high in poverty status within their cluster.  
 
The bar chart of Figure 4.3 represents the median of per capita daily expenditure data of each 
cluster, terciled (low, middle, and high) by the result of estimated poverty index. It allows 
checking the validity of the estimated poverty index compared with expenditure data. The 
height of the bar chart of the poverty group becomes higher from left to right. This indicates 
that there is a similarity between the estimation of absolute poverty status measured by 
expenditure and the estimation of relative poverty status measured by poverty index. 
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Figure 4.3 Household expenditures, by poverty tercile and clusters 
 
Source: Own data 
 
4.3. Overview of contract farming in Moc Chau 
 
4.3.1. Vertical coordination of tea production in Moc Chau 
 
Contract farming plays a vital role in the Vietnamese agricultural sector.90% of fresh milk 
and cotton, 40% of rice, and 50% of tea are purchased by enterprises under the contract (Silva, 
2005). Contract farming today is highly developed, especially in the sector which deals with 
perishable products including commodities that require immediate processing.  
 
As noted in the description of the research site, there are mainly three kinds of institutions 
that provide contracts in Moc Chau: state-owned enterprise, private firms, and cooperatives. 
We do not distinguish between private firms and cooperatives as they function similarly in 
terms of contract participation, arrangements and marketing strategies. Figure 4.4 shows the 
framework of contract farming in the context of its role in the vertical coordination. 
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Figure 4.4 Framework of contract farming in Moc Chau: case of tea production 
 
   Source: Own data 
The vertical coordination of state-owned enterprises starts with VINATEA, which is the 
national headquarters of stated-owned enterprises for tea, and Moc Chau Tea Company at the 
regional level, under the supervision of VINATEA. VINATEA manages nationwide 
marketing strategies, particularly in the sphere of tea export. At the district level, Moc Chau 
Tea Company, which was established in the 1950s as a state-owned enterprise with certain 
independent rights instead of being fully controlled by VINATEA, handles production 
strategies ensuring flexible and timely production management. At the communal level, Moc 
Chau Tea Company has set up communal branch offices in order to manage contracted tea 
farmers in a more flexible way. The company is in charge of only administrative 
arrangements in organizing contracts, and manages the entire course of processing to 
marketing. In the processing stage, pre-processed green tea prepared by communal branches 
all over Moc Chau province is used and some part of the raw product is sent to VINATEA for 
export, which then blends it with tea leaves from other regions. As communal branches are 
located in the production area, they have more interaction with farmers in the production 
management. They share the risk in initial costs by providing primary inputs, production 
materials and extension advices, and collect raw products from contracted farmers.  
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As mentioned in Chapter 1, the number of private tea firms in Moc Chau is increasing 
bolstered by domestic and foreign investments. However, the operation size of a private firm 
is smaller compared to state-owned enterprise as they are new to the sector. In addition, the 
size of factory operation might bring inefficiency problems, because tea farming requires 
large economies of scale in processing (Kirsten et. al, 2009: p.214), an aspect that must be 
considered in addressing overall economic efficiency of tea production in Moc Chau. As seen 
in figure 4.4, these private firms are positioned right at the top of vertical coordination, on par 
with state-owned enterprises, except that they are in full charge of the final marketing 
products. Most of the private firms have been established only a decade ago, and the long-
existing tea producers in the area had already built up their own access to market channels. 
For this reason, private firms first targeted non-tea producers and introduced them to tea 
production by taking away all the risks associated with initial investments. In this way, 
farmers overcame capital-constraints at the establishment stage, where the problems often 
emerge in terms of high-fixed costs. At the level of production management, although most 
private firms are located in the production area, the company is often run by a single person 
facing shortage of labor. Hence, interaction between the company and farmers, especially on 
production management, is taken over by farmer‟s associations or other village organizations 
in most cases. Technical workers from farmer‟s organizations provide extension advice, and 
manage input materials necessary for farmers. It means farmers‟ decision making on 
production management is accepted by contractors, and by this way, contractors avoid 
incurring full risks associated with production management. However, most farmers buy 
input materials from contractors because of its lower prices relative to purchasing directly 
from the market. 
 
4.3.2. Contract arrangements 
 
Detailed contract assignments of state-owned enterprise (SOE) and private firms are 
described in table 4.4. The total production area contracted with Moc Chau Tea Company 
accounts for 50% of the whole district, which was more than 1,600ha in 2007. Since the 
establishment of Moc Chau Tea Company in 1958, they have been managing the traditional 
plantation production system in the surrounding communes.  
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State -owned enterprise with central management (SOE I) 
SOE Type I is one of the sub-groups in our sample and had been consisted with employed 
labors who, until 1996, were under an employment contract with the state enterprise. Its 
management is centralized, and is located close to the processing facility of Moc Chau Tea 
Company. As part of the economic reform Doi Moi, Moc Chau Tea Company also came 
under the purview of the re-construction and decentralization of state-owned enterprises. 
Furthermore, farmers, who had been the employed labor before, have contracted a land 
tenancy agreement with Moc Chau Tea Company for 50 years. In addition, participation in 
the contract of SOE Type I is quite limited and selective, thus contract participation is 
unidentified based on inevitable selection bias. Since we were interested in comparing the 
contractual arrangement of SOE and private under similar socio-economic conditions, 
contract arrangement of SOE Type I was not taken into account in our econometric analyses. 
 
State-owned enterprise with producer’s management (SOE II) 
SOE Type II refers to a group of households contracted with SOE, where the land tenure 
right belongs to the farmers. The contract arrangement of the state-owned enterprise 
presented in table 4.4 refers to this type of contract Type I. The format of this contract is 
written and arranged by an intermediary who is the village representative.  
Those who want to newly participate in the contract with the SOE, both previous tea growers 
and non-tea farmers, can freely contact the village representative and negotiate participation. 
Duration of the contract is “no limitation”, which is strongly influenced by and depends on 
the land property right policy of the country. Once farmers enter into this contract, production 
inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides are provided by the SOE upon farmer‟s direct 
payment to the branch offices in the region. Extension service is freely available whenever a 
farmer requires. The price of tea leaves is decided once a year by VINATEA, which is the 
center of state-owned tea enterprises of Vietnam, and it is neither negotiable nor fluctuates 
depending on the market price. The main concern about this type of contract is the stable 
procurement of tea leaves. Since Moc Chau Tea Company is located in the area of production 
which is dominated by small holders, it is necessary for the company to have reliable access 
to tea leaves from individual farmers to prevent side-selling. Hence, to ensure contract 
enforcement, the SOE together with the local government sets up a penalty in case of contract 
default which might occur particularly during the tea leaves sale. 
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Table 4.4 Contract arrangements of tea production in Moc Chau 
Specifications  State-owned enterprise Private firm 
Land ownership  Farmer  Farmer  
Contract format  Written  Written / Verbal agreements  
Duration  No limit More than 30 years  
Input supply  
  
 - Fertilizer and 
pesticides  
As farmer requires 
In principal company plans, 
additionally farmers can apply 
 - Extension advice  As farmer requires (free)  
Once a month for free (when 
farmer requires)  
Input payment  
Farmer who needs inputs 
must pay directly to SOEs  
Subtracted by firm from fresh tea 
selling during production period 
(normally once/ month)  
Tea leaves price  
  
 - Price arrangement  Fixed price, once a year 
Prices calculated regarding market 
prices, every month  
 - Average price   2,300VND/kg (USD 0.14)  2,500VND/kg (USD 0.16)  
Sanction/ punishment of 
contract default 
Yes  No  
Contract enforcement  Strong  Weak  
Participation in contract  Free, arranged by village  Free  
Source: Own data 
 
Private firms 
Private firms provide contracts through farmer‟s associations in villages where the SOE has 
not implemented its contract arrangement. It is based on horizontal coordination between tea 
companies in order to prevent undermining each other‟s business (Poulton et al., 2010). The 
firms we investigated were Chau Tu tea company, Co Do joint stock company and Doan Ket 
cooperative. Despite one of the companies being a cooperative, all three were grouped 
together on the basis that they administered similar contract arrangements. A contract with 
individual farmers is mediated by village representatives, mostly with new tea growers. The 
company shares the initial risk of production by providing seeds for no charge, since the 
vegetation period of tea takes at least three years before harvest. Technical support is often 
provided through the farmer‟s association regularly once a month and, additionally, upon 
request. Input application for production is implemented by the company within the 
management practice under the supervision of farmer‟s association. These inputs are 
subtracted from the sales once a month. The price per kg of fresh leaves is adjusted on spot 
market price every month. To prevent the side-selling of farmers, Doan Ket cooperative set 
their buying price at 100 to 200 VND (per kg), higher than that of SOE, and in addition, gave 
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incentives to growers by providing the bonus to mass producers. It often sets the floor price 
for procurement, this way the company shares the marketing risks of price fluctuations. 
Contract enforcement is indeed relatively weak compared to that of SOEs, since it is not 
covered within the legal framework. Contract default depends mainly on the tightness of 
social networks in rural areas where people are often close to each other, and the company 
can restrict side-selling of growers only by sense of community.  
 
4.3.3. Reasons for choosing a specific contract in Moc Chau 
 
Contracting provides certain advantages for smallholders. They are assured of their marketing, 
often floor price is guaranteed, they have access to input materials provided by the company, 
access to extension service, new technology, and information, and easier access to credit. The 
credit-facilitating aspect of the contract is often the farmer‟s principal motive for signing up 
(Glover 1987). Meanwhile, what can be the reason for producers to select a specific contract? 
Our qualitative data shows that nearly 45% of famers chose the tea leaves sale price offered 
by the company as the primary reason for selecting a contract (see figure 4.5). Not only the 
degree of price, but also its stability is an important criterion in the selection, since vulnerable 
smallholders are exposed to the risk of fluctuating prices in spot markets. A trustworthy 
relationship between the producers and contractors also affects the contract selection. 
Especially in a rural society, it is possible to establish closer and narrower relationships than 
in urban areas. Thus, tight social networks help linking producers and processors.   
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Figure 4.5 Reason for selecting specific buyer/ contract  
 
Source: Own data 
 
 
4.3.4. Economic performance of tea production – Gross margin of tea production – 
 
It is in the best interest of not only producers but also of agricultural firms to investigate the 
economic performance of production. Gross margin is defined as gross revenue minus 
variable costs, and it is a simple measure to evaluate the cost and benefit performance of 
production. Variable costs defined in our data are presented in table 4.5. They include 
production material costs pertaining to manure, fertilizer, and pesticide, rent of land, small 
tools, hired labor, transport, and interest. Investment on production material such as manure, 
fertilizer and pesticides is likely to be higher for non-contract groups compared to the 
contracted groups. Household contracts with private firms spend much more on rent of land 
for tea production. This might be influenced by the availability of land in the village, and also 
the incentive for producers to expand the scale of production. SOE I and private firms are 
likely to hire more seasonal labor especially during the harvest season. In the case of Private, 
hired labor, which mostly comes from outside the village, is paid 20,000VND per day 
(approx. USD 1.2 at the time of survey). Transportation cost for SOE II seems to be the 
highest among the groups, since households sampled are located in relatively deep 
mountainous area. The mean total variable cost per kg of non-contract farmers is significantly 
higher than that of the other three groups at 1% error level in multiple comparison tests. SOE 
I yielded the lowest variable costs among the four, but the statistically significant difference 
was observed only with non-contract farmers. All in all, it indicates that the variable costs of 
production per unit of tea leaves of non-contract farmers are significantly higher than those of 
the contracted groups. 
44.4%
23.5%
11.1%
8.6%
12.3%
Best price
Stable price
Close relationship
Closest (distance) buyer
Other
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Table 4.5 Variable costs of tea production (in VND, per kg of tea leaves, N =163) 
Cost description 
 
SOE I SOE II Private Non contract Total 
Manure  
Mean 51.16 7.72 34.77 100.45 52.47 
S.D. 199.80 27.59 117.18 420.71 259.58 
Fertilizer 
Mean 512.48 551.92 368.11 830.09 589.23 
S.D. 298.13 329.88 262.06 978.77 616.95 
Pesticide 
Mean 211.81 196.78 214.25 255.07 221.99 
S.D. 209.89 126.98 179.14 263.52 206.05 
Land rent 
Mean 1.95 29.14 55.12 5.22 20.55 
S.D. 7.21 161.04 203.37 36.89 123.93 
Tools 
Mean 43.44 112.03 224.13 355.84 193.37 
S.D. 52.68 99.13 718.79 694.11 519.07 
Hired labor 
Mean 20.77 14.37 26.60 8.90 16.81 
S.D. 79.61 48.89 78.65 35.13 61.35 
Transportation 
Mean 12.52 49.70 29.57 45.71 35.16 
S.D. 10.07 32.37 23.75 55.53 39.20 
Interests 
Mean 1.73 1.50 0.76 0.00 0.94 
S.D. 6.16 7.28 4.46 0.00 5.11 
Total variable costs 
Mean 855.86 963.16 953.31 1601.30 1130.50 
S.D. 598.00 495.75 749.70 1643.18 1084.10 
Area of tea cultivated 
Mean 4280.0 4212.9 4661.8 4152.0 4304.3 
S.D. 5161.1 2653.6 2924.3 3692.0 3737.0 
Source: Own data, computed by Pham 2008 
 
The gross margin was calculated with using the variable costs shown above. Gross revenue is 
yield multiplied by the price of leaf, which also includes the amount spent on personal 
consumption. Table 4.6 shows the gross margin per sale of kilogram of tea leaves in all 
groups. The group comprising of households contracted with private or cooperative (cluster 
3) achieved the highest gross margin. In addition, all the groups comprising of contracted 
households yielded a higher gross margin than non-contract households. Although the price 
per kg of tea leaves is higher for the non-contract group compared to that of the other three 
groups with a maximum difference of 700VND, the variable costs of non-contract 
households amount to 800VND, lending to a bigger difference between cost and benefit for 
non-contract groups. Also, the application of production inputs in the case of non-contract 
groups may not be accurate since they do not take the help of extension service frequently. 
Hence, it can be assumed that there might be inefficient use of production materials such as 
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overuse of chemicals, which in fact causes low land productivity. The private groups 
achieved the highest gross margin, which might be explained by the fact that they provide 
more incentives for production since they retain full autonomy on production decisions 
enabling skilled producers to apply timely and appropriate management practice on their own. 
Furthermore, unskilled producers in contract with private firms have timely access to 
extension services through farmer‟s associations when required. Hence, obtaining technical 
advice is made easy for producers contracting with private firms as farmer‟s associations 
have extensive presence in the village.   
 
Table 4.6 Gross margin (VND) per kilogram of tea leave 
 Mean of Gross Margin  S.D. 
SOE I 1349 0.595 
SOE II 1378 0.535 
Private 1562 0.707 
Non contract 1151 1.692 
Source: Own data, extracted from Pham 2008 
 
After calculating the gross margin, Pham (2008) further analyses it by comparing contract 
and non-contract households by applying matching methods to correct household 
characteristics in each group. The result shows larger difference in gross margin between 
contract and non-contract, although the results are not statistically significant with the t-test. 
With the ANOVA test, it is concluded that SOEI yields a higher gross margin than non-
contract groups, but no other comparison is significant.  
 
4.4. Summary 
 
The relative poverty status of households is assessed by applying the statistical method of 
Principal Component Analysis. The result revealed that non-contract group includes lower-
ranked households compared to other groups. In the group of SOE I and II, the majority of 
households belongs to the middle level, and in the group of private firms, nearly 45% of 
households rank high in poverty status within the group. Among five groups, the proportions 
of Kinh people in group of SOE I and II are higher than in any other groups. This indicates 
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that SOE enters into contracts preferably with Kinh, or, SOE only targets the area where the 
Kinh form the majority of the population. 
Vertical coordination of SOE and private firms are rather similar when regarding production 
management. Some differences in contract arrangement between SOE and private firms are 
noted.  Compared to the contract with private firms, access to technical advice is easier for 
those contracts to SOE with more skilled technical advisers. SOE contractors have to bear a 
lower but fixed price of tea leaves compared to the market price or the price given by private 
firms. The tea leaves price is an important factor for choosing a specific contract: 45% of the 
sampled households choose a specific contract due to the highest leaves price, and 24% 
choose because of its price stability. New participants can freely enter both contracts, but 
sanction or punishment in case of contract default is strict for producers contracted with SOE, 
which makes its contract enforcement strong. On the other hand, contract enforcement of 
private firms is weak perhaps due to the lack of third party intervention such as by law or 
governmental authority. Under those contract arrangements, the gross margin of production 
contracted with SOE I is revealed to be significantly higher than non-contract production 
(Pham, 2008). However, considerable differences of gross margin among different contracts 
are not derived from their estimation.   
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5. TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY OF TEA PRODUCTION 
 
 
5.1. Objective of this analysis 
 
In this section, we assess the effect of contract participation on productivity and efficiency of 
tea production. Advantages of participating in contract farming are often associated with 
marketing and management aspects, and there are some studies that estimate the effect of 
contract participation along with comparative production efficiency analysis. By investigating 
observed differences in production efficiency among the groups of SOE, private and non-
contract, one can assess the potential of contract farming at the production level and derive 
the required institutional arrangements for improving tea yields of farmers. 
 
5.2. Methodology 
 
When considering contract farming as a tool for rural development, it is necessary to 
understand its production efficiency compared to other schemes. There are a considerable 
number of efficiency analyses applying the Stochastic Production Frontier Model to the 
studies of agriculture in developing countries. With regard to our research objective, we first 
review the empirical studies, especially those that focus on the comparative estimates of 
technical efficiency, that investigate the effect which are associated with participation, or 
technology adoption. 
 
5.2.1. Empirical studies on production efficiency 
 
Rawlins (1985) evaluated effects of the Jamaican Second Integrated Rural Development 
Project (IRDPII) on technical efficiency for peasant farmers by using the stochastic frontier 
model with cross sectional data. Although the results showed that non-contract farmers have 
a higher average technical efficiency, it was concluded that contract farming drives up the 
production frontier of contract farmers. Kalirajan and Shand (1986) compared the two groups 
of Malaysian rice farmers, inside and outside of targeted area of irrigation. Those who are 
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outside the targeted area, depend entirely on rainfall for their rice production. Stochastic 
frontier estimate showed a significant difference in technical efficiencies between the two 
groups. They concluded that a technological transfer may not contribute to long term 
technical efficiency, especially in comparison to the traditional production technology. 
Khairo and Battese (2004) studied the effect of the New Extension Program (NEP) on 
technical efficiency of maize farmers in Ethiopia with a set of panel data. While taking into 
consideration the study conducted by Seyoum and Battese (1998) that revealed positive 
technical efficiency impact of SG2000 on an agricultural project implemented in Ethiopia, 
Khairo and Battese (2004) evaluated the changes of technical efficiency over time of those 
who participated in the project. However, the estimated technical efficiency of both 
participants and non-participants are not comparable due to the adoption of different 
technologies. 
 
The application and development of frontier production function model has been researched 
in quite a number of empirical studies in agricultural economics. KaliBravo-Uretaand 
Evenson (1994) examined technical, allocative and economic efficiency by Cobb-Douglas 
production frontiers of peasant farmers in eastern Paraguay estimated separately. They found 
that there is no strong relation between socio-economic characteristics and the productivity of 
farmers. Battese (1992) reviewed the empirical application of frontier production functions in 
agricultural economics with farm-level data. He mentioned that careful and appropriate 
selection of variables included in the model and its functional form would lead to a more 
accurate analysis. We applied the Stochastic Frontier Production Function instead of 
Deterministic Frontier Function because of the existence of a random error associated with 
random factors that farmers cannot control. 
 
5.2.2. Estimating technical efficiency 
 
The Stochastic Frontier Production Function (SFPF) model is used to estimate the technical 
efficiency of farmers.  
 
SFPF was first proposed by Meeusen and van de Broeck (1977), and Aigner, Lovell and 
Schmidt (1977) independently, and has since been further developed in a number of studies 
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related to production models and technical efficiency estimations. The model includes two 
stages of estimation with respect to two error components: one associated with the presence 
of technical efficiency (ui) and the other a conventional random error (vi) that is: 
 
(5.1) . 
 
Where lnYi denotes natural logarithm of output of i-th farm (i=1,….., 124),  
β are the unknown parameters to be estimated, 
Xj is a vector of inputs. 
 
The model defined by (5.1) is called Stochastic Frontier Model because the output function 
includes the stochastic variable exp (xi’β+vi) (Coelli et al., 2005). Figure 5.1 illustrates the 
stochastic production frontier, where the random error vi can be either positive or negative, so 
the output varies with the domestic part of the model (Coelli et al., 2005). 
 
Figure 5.1 The Stochastic Production Frontier 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As approved by many studies, the Cobb-Douglas type production function equations are 
appropriate for functional analysis intended for agricultural activities and are applicable for 
small sets of data (Battese, 1992, and Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro, 1993). Although the Cobb-
Douglas function seems to be adequate for this study, the translog production function, which 
ln 'i i i iY x v u  
Source: Coelli et.al. 2005 (p.244) 
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is more flexible than Cobb-Douglas function, is alternatively applicable. The Cobb-Douglas 
function is a special form of translog function that is βjβl = 0, where the hypothesis test of 
adequacy of functional form is tested after the estimation of each function. Cobb-Douglas and 
translog functions are specified in the following functions respectively: 
 
(5.2) 
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Where Dk is a vector of dummy variables, vi is N (0, σ
2
v) distributed random error, and ui is 
the non-negative random variable representing technical inefficiency of production. ui is 
assumed to be distributed independently, which can have either half-normal, exponential or 
truncated- normal distribution. δ is the unknown parameter to be estimated, Zm is a vector of 
explanatory variables associated with technical inefficiency of production, and wi is N (0, σ
2
u) 
distributed random variable. 
The total variance of the production function is expressed as variances of two error 
components:  
ζ2 = ζ2v  + ζ
2
u.  γ =  ζ
2
u/ (ζ
2
v  + ζ
2
u) is tested to be zero by performing log- likelihood ratio test.  
 
Technical efficiency has been defined in many ways. We define technically efficient 
production as that when farmers maximise output with the given inputs. This is the most 
common output-oriented measure of technical efficiency, and it is defined as the ratio of 
observed output to the corresponding stochastic frontier output: 
 
(5.5) 
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Although the underlying assumption provides consistent estimators of the slope coefficients 
applying Ordinary Least Squares, the OLS estimator of the intercept coefficient is biased 
downwards (Coelli et al., 2005). For the solution, some distributional assumption concerning 
two error components is made and the method of maximum likelihood can be applied. 
Estimations are obtained by using software FRONTIER 4.1 following the instruction of 
Coelli (1994). 
 
5.3. Variables in the model 
 
Here, we will explain the variables included in the technical efficiency estimates. First, we 
will present the variables used in the maximum likelihood estimate, and later explain the 
variables associated with socio-economic characteristics of households which determine 
technical efficiency of production. 
 
5.3.1. Variables in the maximum likelihood estimate 
 
Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics of input variables and variables for inefficiency 
effects. All variables are household level data from October 2006 to September 2007. 
Dependent variable from equation (5.1) is logged total amount of tea harvested in kg. Input 
variables Xj in the equation (5.1) are the following: ln_land is the logged total tea production 
area in acres, including the land rented. Total family and hired labour spent for tea production 
ln_labour is counted in days since all hired labour is paid daily. ln_mate is the logged 
material costs (manures, fertilizers and pesticides) that are in monetary value of „000 
Vietnamese Dong (VND)
1
. All material costs are summed together instead of including 
individually into the model to avoid the multi-collinearity problem. ln_age is the logged age 
of tea tree, weighted by area. Since the economic life of a tea tree is expected to be around 40 
to 60 years in general, and the older the tree is, the more leaves due to its absolute size it 
provides, we hypothesized that older trees enhance productivity. Input dummy variables Dk 
are as follows: Dummy variable D_mate is applied to those who did not use any material in 
production. Studies based on zero-values of some input variables in production often arise in 
agricultural economics. By using a dummy variable, associated with the incidence of zero 
                                                            
1 10,000 VND accounts for 0.6 USD in September 2007. 
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observations, the appropriate parameters of Cobb-Douglas production functions can be 
estimated in an unbiased way (Battese, 1997). Considering different elevations ranging from 
850m to 930m among three communes, two dummy variables D_PL and D_TM are included.  
These variables are commonly used as input variables in the agricultural research based on 
the Stochastic Frontier Production Function (Battesse and Coelli, 1992, Bravo-Ureta and 
Pinheiro, 1993, and 1997). 
 
5.3.2. Socio-economic factors related to technical efficiency 
 
Technical efficiency of the model in equation (5.2) is explained as the functional form of 
socio-economic attributes of households. The variables included in this study refer to the 
study of Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro (1993),who reviewed the studies on farm level 
inefficiency in developing countries. Eleven variables with five dummy variables are 
considered as effective socio-economic characteristics for achieving technical efficiency.  
 
The age of the household head (mem_age) and mean education year of family labour 
(educ_mean) are commonly applied attributes to explain the efficiency effects in many 
studies (Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro, 1993). pro_fe_fam represents the proportion (%) of 
female family labour in the total labour, considering the fact that tea production is labour 
intensive, especially for year round plucking activity, and these activities are predominantly 
devoted to female labour (Sivaram, 2000). Sivaram noted that plucking/ harvesting accounts 
for 70% of the total working days on estates, and this applies to our study as well. We assume 
that those who have more female labour are expected to have an efficient production due to 
the plucking activities.  
 
The variable farm_income refers to a number of farm income sources, which do not include 
tea production. Due to the engagement in other agricultural activities other than tea 
production, farmers might miss plucking tea leaves at the right time and also might face time 
constraints in carrying tea leaves for processing right after harvesting. As tea leaves are 
perishable, it is necessary to start processing within three to five hours after plucking 
(especially in the case of processing green tea), in order to avoid untimely delivery, which 
could lead to rejection of sale by contractors. pov_index is the relative poverty status of 
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households (see chapter 3). It is expected to positively affect technical efficiency as it is seen 
to enhance depending on relative living standard of households. extenuse is the number of 
times extension service is used in a year. It is hypothesized that those households which have 
received more extension services stand a better chance in increasing their technical 
knowledge or receiving timely advice leading to improved technical efficiency.  
 
The variable tealoan is the dummy variable and is applicable only when a household applies 
for credit (= 1) or otherwise (= 0). Considering the availability of credit institutes in the area, 
most of the households have access to some kind of credit offer or the other. Hence, 
application of the variable is more suited to measure the influence of credit on efficiency 
rather than accessibility. Village dummy variables (v_2 to v_5) are included to determine the 
geographical effects on technical efficiency, in terms of steepness and distance to the 
companies that vary by villages. This is considered because, with reference to green tea, tea 
leaves are a perishable product, and companies demand timely transport of the produce. In 
some cases, inconvenience that arises due to the transportation of harvested leaves on steep 
fields makes farmers abandon the produce, which affects the value of output in the technical 
efficiency model. 
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Table 5.1 Variables in the Cobb-Douglas production function      
    SOE Private Non- contract  Total 
Dependent variable: Logged total amount of tea harvested in 2007 (kg) 3635.00 4315.88 2651.60 3425.16 
Input variables     
ln_land β1 Logged land area planted with tea (Ares) 41.49 45.72 42.32 42.98 
ln_labour β2 Logged family and hired labour days spent for tea production 497.68 508.05 469.78 489.27 
ln_material β3 Logged material costs (manures, fertilizers, and pesticides in „000VND) 2397.50 2320.89 1572.68 2043.91 
ln_age β4 Logged age of tea tree (years) 14.21 14.31 9.39 12.29 
D_PL β5 
Dummy variable household located in Phieng  Luong commune 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
0.00 0.76 0.60 0.45 
D_TM β6 Dummy variable household located in To Mua commune 1.00 0.00 0.38 0.48 
D_mate β7 Dummy variable of household does not apply materials 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 
       
Efficiency effects     
mem_age δ1 Age of household head 46.73 42.71 42.94 44.10 
educ_mean δ2 Mean education year of family labours  6.39 6.63 5.87 6.25 
pro_fe_fam δ3 Proportion (%) of female family labour in total labour 0.41 0.51 0.40 0.43 
farm_income δ4 Number of farm income source (except tea production) 1.10 1.76 1.50 1.44 
pov_index δ5 Poverty index -0.04 0.08 -0.12 -0.04 
extenuse δ6 Number of extension use in a year 1.20 1.41 0.90 1.14 
tealoan δ7 Dummy variable that household apply credit to tea production 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.05 
v_2 δ8 Dummy variable household located in Ban Muong 0.00 0.47 0.24 0.23 
v_3 δ9 Dummy variable household located in Suoi Khem 0.00 0.29 0.36 0.23 
v_4 δ10 Dummy variable household located in Lien Hung 0.85 0.00 0.36 0.42 
v_5 δ11 Dummy variable household located in Khua Nhua 0.15 0.00 0.02 0.06 
       
Number of observation  40 34 50 124 
Note: All means of variables are not logged. 
Report period is last 12 months. 
Source: Own data 
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5.4. Hypothesis testing 
 
After the estimation, joint tests of several hypotheses were conducted with respect to the 
coefficients. The value of log-likelihood function is used for likelihood ratio test value 
specified: 
 
(5.1)  0 12 ln[ ( )] ln[ ( )]LR LL H LL H   . 
 
LL (H0) and LL (H1) denote the maximum value of restricted and unrestricted log-likelihood 
functions respectively. Test statistic is followed by number of restrictions of J, and test rejects 
H0 at the 100α% significant level if the test value exceeds the critical value 
2
1 ( )J  (Coelli et 
al., 2005).   
 
Table 5.2 shows the results using the estimations for likelihood ratio test. All the critical χ2 
values are taken from 1% level of significance. As per the Null hypothesis (1) that tests the 
H0, Cobb-Douglas production function is more adopted than translog function. Null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 1% level of significance, but can be rejected at the 5% 
level of significance. This implies that Cobb-Douglas production function is applicable at the 
1% level, and translog function is also applicable at the 5% level of significance. We cannot 
validate a functional form from likelihood ratio test, hence, we evaluate and compare the 
results of returns to scale and technical efficiency estimates derived from Cobb-Douglas 
function and translog function in the later part. 
 
Second Null hypothesis tests one-sided error term accounting for inefficiency, which is zero, 
since all households are technically efficient. The distribution of this test value follows a 
mixed-χ2 since inefficiency effects do not have the asymptotic chi-square distribution (Coelli, 
1995, and Coelli et al., 2005). H0is rejected at the significant level of 1%, hence we can 
conclude that tea farmers are not fully technical efficient.  
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Table 5.2  Likelihood ratio test of hypothesis for parameters of the inefficiency 
frontier model for tea farmers in north-western Vietnam 
Null hypothesis Description of test Crit. χ2 value Test value λ 
(1)
0 : 0, 1,...,4ijH i j     Functional form 18.31 19.94** 
(2) 0 : 0H    Inefficiency term 28.49
a)
 61.91*** 
(3) 0 1 7: ... 0H      Inefficiency determinants 24.73 50.28*** 
Note: The Null hypothesis is rejected at the **5%, and ***1% level of error probability. 
a) Critical value is obtained from mixed χ2 distribution. 
Source: Own data 
 
Last Null hypothesis accounts for the coefficients in inefficiency model that are jointly zero. 
This hypothesis was also strongly rejected at 1% level of significance. 
 
5.5. Estimated parameters in the Stochastic Frontier Model 
 
Table 5.3 presents the result of coefficients estimate in the stochastic frontier model. The 
signs for estimated coefficients in stochastic frontier are assumed, as only one variable 
D_mate shows negative estimation. Estimated coefficients of stochastic frontier by using 
Cobb-Douglas function can be directly interpreted as partial production elasticises.  
 
Coefficient of land size is 0.48 which has high significance as it indicates that by expanding 
1% of land size would result in 0.48% increase in output. The coefficient for labor is 
relatively smaller at 0.19, while the coefficient for material costs is 0.36 and highly 
significant. In table 5.1, difference in labour inputs between private and non-contract 
households is discernible. Additionally, we applied median tests to investigate the difference 
in inputs of family and hired labour between groups and the results show that hired labour 
spent for tea production is not significantly identical among the three groups. Therefore, we 
assessed the estimated result taking into consideration only family labour. The total number 
of family labour devoted to tea production is not significantly different among the three 
groups, but a mean of total days that family labour spends in tea production is significantly 
different between SOE and the other two groups. The insignificance coefficient estimate of 
labour in the frontier model can be related to the location of households that are in contract 
with SOE; due to the fact that it is the most mountainous remote area, it provides less job 
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opportunities than others. Thus, households contracting with SOE have not much choice of 
devoting their labour in any other work areas other than in tea production. All in all, there 
might be over input of labour, and this might result in insignificant coefficient estimate of 
labour.  
 
Significant coefficient estimate of material costs reveals a positive relationship between 
material input and total amount of production. Meanwhile, the coefficient of the age of tee is 
estimated to be insignificant, as well as the three dummy variables. One of the tea varieties, 
Shan Tuyet, accounted for 94% of our samples, which is a larger share compared to its 
nationwide distribution of 27% (MPI, 2006). Unfortunately, there is no empirical study on the 
economic age of Shan Tuyet variety in relation to its productivity. It can be grown only under 
limited conditions, hence it is adaptable only to mountainous regions. Therefore, Vietnamese 
government paid more attention to promoting new varieties instead of Shan Tuyet to scale up 
nationwide tea production. Apart from this, there is a common consensus on the relation 
between tree age and productivity: the older the better. But this is satisfied only under the 
condition that farmers control and manage the tree by pruning it from time to time, to make 
branches thick for getting more nutritious leaves. There is a possibility that the farmers in our 
samples may neglect this procedure or due to the lack of knowledge might influence the 
result of insignificant coefficient estimate of tree age.  
 
The commune dummy variables D_PL and D_TM are found to have insignificant coefficients. 
This confirms that there is no effect of geographical location including elevation on 
productivity. Dummy variable for no application of materials is estimated with an 
insignificant negative coefficient as assumed. This variable is used in place of a value of zero 
for ln_material to estimate the stochastic frontier in an unbiased way. Only two households 
out of 124 samples contain value of0. We can still confirm the effect of material use on 
productivity with an estimated coefficient of ln_material which is highly significant. 
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Table 5.3 Maximum likelihood estimates in the stochastic frontier model 
Dependent variable: Logged total amount of tea harvested in 2007 (kg) 
Variables  Description Coefficients  S.E.  
Constant β0  2.73 (0.65) *** 
ln_land β1 Land size 0.48 (0.08) *** 
ln_labour β2 Labor spent for tea production 0.19 (0.12)  
ln_material β3 Material costs 0.36 (0.08) *** 
ln_age β4 Age of tea trees 0.07 (0.08)  
D_PL β5 Dummy variable of Phieng Luong commune 0.60 (0.46)  
D_TM β6 Dummy variable of To Mua commune 0.06 (0.16)  
D_mate β7 Dummy variable of material costs -0.72 (0.51)  
     
Partial production elasticises 
ln_land   0.48 (0.08) *** 
ln_labour   0.19 (0.12)  
ln_material   0.36 (0.08) *** 
Returns to scale  1.03 (0.09)  
Note: Reporting period is last 12 months. 
Significant at the *10%, **5%, and ***1% level of error probability. 
Source: Own data 
 
5.6. Estimated parameters in the inefficiency model 
 
Table 5.4 shows the estimated coefficients of inefficiency and corresponding standard error. 
Age of household head (mem_age) is estimated negative, which indicates a positive effect on 
technical efficiency of production. This means that older farmers are more efficient than 
younger farmers. This can be attributed to the fact that older workers are more skilled in 
production due to their extensive experience. The coefficient of educ_mean is also 
significantly negative as assumed, and it confirms the effect of the level of education on 
efficiency. The coefficient for the proportion of female labour (pro_fe_fam) is negative and 
insignificant. This variable is supposed to represent the effect of plucking skill of female 
labour on technical efficiency as per the study on South Asian tea industries (see Sivaram, 
2000). The insignificant estimate of parameter may be due to the relatively small proportion 
of female labour in our sample ranging from 0.40 to 0.51 due to which we could not measure 
the contribution of female labour to efficiency. The coefficient of number of farm income 
sources (farm_income), except of tea production, is estimated significantly positive, which 
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implies that those farmers with diverse agricultural production tend to be less efficient in tea 
production. This is understandable considering the fact that specializing in tea production 
increases expertise of farmers, which may enhance production efficiency. Variable measures 
for relative poverty status of household (pov_index) shows that those with higher living 
standard are efficient but the measure is surprisingly insignificant. The variables extenuse and 
tealoan also have insignificant estimations, and efficiency increasing. Unfortunately, we 
could not obtain enough and accurate qualitative information about the level of knowledge on 
tea production of each farmer. The coefficient estimate pertaining to the use of extension 
service by the group of non-contract farm households was not statistically significant. We 
were supposed to investigate the impact of geographical location of villages on efficiency 
with dummy variables for villages (v_2 to v_5). Initially, we included a variable of distance 
measured from the tea field to the company where farmers have to transport their output. 
However, we decided to exclude that from our analysis due to the multi-collinearity problem 
with village dummies and its weak relationship to efficiency, relative to its estimated standard 
error. Furthermore, insignificant “efficiency reducing” estimates were observed among all 
villages, hence it can be assumed that geographical disadvantages with respect to 
transportation may not differ among the villages.  
 
Variance estimate of gamma (0<γ<1) is 0.94, hence efficiency effect is highly significant in 
the estimated model. 
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Table 5.4 Maximum likelihood estimates in the inefficiency effects model 
Variables  Description Coefficients  S.E.  
      
Constant δ0  -2.53 (6.32)  
mem_age δ1 Age of household head -0.02 (0.01) * 
educ_mean δ2 Mean education year of family labour -0.11 (0.05) ** 
pro_fe_fam δ3 Proportion of female labour -0.13 (0.45)  
farm_income δ4 Number of farm income sources 0.26 (0.16) * 
povindex δ5 Poverty index -0.02 (0.14)  
extenuse δ6 Use of extension service -0.05 (0.11)  
tealoan δ7 Application of credit -0.22 (0.51)  
v_2 δ8 Dummy variable of village 2 5.44 (6.29)  
v_3 δ9 Dummy variable of village 3 4.89 (6.20)  
v_4 δ10 Dummy variable of village 4 3.38 (6.17)  
v_5 δ11 Dummy variable of village 5 4.79 (6.51)  
       
Variance parameters     
sigma-squared (σ2)  0.60 (0.17) *** 
Gamma (γ)  0.94 (0.05) *** 
Mean efficiency  0.50   
Note: Reporting period is last 12 months. 
Significant at the *10%, **5%, and ***1% level of error probability. 
Source: Own data 
 
 
5.7. Assessing predictive performance derived from Cobb-Douglas and translog 
function 
 
5.7.1. Returns to scale 
 
As the likelihood ratio test did not provide enough evidence of validity to use the Cobb-
Douglas function in the previous section, we first compared the results of returns to scale and 
the technical efficiency estimates. 
 
Table 5.5 shows the values of returns to scale obtained from Cobb-Douglas and translog 
function and the t-value of tested Null hypothesis. T-values are used for testing the Null 
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hypotheses that are constant returns to scale, and testing the value of returns to scale yielded 
from translog function is the same as that of Cobb-Douglas function. These are calculated 
from estimated partial productivity and sum of covariance. 
 
Table 5.5 Returns to scale and t-value derived from Cobb-Douglas and translog 
functions 
Functional 
form 
Returns to 
scale 
t-value 
 
 
H0: Constant returns to scale H0: Returns to scale is 1.03 
Cobb-Douglas  1.03 0.32 - 
Translog 0.87 -0.02  -0.04 
Source: Own data 
 
All three t-values did not exceed critical values so they validate the Null hypotheses. It can be 
concluded that returns to scale derived from Cobb-Douglas function are constant. For model 
adequacy, returns to scale estimated from translog function are not different from that of 
Cobb-Douglas function. Hence, Cobb-Douglas function is applicable to this data. 
 
5.7.2. Test of efficiency estimates 
 
Model adequacy of production function is often evaluated by conducting some tests (Coelli et 
al., 2005). Lastly, we compare the estimates of technical efficiency yielded from Cobb-
Douglas and translog functions, and evaluate the validity of applying Cobb-Douglas function 
for our data. 
 
Table 5.6 shows the ranking test for technical efficiency estimates of both Cobb-Douglas and 
translog function. As values are not normally distributed, we applied Wilcoxon signed ranks 
test using the test value of: 
 
(5.1) 
'
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Where Ri
(+)
 is the rank assigned to the pair of technical efficiency estimates derived from 
Cobb-Douglas and translog functions of i-th household (Xi, Yi) with n’ observations that are  
Xi> Yi. When n’>50, the distribution of W is approximated to normal distribution (see 
Conover, 1999). Therefore, we can use standardized Z-test statistic with mean µw and 
standard deviation σw, that is: 
 
(5.2) Z  w
w
W 


. 
 
Table 5.6 Test of efficiency estimates of Cobb-Douglas function and 
translog function by Wilcoxon signed ranks test 
 Number of observations 
Negative ranks (Cobb-Douglas
 a)
<Translog
 b)
) 67  
Positive ranks (Cobb-Douglas >Translog) 57  
Ties (Cobb-Douglas = Translog) 0  
Total 124  
Z-test statistic -1.62  
p-value 
c)
 0.11  
Note: 
a). b) 
Ranking in overall technical efficiency estimation in 
a)
Cobb-
Douglas function and 
b)
Translog function. 
c)
 Test the Null Hypothesis that the difference of median between pairs of 
observations is zero. 
Source: Own data.
 
 
The Null hypothesis that the median difference between pairs of observation is zero cannot be 
rejected. Therefore, we can conclude that the technical efficiency estimates of Cobb-Douglas 
and translog functions are identical. Kopp and Smith (1980) evaluated empirical performance 
on three different functional forms (Cobb-Douglas, CES, and translog) of frontier estimation. 
Their results revealed “discernible but rather small impact on estimated efficiency”. All in all, 
we affirm the validity of Cobb-Douglas function by applying it for our technical efficiency 
analysis by evaluating predictive performance in the following section. 
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5.8. Technical efficiency estimates 
 
The functional adequacy of Cobb-Douglas function is satisfied by applying several post-
estimation tests. Following these results, we assessed the technical efficiency estimate 
derived from Cobb-Douglas function. Figure 5.2 shows the frequency of estimated technical 
efficiency of all 124 samples and of each group. Equal distribution of frequencies is observed 
neither in the overall sample, nor in the group‟s sample. While frequency distribution of SOE 
is upward-sloping, non-contract is unbalanced and is marked by a frequent count of the 
lowest range (0.1 to 0.2) compared to the other two groups.  
 
Figure 5.2 Frequency of technical efficiency estimates 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Vertical axis presents counts of frequency. 
Source: Own data. 
 
Table 5.7 presents the result of a non-parametric rank test (Kruskal-Willis test) used for 
comparing technical efficiency estimates between the three groups. Null hypothesis is 
rejected at 1% of significant level, so that further estimation of multiple comparisons is 
applied which is shown in table 5.8. In the rank test, estimated technical efficiency of SOE is 
the highest, which is also confirmed by the visual analysis of frequency distribution.   
  
All samples (n=124) 
Technical Efficiency Estimates 
SOE 
Private 
Non 
Contract 
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Table 5.7 Test of mean ranks of technical efficiency  
 Mean rank N 
SOE 78.88 40 
Private 59.56 34 
Non contract 51.40 50 
Test value
 a)
 13.30  
Critical χ2 value   9.21***  
Note: a) Test the Null Hypothesis that the rank difference 
between groups is zero. 
b) Weighted sample. 
*** Significant at the 1% level of error probability. 
Source: Own data. 
 
According to the results of multiple comparisons (see table 5.8), households contracted with 
state-owned enterprises achieve significantly higher technical efficiency compared to the 
other two groups. Significant difference in technical efficiency between SOE and Private is 
perhaps due to the difference in experience in tea production. SOE has been engaged in tea 
production since the 1950s, which is the longest in the region. The production expertise of 
extension workers of companies might differ in their quality, in terms of technological advice, 
or timely input provisions, which might affect technical efficiency. In addition, as seen in 
Chapter 4, SOE directly hires regional extension/ technical workers in each contracted village. 
In contrast, private company ensures farmers are in direct contact with the regional farmer‟s 
association due to their limited knowledge or skill of tea production. The difference in the 
level of direct management of farmers might influence the incentive or motivation of 
extension workers in the following way; though SOE follows strict control of technical 
officer‟s work, it leaves room for compensations on their achievement, thereby increasing 
technical workers‟ incentives. On the other hand, private companies lack monitoring 
mechanisms for technical workers. And due to an indirect relationship between their 
achievements and profits, it results in reduced incentives for the workers to provide accurate 
and adequate advice for enhancing production and hence lowering technical efficiency.  
 
Estimated technical efficiency of non-contract group is the lowest in a ranking test, but only 
significantly different from that of SOE.  
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Table  5.8 Test for multiple comparisons  
Compared groups
 
p-value
 a)
 of Mann-Whitney U test  
SOE – Private  0.011*** 
SOE – Non contract  0.001*** 
Private – Non contract  0.226 
Note: 
a)
 Significance level is 0.05/(number of 
comparisons) following the adjustment of Bonferroni 
correction to avoid statistical error of type I. 
Source: Own data.
 
 
5.9. Conclusion and discussion 
 
In this chapter, we applied the Stochastic Production Frontier Function to estimate technical 
efficiency associated with socio-economic characteristics of households, and assess the 
difference among the groups. High coefficient estimates of partial production elasticity 
associated with land size and material costs were derived. The effect of each input on the 
productivity could not be assessed, because material cost is a sum of costs pertaining to 
fertilizers, manures, and pesticides to avoid the multicollinearity problem in a model. It is 
necessary to apply an appropriate amount of fertilizer and in the right time frame in order to 
increase tea yield (Sedaghathoor et al., 2009), which requires some level of expertise in 
pesticide management. In our research site, we observed crop failure caused by over-
application of pesticides due to the lack of producer‟s knowledge. Thus, although the result 
shows that increase in material input might enhance productivity, it also requires careful and 
cautious implementation.  
In the model of technical efficiency estimates, a significantly higher estimate of the group 
which is in contract with SOE is identified by applying non-parametric tests. This observation 
is associated with three different household characteristics: age, education and number of 
farm income. Contrary to our expectation, the living standard of households is not a 
determining factor for achieving higher technical efficiency. This result leads to the concern 
that there might be a selection bias if the contract participation is associated with household 
characteristics. In this case, it is not appropriate to apply only the statistical tests to compare 
the technical efficiency estimates among the groups. Tayler and Shonkwiler (1986) estimated 
the technical efficiency of Brazilian farmers under the influence of a credit programme 
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sponsored by World Bank (PRODEMATA), by applying two alternative frontier 
specifications. Their conclusion is slightly disappointing and confusing since very different 
influences derived from each model. In addition, the effect of the credit programme in 
improving technical efficiency is not clear due to the lack of further assessment on 
homogeneity of the frontier on programme participation. In order to deal with the 
homogeneity problem in our model, we applied a treatment effects model to control for 
selection bias, and estimate the technical efficiency with reduced bias samples. The treatment 
effect model and its result are presented later (see chapter 7). 
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6. DETERMINANTS OF CONTRACT PARTICIPATION 
 
 
6.1. Objective and methodology 
 
In order to answer the research question: what are the determining factors to participate in a 
contract, the binary outcome model was chosen which yields the probability of participation. 
Although there are probit and logit models that are standard qualitative outcome models for 
estimating probability, the results attained by both models are not very different in terms of 
binary outcomes. The only difference in the two models is the specification of probability as 
a function of regressors. Hence, the choice of model depends more on the preference, and the 
purpose of post estimation calculations. In this study, logit model was chosen because it 
yields odds ratio that is applied later to the propensity score matching. 
 
Let Yi denote participation in the contract of i-th household, where Yi=1 represents 
participation, and Yi=0 represents non-participation. xij denotes the socio-economic 
characteristics of household i. The logit model specifies: 
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Where 0 <pi< 1. ( )  . This is the logistic cumulative distribution function, with
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Maximum likelihood estimation leads to the estimation of parameter βi (i=1,.., j). 
 
In the logit models, the marginal effects can be easily obtained from the estimated 
coefficients, since / (1 )i ij i i jp x p p     , where ( )i i ip x     (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2005).  
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When Pi denotes i-th household‟s probability of participation, (1 – Pi) denotes probability of 
no participation, so that Pi / (1 – Pi) can be defined as an odds ratio which measures relative 
probability of participation (Yi =1) to non participation (Yi=0).  
In the logit model, Pi/ (1–Pi) = exp( )ix   so that the log-odds ratio which is linear in the 
regressors can be defined by ln
1
i
i
i
p
x
p


which can be directly obtained from coefficients 
estimate. 
 
6.2. Variables in the model 
 
Ten variables that are assumed to determine contract participation, are included in the model 
(see table 6.1). All the variables including the dependent variable were obtained from a 
household survey. Variable av_age_adult denotes the average age of adults in the household 
and forms the basis for the hypothesis that the younger the age there is an increased chance of 
participation in a contract, given the fact that contract farming is a relatively new activity. 
According to this hypothesis, farmers belonging to older age group would be more 
conservative in a manner that they would want to protect their habits, customs and are not 
willing to embrace changes. Variable edu_second_pro is the proportion of adults who 
finished secondary school or proportion of adults who completed more than nine years of 
education. Variable tea_experience represents the number of years of experience in tea 
production. The more experienced a household has in tea production, the more likely that 
household has developed a larger and tighter social network and reputation with the traders or 
buyers. The Variable distance is the distance from the field where farmers produce tea to the 
closest tea company. This variable takes into account the transportation cost that households 
can reduce if the distance is shorter, an incentive that encourages contract participation.  
The Variable p_t_income is the proportion of tea income in the overall income of a household 
in the year 1997, before contracting started in 1998. With this variable, the influence on 
contract participation of being tea producer before entering into a contract could be observed. 
The Variable child_rate is the ratio of child dependency on an adult, which assumes that 
households having more children tend to avoid marketing risks, leading to contract 
participation. Variable red_book is the area of tea field belonging to a farmer with the land 
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title issued by the Vietnamese government. Land allocation ensures equality and efficient use 
of land with the recent most allocation in the area having taken place in the year 2003. It 
provides farmers with a land hold for a period of 50 years, and enables the implementation of 
a long-term production plan, an incentive for farmers to invest in their own land. Planting 
perennial crops like tea requires long-term planning, and farmers who are into tea production 
prefer avoiding associated risks by choosing a marketing channel like contract farming. In 
addition, in a liberalized land market, smallholders tend to be excluded from contract farming 
due to the concentrated land ownership of more competitive farmers. Since the Vietnamese 
government permits farmers to sell or rent their land use rights, there are efficient resource 
allocations introduced in the land market which may enhance the economy of scale in 
production. Meanwhile, rental markets dealing in lands without titles do exist, but it is 
assumed that farmers would not invest in these kinds of land because of uncertain land 
assurance, and lack of incentives, and in fact, such cases were rarely observed in our sample. 
Therefore, we assume that those who have more land with legal titles including leased land 
holders prefer to participate in contracts from the aspect of minimizing the risk associated 
with production and marketing, and in accordance with their long-term investment plans. The 
Variable res_year stands for the number of years of residence of a household in the inhabited 
village. We expect that those who stay in a village for a longer time period have more 
chances to obtain the information with respect to their broader community network, and this 
provides easier access to information about contract farming, which might enhance contract 
participation. The Variable org_adult is the number of memberships in organizations 
(governmental, agricultural, trade, political, NGOs, local groups, major mass organizations) 
per adult. It represents the accessibility to information for households. As mentioned earlier, 
contract farming in the area is a relatively new concept, hence one way to introduce new 
farming schemes is through word of mouth, for example in the meeting of organizations. It is 
assumed that those who belong to more organizations rather tend to participate in contracts. 
 
  
Chapter 6.Determinants of contract participation 
 
82 
 
Table 6.1 Average characteristics of tea farmers in the logit model 
Variables    Mean  
Dependent variable: Contract participation (1=yes, 0=no) SOE Private 
Non- 
contract 
av_age_adult Average age of adults (age between 15 to 65) 34.2 34.4 32.3 
sq_av_age_adult Square of average age of adults 1186.5 1207.7 1079.6 
edu_second_pro Proportion of adults who finished secondary 
school 0.5 0.5 0.4 
tea_experience No. of years of Experience in tea production 17.0 8.9 7.9 
distance Weighted distance to the selling site of tea 
leaves 1224.0 746.1 1072.8 
p_t_income Proportion of income from tea production in 
1997 0.2 0.0 0.1 
child_rate Child dependency ratio 0.3 0.3 0.3 
red_book Proportion of tea area with land title 0.9 0.6 0.7 
res_year Years of residence in the village 20.3 18.0 17.7 
org_adult Number of memberships in organizations per 
adult 0.9 1.4 1.0 
Number of observations 40 34 50 
Source: Own data. 
 
6.3. Test for overall fitness of binary logit model 
 
The Goodness-of-fit test for logistic regression evaluates the null hypothesis that there is no 
difference between observed and predicted probability. It is aimed to compare the observed 
and expected number of outcomes for each independent variable. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
(1980) proposed the fit measure with the test statistics distributed as chi-square. They 
recommended dividing the observations into 10 equal sized groups according to their 
predicted probabilities. Then the test statistic with M - k degrees of freedom is: 
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Where:  
k is the number of independent variables, 
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M is the total number of covariate patterns among N observations,  
j is the number of covariate patterns where j=1,…,M, 
mj is the total number of observations having covariate pattern j, 
yj is the total number of positive responses among observations with covariate pattern j, and 
pj is the predicted probability of positive outcome. 
Since there are too few observations for each covariate M, the data is divided into 10 deciles 
to compare the groups in Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test. 
 
Table 6.2 Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test 
a)
 
Number of 
observations 
Number of 
groups 
Hosmer-Lemeshow 
chi
2
 
Prob > 
chi
2
 
124 10 5.59 0.69 
Note: 
a)
 Tests the null hypothesis that there is no difference between 
observed and model predicted value. 
Source: Own data 
 
Table 6.2 presents the result of Hosmer-Lomeshow test. The value of probability of Chi-
square test statistic is far from 0.01, which indicates that the model estimation fits with the 
1% level of significance, so that rejects the null hypothesis.  
 
6.4. Empirical results 
 
Table 6.3 shows the results of determinants to contract participation derived from logit model. 
Six variables are significant at different error probability levels. 
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Table 6.3 Parameters estimated of contract participation in logit model  
Variables Description 
a)
 Coefficients (S.E.) 
Marginal 
Effects 
Dependent variable: Contract participation (1=yes, 0=no) 
av_age_adult Average age adults 1.384 (0.455)*** 0.318 
sq_av_age_adult Age squared -0.018 (0.006)*** -0.004 
edu_second_pro Education  1.273 (0.751)* 0.293 
tea_experience Experience in tea production 0.100 (0.042)** 0.023 
distance Distance -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 
p_t_income Income share from tea in 1997 0.831 (1.263) 0.191 
child_rate Child dependency ratio 0.697 (1.279) 0.160 
red_book Land tenure 0.235 (0.559) 0.054 
res_year Year of residence -0.048 (0.027)* -0.011 
org_adult Memberships in organizations 0.961 (0.440)** 0.221 
Constant -27.221 (8.009)*** - 
Pseudo R squared 0.215   
Log likelihood -65.670   
LR chi
2
 35.890 ***   
% of correct prediction  71.77%  
Note: 
a)
 More detailed descriptions of variables are presented in table 6.1. 
Significant at the *10%, **5%, and ***1% level of error probability. 
Source: Own data. 
 
The average age of adults (av_age_adult) is found to be highly significant since it has the 
highest marginal effect on contract participation among all parameters. According to the 
estimation, if the average age of households increases due to an addition of one older person, 
the probability of contract participation would increase by 31.8%. This tendency of older 
farmers participating more in contracts than younger farmers can be explained as follows: 
Older farmers tend to be more averse to the risks associated with marketing and production, 
which can be alleviated by participating in a contract. The proportion of adults finishing 
secondary school (edu_second_pro) is significant at 10% level of error probability, and has a 
positive effect on contract participation. It shows a Marginal effect of 0.29, which implies 
that a household with 1% higher proportion of educated adults would lead to an increase in 
contract participation by 29%. As shown in many studies, education level is one of the vital 
factors influencing decision making. In our case, education level leads to positive 
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participation in a contract. The number of years of experience in tea production 
(tea_experience) is estimated to be at 5% significant level, which has a positive impact on 
contract participation. Its marginal effect is 2.3% which is relatively lower than the former 
two variables. It seems that if farmers have more expertise in tea production, they would be 
more aware of the advantages of participating in a contract. Contrary to our assumption that 
farmers who have more  experience establish their own marketing strategy, including 
marketing channel, the estimated result might have been impacted by the constraint of limited 
market access in the region due to its remoteness. The number of years of residence of a 
household in a village (res_year) negatively impacts contract participation, at 10% of 
significant level. The reason might be that those who live longer in a village tend to not 
participate in a contract perhaps due to the creation of larger social networks, which then 
leads to the establishment of individual market connections. The number of memberships in 
organizations per adult (org_adult) shows a positive effect on contract participation at 5% 
level of significance. It can be assumed that those who belong to more organizations can 
create broader social networks, where they can access and collect information about contract 
farming. Access to information is one of the most important determinants of contract 
participation; hence those who have more information can be convinced to participate. This is 
indicated by a marginal effect of 0.22, which implies that one additional membership in an 
organization increases the probability of contract participation by 22%.   
 
6.5. Summary 
 
The binary logit model was applied to identify the determinants of contract participation of 
tea farmers. The results revealed that six out of ten variables associated with household 
characteristics which are included in the model are significant determinants of contract 
participation. They are: average age of adults, squared average age of adults, proportion of 
adults who completed secondary school, number of years of experience of households in tea 
production, number of years of residence in a village and average number of organizations‟ 
memberships of adults The average age of adults shows the highest marginal effect of 0.32, 
perhaps due to the fact that elder producers are more risk averse, or less capable of risk 
management. This result validates the theory that we discussed in Chapter 2 on the relation 
between degree of integration in the value chain and producers‟ risk-averse attitude. 
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Education of adults also has considerable influence on contract participation with a marginal 
effect of 0.29. It revealed that education is an important influence on decision making 
especially in terms of employing specific marketing strategy in a rural society which lacks or 
has limited access to information. 
 
These results from the binary logit model are applied on matching methods in the next 
chapter, in order to obtain further accurate measurements of the impact of contract 
participation on income and production efficiency.  
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7. IMPACT OF CONTRACT PARTICIPATION ON INCOME AND 
TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY 
 
In this chapter, we investigate the impact of contract participation on income and technical 
efficiency by applying propensity matching. Before doing so, however, we first review the 
literature on contract farming, focusing on recent empirical research on the economic impact 
of contract farming. 
 
7.1. Objective and methodology 
 
Contract farming has been analyzed with interest in its economic impact on livelihood from 
different dimensions. Minot (1986) discussed the role of smallholders in the course of 
economic growth and the influence of contract farming. By considering all the potentials and 
constraints of contract farming, he concluded that in almost all cases contract farming 
succeeded in improving income. Comparative case studies of African countries by Glover 
and Kunsterer (1990) and Little and Watts (1994) attempted to develop an overall scheme for 
contract farming and to comprehensively assess its social impact. 
 
Warning and Key (2002) determined how participation in the NOVASEN (a private 
company) program affected the agricultural income of 32,000 peanut growers in Senegal. 
They found that contract participation (participation in the program) had an impact on their 
income, compared to those who did not participate. Similarly, Miyata et al. (2007) examined 
the impact of contract participation on household income of apple and green onion farmers in 
China. Both studies controlled unobservable factors by applying selection correction models 
to contract participation and income models in order to obtain unbiased results. 
 
Ramaswami et al. (2006) focused on the efficiency factor in contract farming of Indian 
poultry producers. They found that producers involved in contracts reached higher efficiency 
mainly due to a higher feed-conversion ratio. Moreover, by estimating the average returns of 
contract and non-contract producers, they concluded that a contract enables farmers with 
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poorer prospects to generate a comparable income to non-contract farmers with better 
prospects. 
 
The impact of contract farming on income can be estimated by applying propensity score 
matching. Propensity score matching was first proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).It 
is a treatment effect correction model used to reduce bias when estimating the effect of 
treatments. As a non-experimental approach, propensity score matching has been applied in 
many projects and policy evaluation studies because it formulates comparison of treatment 
groups better than previous models and enables estimation of the reduced-bias treatment 
effect. In the studies of contract farming, Katchova (2008) applied propensity score matching 
to correct farmer‟s receiving price from contractors depending on whether the contracted 
group has alternative marketing choice or not. It is based on a principal-agent study, and 
revealed the absence of price distortion in six different agricultural commodity markets of 
contract farming where there were no marketing options. Fort and Ruben (2009) investigated 
the impact of fair trade involvement on farmers‟ income and the overall welfare indicators of 
Peruvian banana farmers by applying propensity score matching. There are two other 
commonly used correction models for cross-sectional data: Instrument Variable Method and 
Heckman Selection Correction Model. The disadvantages of applying these models to this 
study are, that first there is no suitable variable associated with contract participation that is 
independent of income estimation for instrument variable approach; second, the Heckman‟s 
correction model assumes strict condition of distribution function of joint error term 
associated with participation and income equation, which does not fit with our data (Owusu 
and Abdulai, 2009, and Bryson et al., 2002). Propensity score matching does not require any 
functional form assumption for matching and thus can obtain more robust estimation than 
imposing regression model with the risk of inaccurate distributional assumption. Also, if the 
variables in the participation and income equation mostly overlap, like in this study, it will 
result in a multicollinearity problem between participation and income assumptions. Because 
of these assumptions of our data, propensity score matching was more applicable than any 
other approach for estimating impact of contract participation on income. 
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The expected treatment effect of contract participation is the difference between the actual 
income and the income if they did not participate. This can be written following Ravallion 
(2001): 
 
(7.1) 1 0( | 1)i i iATT E Y Y D   . 
 
Where Yji denotes the actual income of the i-th farmer participating in a contract (j=1), and 
otherwise (j=0). 
D denotes contract participation, 1=participate, 0=otherwise. 
 
ATTi, the conditional mean impact or Average Treatment effect on Treatment (ATT), is 
conditional on contract participation. In other words, ATTi is the income difference between 
the observable outcome of treatment and the unobservable counterfactual outcome of control. 
The mean difference from sample estimation between observable treatment and control is 
written as: 
 
(7.2) 1 0( | 1) ( | 0)E Y D E Y D ATT      . 
 
Term ε denotes bias given by 
 
(7.3) 0 0( | 1) ( | 0)E Y D E Y D     . 
 
The equation (7.3) is the difference between the counterfactual mean of contract participation 
and the mean output of non-participation. 
 
The true parameter of ATT is identified only if the outcome of treatment and control under the 
absence of contract are the same. This is written as: 
 
(7.4) 0 0( | 1) ( | 0) 0.E Y D E Y D     
 
The situation expressed in the equation (7.4) might be possible if contract participation is 
randomized as long as it provides the same mean and equal whole distribution between 
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participant and non-participant (Ravallion, 2001). However, there are no “perfect” random 
samplings in practice due to the sampling error. Additionally, average treatment effect is 
defined as: 
 
(7.5) 1 0( )iATE E Y Y  . 
 
To measure ATE, both counterfactual outcomes of E (Y1| D = 0) and E (Y0| D = 1) need to be 
estimated. The possible identification strategy to overcome the problem of measuring 
counterfactual outcomes is to make Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) which 
enables comparison between outcomes from both treatment and control with the same value 
of Xs. This can be written as: 
 
(7.6) 0 1, |Y Y D X . 
 
Equation (7.6) indicates that outcome is independent of the treatment assignment 
(participating in a contract) by controlling observable Xs. 
 
To evaluate the impact of participation on income, all observable characteristics Xs between 
the contract (treatment) and the non-contract (control) group have to be the same. The initial 
idea of Propensity Score Matching was to construct a variable derived from all Xs in order to 
avoid fitting same values for each variables pertaining to each treatment and control samples, 
which is impossible. The procedure of Propensity Score Matching starts by obtaining 
probability of participation p(x) for all samples through either probit or logit model. To 
estimate the participation probability, logit model with its maximum likelihood method is 
often preferred due to its consistency of parameter estimation associated with the assumption 
that error term v in the equation has a logistic distribution (Ravallion, 2001, and Baker, 2000). 
After estimating the propensity score, the results of both treatment and control are compared 
under the condition of: 
 
(7.7) 0 ( 1| ) 1p D X   . 
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Equation (7.7) presents an overlap assumption, that is, samples with the same value of Xs 
have a positive probability of being both treatment and control (Smith and Todd, 2004, and 
Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith, 1999).  
 
7.2. Matching method  
 
Once the propensity score (estimated probability of participation) is estimated, the use of 
either propensity score or odds ratio for the matching method needs to be decided. The ratio 
of number of treatments to controls has to be considered because the one which is 
oversampled, relative to its frequency in the population, misleads the estimations with 
incorrect weights (Smith and Todd, 2005, Baker, 2000, and Heckman, 2008). Heckman and 
Smith (1995) investigated this issue and found that matching methods are applied even with 
unknown weights, considering the fact that odds ratio with incorrect weights is scalar 
multiple of the true odds ratio, and this is the monotonic transformation of propensity score 
(Heckman and Smith, 1995, and Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005). In the nearest neighbour 
matching method, ranking of observation is identical so that same neighbours are selected 
anyway; it does not matter whether to choose odds ratio with incorrect weights or propensity 
score as a matching indicator. Whereas, in the matching that is performed on absolute 
distance, such as kernel matching, it is necessary to consider these issues of choosing 
between odds ratio and propensity score.  
 
In the next step, the matched controls for each treatment are explored using selected matching 
algorithms on the estimated probability as a propensity score. The matching algorithm for this 
study is the single nearest neighbour due to the nature of the dataset. Each treated sample will 
be matched to one closest untreated sample in terms of estimated propensity score (odds 
ratio). Matching is done with replacement in consideration of relative sample size of control 
on treatment. In other words, each untreated sample can be used more than one time for 
matching. Region of common support Sp is imposed to eliminate the treatments if their 
estimated propensity scores are higher or lower than the maximum or minimum propensity 
score of controls. Assuming that treatment unit i matched with control unit j, pi and pj denote 
estimated propensity score of each treatment and of matched control of each treatment. 
Nearest neighbour sets the unit of control j for treatment i with: 
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(7.8) ( ) min || ||i j
j
C i p p  . 
 
After the matching, the difference between the outcome of treatment and the outcome of 
weighted matched control, ATTi is estimated with the following equation: 
 
(7.9) 
1 0
1 01
1
[ ]
p
i i ij j
i I S j I
ATT Y W Y
n   
    
 
Where n
1
 denotes the number of persons in the set of I1 ∩Sp,  
I1 is the set of treatment, and I0 is the set of control. 
Sp is the region of common support, 
Yi1 is the outcome of observed treatment unit,  
Yj0 is the outcome of matched control unit, and 
Wij is a weight where Wij=1 if ( )j C i , and Wij=0 otherwise. This weight is arrived at 
depending on the distance between pi and pj. 
 
7.3. Distribution of propensity scores before and after matching 
 
After matching treatments and controls, we first check for the common support functions in 
the matching procedure which is dropping treatment observations whose propensity score is 
higher than the maximum or lower than the minimum propensity score of the controls.  
For this, distribution of propensity score between the treatment and control is checked by 
visual analysis before and after matching. For visual analysis of propensity score distribution 
before and after matching, density function is commonly applied to check the overlap and the 
region of common support (see figure 7.1). Note that the propensity score in this study is 
odds ratio p / (1-p), where p denotes estimated probability gathered from logit model.  
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Figure 7.1 Kernel density before and after matching 
 
 
 
Source: Own data 
 
After the matching, observations that hold larger number of propensity scores are dropped, 
and both groups yield similar density function of propensity scores.  
 
7.4. Assessing the matching quality: Balancing test before and after matching 
 
After matching, several tests are applied to assess the matching quality. Although there are 
several tests for sensitivity analysis that take into account hidden bias associated with 
contract participation, they are not applicable for this study due to the selected matching 
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method. However, sensitivity analysis in observational studies has become very important, 
hence, the brief concept developed by Rosenbaum (2002) is shown in Appendix 1.  
Matching quality is assessed by three different tests comparing groups before and after 
matching.  
 
7.4.1. Standardized test of differences of normalized covariates between groups 
 
Test of Standardized bias before and after matching was developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1985) that checks the balance between the treatment group and control. They suggest that 
standardized bias can be large if the absolute estimate is larger than 20. Standardized biases 
were first developed by comparing the mean of continuous variables between two groups, 
and are the common approach in many evaluation studies (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005). 
The standardized bias is defined by the formula: 
 
(7.10) ( ) 100. ( ) 100.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
T C TM CM
Before After
T C TM CM
X X X X
B X B X
V X V X V X V X
 
 
 
 
Where: 
,T CX X are the sample means of treatment and control before matching.  
,TM CMX X are the sample means of treatment and control after matching, and 
( )V X is the corresponding sample variance. 
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Table 7.1 Test of standardized bias   
 
 
 
 
Table 7.1 shows the result of the test of standardized bias. Since all variables between 
treatment and control are not expected to be the same before matching, there are obvious 
differences in covariates between treatment and control resulting in a value exceeding 20, or 
in a value not close to zero. The standardized biases of several variables are reduced after 
matching as they become smaller or closer to the value of zero. But the variables distance and 
org_adult are still imbalanced leading to a larger bias after matching. Although the variable 
tea_experience showed reduced bias after matching, the absolute value of standardized bias is 
still larger then 20,which means there are some differences remaining between contract and 
non-contract groups after matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985, and Lee, 2006). 
 
7.4.2. Test for equality of each variable between groups 
 
The test for normality of all variables in the model reveals some of them are not normally 
distributed. Because of this reason, Mann-Whitney U is estimated to check the equality of 
explanatory variables before and after matching. 
Mann-Whitney test statistic is given with the test value by Conover (1999, p.273) when the 
population of each group exceeds 20:  
Variables  
Standardized bias 
before matching 
Standardized bias after 
matching 
av_age_adult 35.81  3.20 
sq_av_age_adult 29.05  3.94 
edu_second_pro 34.49  17.83 
tea_experience 64.83  -38.35 
distance -6.40  28.41 
p_t_income_sum 32.04  17.38 
child_rate -8.44  -4.61 
red_book 15.89  0.04 
reg_year 14.84  6.69 
org_adult 19.98  61.67 
Number of samples   124 107
 a) 
(=124 weighted) 
a)
Number of samples of Standardized bias after matching is 124 when it is 
weighted to adjust the number of matched control for number of all 
matched treatment that are Ntreatment ( =62 ) + Ncontrol ( =62 ) = 124. 
Source: Own data 
Chapter 7. Impact of Contract Participation on Income and Technical Efficiency 
96 
 
(7.11) 
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Where: 
nX denotes the random sample of size n from population 1, which is smaller than the other 
non-contract group, 
1
( )
n
i
i
R X

 denotes the sum of ranks assigned to the sample from population1, 
N is the number of total samples of both groups, 
m is the size of the other population group (contract group), 
2
1
n
i
i
R

 refers to the sum of the squares of all N of the ranks. 
 
Table 7.2 Mann-Whitney U test of each variable before and after matching 
Variables 
p-Value of U statistic 
before matching 
p-Value of U statistic 
after matching 
av_age_adult 0.011**  0.958 
sq_av_age_adult 0.011**  0.958 
edu_second_pro 0.061  0.212 
tea_experience 0.000***  0.254 
distance 0.250  0.062 
p_t_income_sum 0.036**  0.774 
child_rate 0.593  0.738 
red_book 0.267  0.871 
reg_year 0.290  0.984 
org_adult 0.909  0.022** 
Number of samples 124  107 (=124 weighted) 
Significant at the ** 5% level, and *** 1% level of error probability. 
Source: Own data 
 
Table 7.2 presents the test result. Before matching, six variables are significantly different 
between the treatment group (contract) and the control group (non-contract), and after 
matching only org_adult is significantly different between the two groups at 5% level of error 
probability.  
 
Chapter 7. Impact of Contract Participation on Income and Technical Efficiency 
97 
 
7.4.3. Test for joint equality of all variables between groups 
 
Hotelling‟s T2 tests the equality of means of multiple variables. It is applied to see the robust 
joint equality of means of all the variables in the model, and tests for balances of the matched 
samples after nearest-neighbour matching with the null hypothesis; joint means of variables 
of the two groups are the same.  
 
Additionally, Pseudo R
2
 is compared before and after matching to check how the variables 
explain the probability of participating in the contract. If the matching is done well Pseudo 
R
2
might become lower, which ensures that there are no systematic differences in the 
distribution of covariates between the two groups, which means, the variables in the model 
are less explanatory for participating in the contract than before matching.  
 
Table 7.3 Hotelling’s t-test and Pseudo R2 before and after matching 
Test statistics Before matching After matching 
Hotelling‟s t-test, F-Value 3.5678*** 1.6486 
Pseudo R
2
 0.2146 0.1131 
Number of samples 124 107 (=124 weighted) 
***Significant at the 1% level or error probability. 
Source: Own data 
 
After matching, Hotelling‟s F-value becomes insignificant (see table 7.3), which indicates 
that there is no bias in the joint equality of the model between matched control and treatment, 
although the org_adult variable remains biased in the Mann-Whitney test. Also, Pseudo R
2
 
becomes lower after matching, leading to the conclusion that overall fitness of the model is 
acceptable. 
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7.4.4. Summary of balancing tests 
 
In the standardized bias test, three variables (tea_experience, distance, and org_adult) 
remained unbalanced after matching. The test compared the rank difference in each variable, 
which revealed that only the variable org_adult showed considerable difference between 
treatment and control. In the overall model fit test, Hotelling‟s T2 test cannot be rejected and 
PseudoR
2
becamelower after matching, which can be interpreted as the joint equality of 
variables between the two groups after matching. Hence, it can be concluded that the 
matching quality is acceptable after conducting three different balancing tests. 
 
7.5. Empirical results 
7.5.1. Impact of contract participation on income  
 
The results of the balancing tests showed that the matching was done with the acceptable 
level, so that the income (expenditure proxy) between contract and non-contract can be 
compared.  
 
Table 7.4 Difference of mean income daily per capita (‘000VND) 
between contract and non-contract 
 Before matching After matching 
Contract 27.450  25.164  
Non contract 23.537  24.269  
Difference 3.912  0.895  
p-value 0.209  0.013***  
% reduced bias -  77.1  
*** Significant at the 1% error probability. 
Source: Own data 
 
Table 7.4 presents the difference of mean income daily per capita between contract and non-
contract households before matching, which is 3,900 VND or USD 0.24 in September 2007. 
After matching, the difference became much smaller at 895 VND or USD 0.06. Considering 
that the outcome is estimated daily per capita income, and the average number of household 
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members with working age (above 15 and below 65 years old) of matched control group is 
3.40, this result could be taken as to an average 3,043 VND (895 VND multiplied by 3.4) 
income impact for each non-contract household if they participate in the contract (see table 
7.5). Non-contract households have the potential to increase their income by 2.7% by 
participating in contract production. 
 
Table 7.5 Selected results of household characteristics after matching 
  
Mean value 
 Contract Non contract p-value 
Daily expenditure per capita 25.16  24.27 
 
0.65 
Number of household members 4.84  4.74 
 
0.61 
Number of adults per household 3.66  3.40 
 
0.25 
Daily expenditure per household 120.40  112.80 
 
0.44 
Note: None of the variables is significant after matching. 
Source: Own data. 
 
7.5.2. Impact of contract participation on technical efficiency 
 
In the technical efficiency analysis, we conclude that household contracts with state-owned 
enterprise achieved significantly higher technical efficiency than non-contracted households. 
Furthermore, we evaluated the results of propensity score matching, as these households are 
comparable on the basis of their socio-economic characteristics, and applied matched samples 
to compare technical efficiency. 
 
Table 7.6 shows the result of ranking test of mean technical efficiency before and after the 
application of matching, of each contractual arrangement. There are slight changes in the 
absolute ranking value of matched samples, but the result stays the same for the unmatched 
samples. SOE achieved the highest technical efficiency, and private and non-contract groups 
were closer in their rankings after matching. Differences in mean technical efficiencies were 
observed with 1% of significant level, although test value became lower than the value before 
matching.  
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Table 7.6  Test of mean ranks of technical efficiency before and 
after matching (Kruskal- Willis test) 
 Before Matching After Matching 
 Mean rank N Mean rank N 
SOE 78.88 40 79.25 32 
Private 59.56 34 58.43 30 
Non-contract 51.40 50 55.82 62
 b)
 
Test value
 a)
 13.30    9.49  
Critical χ2 value   9.21***    9.21***  
a)
 Test the Null Hypothesis that the rank difference between groups is 
zero. 
b)
 Weighted sample. 
*** Significant at the 1% level of error probability. 
Source: Own data 
 
For a detailed comparison of mean technical efficiency among different contracts, multiple 
comparison of non-parametric test was applied. The results are presented in table 7.7. Before 
matching, SOE showed significant difference in technical efficiency compared to other two 
groups, but after matching, considerable difference was observed only between SOE and non-
contract group, and not between any other combinations. This indicates that SOE achieved 
significantly higher technical efficiency than non-contract. However, there was no major 
difference between SOE and Private and between Private and non-contract. These differences, 
with respect to the household characteristics, cannot be investigated using the contract 
participation model applied in Chapter 6.Binary logit model on the other hand, although it is 
applied to assess household characteristics as determining factors of contract participation, it 
does not distinguish between the participation of SOE or Private.  
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Table 7.7 Test for multiple comparison of technical efficiency 
Compared groups
 
p-value
 a)
 of Mann-Whitney U 
test before matching 
p-value
 a)
 of Mann-Whitney U 
test after matching 
SOE – Private  0.011***  0.025 
SOE – Non-contract  0.001***  0.000*** 
Private – Non-contract  0.226  0.144 
a)
 Significance level is 0.05/ (number of comparisons) following the adjustment of 
Bonferroni correction to avoid statistical error of type I. 
Source: Own data
 
 
Qualitative investigation might be affected by the difference in skilled family labor (Minot, 
1986, and Sivaram, 2000). Figure 7.2 shows that more than 50% of family labor of SOE has 
more than 10 years of experience in tea production, which can lead to more efficiency in 
management knowledge, or plucking skills in the most labor intensive stage resulting in 
better production efficiency. 
 
Figure 7.2 Number of years of experience in tea production of sampled households 
 
Source: Own data 
 
7.6. Conclusion and discussion 
 
Propensity score matching was applied to obtain the reduced bias treatment effect of contract 
participation on income and technical efficiency. Estimation revealed the significant impact 
of contract participation on income, by approximately 900VND per capita. This evaluation 
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works on the condition of contract participation or non-participation but doesn‟t take into 
account the type of contract households enter into. This is due to the division of research site 
where SOE and private have isolated their target villages respectively. Taking into account 
this situation in the framework of sampling design, binary logit model seemed to be the 
logical choice to investigate the determinants of contract participation and was applied. Based 
on this reasoning, although the mean technical efficiency of each group (SOE, Private and 
non-contract) was indeed estimated individually, the influential household characteristics 
derived from propensity score matching could not be directly used as a ground for the results. 
Technical efficiency estimates after matching revealed the significant difference between 
SOE and non-contract, and insignificant difference between Private and non-contract. It can 
be assumed that SOE enabled more precise and experienced extension service or technical 
advice compared to Private, which might have influenced the technical efficiency positively. 
Chapter8. Conclusions 
103 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
During the last two decades, Vietnam experienced essential and fundamental institutional 
changes under the transition economy, which enabled rapid economic growth in the country. 
One of those institutional changes is observed in the restructuring of agricultural markets 
enhanced by policies such as deregulation of foreign investments, decentralization of state-
owned companies, and more initiatives for private sector establishment. Besides these 
national economic reforms, another important factor impacting Vietnamese economy is the 
growing force of globalization. However, the economic growth has not resulted in a 
substantial reduction of rural poverty especially in north western Vietnam. Since tea 
predominately produced by poor farmers, greater access to markets can play key roles in 
reducing poverty in north western Vietnam. Therefore, we consider contract farming can be 
one of the rural development tools in order to effectively involve poor farmers into 
agricultural markets. 
 
This study investigates the potential of contract farming as one of the institutional 
innovations in terms of market participation of smallholders in rural Vietnam.  
 
We have highlighted contract farming scheme, which is one form of vertical coordination 
between producers and processors. Contract farming is often established as an institutional 
response to market imperfections and failures confronting smallholder farmers. Its 
advantages include reducing costs emerging from transactions and reducing risks associated 
with commodity exchange in the market.  
 
Tea production is one of the main income sources for Northern mountainous rural households. 
Since the country‟s economic reform in 1986, notable increase in private and foreign 
investment has been observed, which led to further development of the tea sector. However, 
remaining institutional and political constraints impair fair competition, particularly in 
contract enforcement. For example, state-owned enterprise has a stronger say in the local 
government, and this enables them to bind contracted producers legally, which is not 
applicable for private companies. Private companies on the other hand only rely on trust-
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based relationships or network-based relationships such as reputation, which make contract 
enforcement difficult, especially for newly established firms in the village. There is an urgent 
need for effective governance and administration to enforce laws that are often lost in the 
dilemma posed by the political and economic institutions of Vietnam; the government-
legislative, administrative, and judicial bodies are not independent of each other. Furthermore, 
in our case study we observed that tea producers selected specific contracts depending on the 
output price. Qualitative investigation revealed that output price creates a strong incentive for 
producers to decide on the type of market they choose to sell their products.  
 
Our empirical study shows that there is significant potential for enhanced production 
efficiency and increase in income in contract production. 
 
First, it revealed that contract farming leads to greater production efficiency compared to 
non-contract farming. This result refers to our first research question.  
Technical efficiency estimate result indicates that skilled labor is vital to tea production as 
older, more experienced, more educated, and more specialized tea farmers are more efficient. 
In addition, producers contracting with state-owned enterprise achieved significantly higher 
technical efficiency than non-contract producers. This indicates that the provision of 
extension service or technical advice by a state-owned enterprise might improve efficiency 
since state-owned enterprise has more experience in tea production than private companies.  
 
Second, we found some significant differences in characteristics of households between 
contract participants and non-participants. Among the determinants of contract participation 
identified, we found that age, education, experience in tea production, and degree of social 
network of household positively effect on contract participation. On the other hand, year of 
residence in the village negatively affects contract participation. Age of adults scored the 
highest elasticity. We suppose that the age effect on contract participation might be the 
reflection of more risk averse behavior of older producers compared to younger producers. 
We also found that the degree of social networking of household members positively affects 
participation in tea contract farming, presumably because of improved access to information 
through the social network. With these results, we can draw considerable policy implications 
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such as providing higher education and access to information to enhance contract 
participation by smallholders.  
 
Finally, we applied propensity score matching to investigate the impact of contract 
participation on income. This model is selected to obtain the reduced bias treatment effect of 
contract participation on income. The result revealed that the households producing under a 
contract had significantly higher incomes than non-contract households. And non-contract 
households can increase their per capita daily income (expenditure proxy measured) by 2.7% 
by participating in contract farming. 
 
Several policies along the lines of our case study on contract farming in the tea sector have 
been implemented through different dimensions of nationwide strategy, like boosting 
privatization, increasing tea production and dissemination of contract farming. The changes 
brought in by some of these policies reached rural households in terms of expansion of 
cultivation area, increase in the number of private tea firms and boosting contract 
participation. However, some policies failed to uplift agricultural and rural sector. The 
development of agricultural sector requires implementation of multi-dimensional policies for 
efficient complementary effects.  
 
Our empirical results point out a significant positive impact of contract farming on technical 
efficiency on tea production under the tightly arranged vertical coordination by SOE but not 
under the informal contract arrangement by private firms which are based on trust. This 
implies a contract arrangement in Moc Chau tea production functions better in the centralized 
contract management which involves organized production managements and some degree of 
collective sanction in the contract enforcements. Our study also empirically reveals that 
participation in contract farming provides significant impact on income for small scale tea 
producers. However some characteristics differ between contractors and non-contractors such 
as age, educational level, or organizational memberships.  
 
Throughout this study, we find that public enterprises play a crucial role in promoting 
agricultural development and in alleviating rural poverty in developing countries, particularly 
in an economy ridden with market failures and imperfections. Furthermore, our results point 
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out to the absence of fair competition between state-owned enterprise and private firms in 
implementation of contract enforcement. Further institutional improvements are necessary to 
facilitate efficient resource allocation for further development of the Vietnamese tea sector. 
Along with institutional improvements such as pricing, contract enforcement, and land tenure, 
contract farming in Moc Chau tea production should be enhanced by adopting a suitable 
contract model and providing more information on contract farming to small scaled tea 
producers.  
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APPENDIX 1.  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF TREATMENT EFFECTS 
 
Sensitivity of unobservable variables associated with contract participation can be tested 
with Rosenbaum-bounds proposed by Rosenbaum (2002). It is clear that propensity score 
matching are not robust against hidden bias arising from unobservable variables that affect 
assignment to treatment and the outcome variable (Diprete and Gangl 2004). Assuming 
that those who are most likely to participate in the contract also have a higher income, the 
estimated treatment effect would be overestimated due to those positive unobserved 
selection. Hidden bias commonly refers to the characteristics which are not observed, and 
that are not in the xi, therefore is not controlled by adjustment for xi like in propensity score 
matching (Rosenbaum 2002).  
 
Test for unobserved heterogeneity 
If there are unobservable factors assigned with contract participation, the matching method 
is not anymore robust, thus estimated treatment effect might be over- or underestimated.  
Rosenbaum proposed Rosenbaum-bounds for non experimental data that can investigate 
the degree of influence by selection biases to the matching method using bounding 
approach (Rosenbaum 2002). This sensitivity analysis indicates neither the presence of 
bias nor eligible magnitude of test statistic. However, it shows how the influence of 
treatment effects may be altered by hidden bias, and how large would differences of 
hidden bias have to be to alter the qualitative conclusions of study (Rosenbaum 2002, 
Aakvik 2001, and Becker and Caliendo 2007). 
 
Let probability of participation p(xi) express with observed variable xi and unobserved 
variable ui and the effect of uion participation γ that is: 
 
(1) ( ) Pr( 1| ) ( )i i i i ip x D x F x u      
 
When we compare the pair of matched treatment i and control j those who have the same 
xs, possibly have different p(x) because of the hidden bias expressed by γui. The odds that 
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unit i and j receive the treatment are p(xi)/(1-p(xi)) and p(xj)/(1-p(xj)) respectively. The 
odds ratio of receiving treatment when the units i and j have same values on xs: 
 
(2) 
( )(1 ( )) exp( )( ) /1 ( )
exp[ ( )]
( ) /1 ( ) ( )(1 ( )) exp( )
i j j ji i
i j
j j j i i i
p x p x x up x p x
u u
p x p x p x p x x u
 

 
 
   
  
 
 
This odds ratio for units with the same xs is some known number written as: 
 
(3) 
( )(1 ( ))1
( )(1 ( ))
i j
j i
p x p x
p x p x

  
 
. 
 
If Γ is 1, then p(xi) = p(xj) so the estimated treatment effect is free from hidden or 
unobserved selection bias that is associated with either no difference in unobserved 
variables (ui = uj) or unobservable variable has no influence on the participation 
probability (γ = 0) (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2005). If it is 2, then the one unit has twice as 
likely as to receive the treatment than the other unit under the condition those two units 
have same xs. Rosenbaum (2002) suggest that Γ is a measure of the degree of departure 
from study that is free from hidden bias. Sensitivity analysis with Rosenbaum bounds 
considers several measure of Γ and will show with which degree of hidden bias would 
alter the treatment effect. However, sensitivity analysis is only applicable for the matching 
without replacement so that it does not suit for this study. 
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APPENDIX 2.  SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
 
Questionnaire for household survey 
 
 
 
I. Identification 
 
1.1. Date of Interview : 
       
 
1.2. Commune name     
 
 
1.3.Village name  
 
 
 
1.4. Household identification number 
(please write this number on all pages) 
 
1.5. Name of the Household head 
 
 
1.6. Name of respondents   
 (Name and ID)  
 
1.7 Type of farming                                                                                                   1- tea farmer, 2- non-tea farmer 
 
 
1.8. Ethnic group of the household head  
Kinh............................................... 1 
Thai............................................... 2 
H’mong.......................................... 3 
Dao…....................................... 4 
Muong……………….………………………… 5 
Other (specify)_______________ 6 
 
1.9. Ethnic group of the spouse of the household head (See code above) 
 
 
1.10. Interviewer name and code 
 
 
1.11. Supervisor name and code 
 
 
1.12. Date checked by supervisor                  _____/_____/______ 
 
 
Signature of the supervisor 
 
 
 
1.13 Type of Cluster (by supervisor) ________________________ 
Day Month Year 
 
1 …TK 69 2 …Ban Muong 3 …SuoiKhem 4 …Lien Hung 5 …KhuaNhua 6 …Ban 83 7 …Ban On 
Tea Farmer contract with MCTC 
with leased land 
1 
Tea Farmer contract with MCTC 
without leased land 
2 
Tea Farmer contract with Private 
company or cooperative 
3 
Independent Tea Farmer 4 
Non- tea Farmer 5 
Code 
  120 
2. Household RosterNote to the interviewer: A household consist of all people who live under the same roof, eat from the same pot and share expenditures. A person is 
not considered as a member if she spent more than 3 months away in the past 12 months. 
2.1 
ID 
2.2. 
Name 
2.3 
Sex 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1= Male 
2= Female 
2.4. 
Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5. 
Relation 
to hh 
head 
 
 
 
 
 
(code 1) 
2.6. 
Marital 
Status 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(code 2) 
2.7. 
Can read/ 
write 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(code 3) 
2.8. 
What languages does this member 
speak? 
 
 
 
(code 4) 
2.9. 
Highest 
class 
passed 
 
 
 
 
 
(code 5) 
2.10. 
If children from 6-
15 years old (i.e. if 
born between 
1992 and 2001) 
 
Is he/she regularly 
going to school ? 
 
(code 6) 
2.11. 
If 2.8.>1 
 
Why ? 
 
 
 
 
 
(code 7) 
1st lang. 2nd  
 
3rd  
 
4th  
 
1    1          
2              
3              
4              
5              
6              
7              
8              
9              
10              
Code 1 Relation to hh head Code 2 Marital status Code 3 Read/write Code 5 Education Code 6 School attendance Code 7 Non  attendance 
Household head.................. 1 
Spouse................................ 2 
Son or daughter.................. 3 
Father or mother................. 4 
Grandparent........................ 5 
Grandchild......................... 6 
Brother or sister................. 7 
Other relative..................... 8 
Other non relative.............. 9 
 
Child, not old enough to marry…0 
Single........................................... 1 
Married with spouse permanently 
present in the household.........2 
Married with the spouse 
migrant................................... 3 
Widow / widower........................ 4 
Divorced / separated.................... 5 
Cannot read or write.............. 1 
Can read only........................ 2 
Can read and write................ 3 
 
Read in 1st year of Primary school….. 0 
Put the number of the highest class 
passed (1-8) 
Secondary degree…………………….. 9 
Vocational diploma…………………... 10 
High school certificate……………….. 11 
High education degree……………….. 12 
Bachelor degree……………………… 13 
Master and more……………………... 14 
Regularly..................................... 1 
Not Regularly.............................. 2 
Children attended to school before 
but not this year..................... 3 
Children never attended to 
school.................................... 4 
 
Cannot afford expenses……. 1 
Children must work………... 2 
Too young…………………. 3 
Other reason……………….. 4 
 Code 4 Languages  
Kinh...................................... 1 
Thai....................................... 2 
Hmong................................... 3 
Dao........................................ 4 
Muong................................... 5 
Other..................................... 6 
  121 
 
 
 
Code 8 Occupation 
Self employed in agriculture................. 1 
Self employed in non farm enterprise... 2 
Student/pupile....................................... 3 
Government employee.......................... 4 
Salaried worker in agriculture............... 5 
Salaried worker in non agriculture........ 6 
Daily agricultural labor......................... 7 
Daily non agriculturallabor.................. 8 
Domestic worker................................... 9 
Military service..................................... 10 
Unemployed 
 Looking for a job.............................11
 Homework.......................................12 
 Retired........................................... 13 
 Disable to work............................. 14 
 Leisure..................................…... 15 
 
  
2.12. 
If > 6 years Old 
 
Main occupation in the 
12 past months 
 
Put  /  in the cell if they 
engaged in only one 
occupation. 
 
(code 8) 
2.13. 
How many days in the 
past 12 months this 
person was sick and 
therefore unable to work? 
 
 
 
 
 
Nb of Days 
2.14. 
Does this member 
have any chronic 
illness (e.g. chronic 
fever,  heart 
disease, diabet, 
blood pressure, 
dysentry, etc.)? 
 
1= Yes 
2= No 
2.15. 
Does this member 
have disabilities 
(e.g. blindness, 
body member lost, 
etc.)? 
 
 
 
1= Yes 
2= No  
2.16. 
Clothing expenses 
in the past 12 
months 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘000 dong 
Primary Secondary 
1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
6       
7       
8       
9       
10       
11       
12       
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2.16. In which year was your household established in this Village?     year  
 
2.17. Where were born the following persons? 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Housing indicators 
 
Serial 
# 
Questions Response Response Code 
3.1 Is this dwelling owned by a member of your household?  Yes ..................... 1 
No ...................... 2 >> 3.4 
3.2 If you sold this dwelling – including the land plot – today, how much 
would you receive for it? 
 „000 VND 
3.3 Estimate please, the amount of money you could receive as rent if you 
let this dwelling – including the land plot – to another person. 
 
 
 
 
 A. „000 VND 
 B. Time unit Day ............................. 1 
Week .......................... 2 
Fortnight .................... 3 
Month......................... 4 
Quarter ....................... 5 
Half Year ................... 6 
Year ........................... 7 
3.4 Do you rent this dwelling for goods, services or cash? 
 
 Yes ..................... 1 
No ...................... 2 >>3.6 
3.5 How much does your household pay in cash to rent this dwelling? 
 
 
Interviewer: If does not pay in cash write zero “0”. 
 
 
 
 
 A. „000 VND 
 
 
 B. Time unit Day ............................. 1 
Week .......................... 2 
Fortnight .................... 3 
Month......................... 4 
Quarter ....................... 5 
Half Year ................... 6 
Year ........................... 7 
a. 
Household 
head 
b. 
Father of the 
household 
head 
c. 
Mother of the 
household 
head 
d. 
Spouse 
e. 
Father of 
the spouse 
f. 
Mother of the 
spouse 
      
1- In this village 
2- Elsewhere in Moc Chau district 
3- Elsewhere in Son la province 
4- Elswhere 
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3.6. What kind of lock does the main entrance have? 
(Gather this information through observation only) 
 No lock..............................................................  
Wood or metal bar to close from inside only…... 
Key lock............................................................ 
Security key lock/metal frame with padlock….... 
1 
2 
3 
4 
3.7. How many rooms does the dwelling have? 
( Include detached rooms in same compound if same household 
    Exclude bathrooms, toilets, kitchen and basement) 
 Number 
3.8 What is a total area of your house? Only the place which are covered 
by roof. 
  
M2 
3.9. What type of roofing material is used in the house?  
 
Straw leaves…........................................ 
Wood, bamboo….................................... 
Canvas, tar paper…................................. 
Panels (wood)…...................................... 
Galvanised iron….................................. 
Tile…..................................................... 
Big Tile….............................................. 
Concrete……... ….................................. 
1
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
3.10. What type of exterior walls does the house have? 
 
Leaves, branches…................................. 
Bamboo…................................................. 
Wood….................................................... 
Galvanized iron…................................. 
Earth…..................................................... 
Brick, stone…........................................... 
Concrete…................................................. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
3.11. What type of flooring does the main room have? 
 
Earth….................................................... 
Bamboo…............................................. 
Wood….................................................... 
Concrete…................................................ 
Brick…..................................................... 
Concrete with additional covering…........ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
3.12. What type of cooking fuel source is primarily used? 
 Leaves/ grass/ rice husks/ stubble/ straw / 
thatch/ stems............................................... 
Wood.................................................................. 
Coal/ charcoal..................................................... 
Kerosene..............................................................B 
Biogas................................................................ 
Bottled gas........................................................... 
Electricity.............................................................. 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5
6 
7 
3.13. What is the main source of lighting for your main living rooms?  
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 Cannot afford lighting at night............................. 
Candles/ battery lamb/ Resin torches..................... 
Gas, oil, kerosene lamp........................................ 
Electricity (public, shared connection)................. 
Electricity (public, owned connection).................. 
Generator............................................................. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
3.14. What is your primary source of drinking water?   
 River, lake, spring, pond...................................... 
Rain water........................................................... 
Public well – open.............................................. 
Public well – sealed with pump........................... 
Public tap......................................................... 
Well in residence yard – open............................. 
Well in residence yard – sealed with 
pump........................................................... 
Outside private tap................................................ 
Inside private tap................................................ 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
 
7 
8 
9 
3.15. What type of toilet facility do you have?  
 Bush, field............................................................. 
Shared kneel-down toilet.......................................... 
Owned kneel-down toilet........................................... 
Shared sit-down toilets.......................................... 
Owned sit-down toilets........................................ 
Shared flush toilets............................................... 
Owned flush toilets.................................................. 
1
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
3.16. Where do you usually cook your meals? 
 
 
Outside................................................................ 
In one of the rooms in the house.........................  
In a separate kitchen........................................... 
1 
2 
3 
 
3.17. Do you have any of the following utilities for your household?  
 
 
 
a.Piped water 
 
b.Electricity 
 
c.Telephone 
 
d.Mobile (cell phone) 
 
Yes, own connection.......... 
Yes, shared connection......... 
No......................................... 
1 
2 
3 
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4. Assets based indicators 
4.1. Assets owned 
 
Assets type and code 
4.1.1. 
Number 
owned 
4.1.2. 
Total resale value at the current market 
price/animal 
„000 dong 
Animals   
a. Buffalo   
b. Pig   
c. Goat   
d. Cattle   
e. Dog   
f. Chicken   
Farm assets   
g. Motor tiller   
Transportation- related assets   
h. Motor bike   
i. Bicycle   
Appliances and electronics   
j. Colour TV   
k. Black TV   
l. Telephone sets   
m. Mobile phones   
 
 
4.2.Land use certificates: 
 
4.2.1 Does your household own a Red book at the moment? 
 Yes…............... 1 
 No…................ 2 >> 4.2.3 
 
4.2.2. If yes, in which year did you get it for the first time?       Year 
 
4.2.3. How many plots are currently registered on your certificate? What is the total area (m2) of your all plots you 
owned? 
Type of land owned Number of plots 
 
Total area (ha) of plots 
the HH owns. 
% area titled with red 
book 
During past 12 
months, area rented 
out to other 
households (not 
cultivated by owner) 
Agr land irrigated (not 
tea) 
 m2 
% 
m2 
Agr land non-irrigated 
(not tea) 
 m2 
% 
m2 
Forestland  
 
m2 
% 
m2 
Homestead land, 
garden around house 
 m2 
% 
m2 
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5. Food Consumption Indicators 
 
5.1. During the past seven days (or the last seven days before the special event), for how many meals were the 
following foods served in a main meal eaten by the household? 
 a. Fresh fish 
 
b. Poultry 
 
c. Beef, buffalo 
 
d. Pork 
 
# meals served 
5.2. During the last seven days (or the last seven days before the special event), for how many 
days did a main meal consist of rice and vegetables only? (i.e. without any animal protein) 
# days  
5.3. During the last seven days (or the last seven days before the special event), for how 
many meals was rice replaced by cassava, or sweet potato? 
 
# days  
5.4. Did your household eat outside meal in the past 7 days? 
1-yes 
2-no 
 
5.5. In the last 30 days, how many times did you buy rice? 
5.6. During the last 30 days, was there some days where your household did not have enough 
to eat? If yes, how many days?  
No = 0,  
Yes, write # of days 
 
# days  
5.7. a. What is the amount of rice that you have currently in the house for your own 
consumption? 
 
b. For how many days will your stock of rice last?  
Kg of unhusked rice 
 
 
# days 
 
Now I will ask question about the food eaten in your household in the past 12 months  
5.8 In the past 12 months were you and your household members worried that your food would run out before 
you had money to buy more/ or before the harvest?  
 Yes.......................................... 
No........................................... 
1 
2 
5.9. In the past 12 months how often did you have to borrow food from relatives or neighbours to make a meal?  
 Never..................................................................... 
Rarely (1 to 6 times a year)................................... 
Sometimes (7 to 12 times).................................... 
Often (a few times almost every month).............. 
Mostly (this happened a lot)................................. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
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5.10. a. Did you or another adult in your household skip meals during the past 12 months because you did not 
have enough money to buy food? 
 Yes.......................................... 
No............................................ 
1 
2 >>go to Section 6 
b. How often did that occur during the past 12 months?  
 More than 180  days............................................. 
Less than 180 but more than 30days.................... 
Less than 30 days but more than 10 days............ 
Less than 10 days last years................................. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
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6. Expenditure based indicator 
 
Interviewer: We only ask for expenditures by the household and its members for consumption. Do 
exclude all expenditures for business, trade or any other micro enterprise (agricultural or non-
agricultural). With the following sentences and example, you should be able to make clear the 
difference. If not, continue the explanation until the difference between household and enterprise 
expenditures is known to the respondent. Only then begin with this section. 
 
The Interviewer must read the following statement.  
We would like to ask you about the expenditures that your household does for consumption, such 
as food, shelter, clothing, social events, and other living expenses. Rural example: Therefore, 
expenses such as for water for irrigation are excluded, but expenses for your own drinking water are 
included. Urban example: Therefore, expenses for buying goods and materials for a handicraft or 
trade micro enterprise are excluded from the following, but expenses for soap or furniture for your 
own household are included. 
Interviewer: Make sure that the respondent did understand the difference between expenditures for living, 
and expenditures for enterprises. Otherwise, give more examples. 
 
 
 
QID Questions. Response Response code 
 
Interviewer: recall period refers to the average 
week (6.1b and 6.2b))  during past 12 months 
(need to prompt accordingly).  
  
6.1a. 
How much did your household spend during the 
past seven days for buying food? (Interviewer: 
Value of barter exchange included) 
 „000 VND 
6.1b. 
How much does your household usually spend per 
week for buying food? (Interviewer: Value of 
barter exchange included) past 12 months! 
 „000 VND 
6.2a. 
What is the value of food that your household 
produces on your farm or garden, or gathers from 
the forest and then has consumed during the past 
seven days? Past 12 months! 
 „000 VND 
6.2b. 
What is the value of food that your household 
produces on your farm or garden, or gathers from 
the forest and then consumes usuallyper week?  
 „000 VND 
 
Recall refers to Average Month in past 12 
months for 6.3 thru 6.6 
  
6.3. 
How much does your household usually spend 
each month on Utilities (e.g. Electricity, phone, 
water and sanitation, etc.)? MONTH 
 
„000VND 
6.4. 
How much does your household usually spend 
each month on Transport (including fuel used for 
transport) (e.g. transport to work or school, 
transport for leisure, repair for bicycles, etc.)? 
MONTH 
 
„000VND 
6.5. 
How much does your household usually spend 
each month on Fuel (excluding fuel used for 
transport)? (e.g. fuel i.e. paraffin , wood, gas for 
cooking, , cooling, etc.) MONTH 
 „000VND 
6.6. 
What is the value of other goods (not food, e.g. 
wood or charcoal for fire/cooking) that your 
household usually produces on your farm or 
 „000VND 
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QID Questions. Response Response code 
garden, or gathers from the forest and then usually 
consumes? MONTH 
 
Recall period is PAST 12 MONTHS for 6.7 thru 
6.12.  
  
6.7. 
How much did your household spend in the last 12 
months on School/education (e.g. school 
enrollment fees, books, uniforms and other school 
supplies): 
 
„000VND 
6.8. 
How much did your household spend in the last 12 
months on Health (e.g. medicaments, visit to 
clinics, traditional healers or doctors, etc.)? 
 
„000VND 
6.9: 
How much did your household spend in the last 12 
months on Housing? 
 
„000VND 
6.10. 
How much did your household spend in the last 12 
months on Furniture, appliances etc.? 
 
„000VND 
6.11. 
How much did your household send to your 
relatives in the last 12 months who do not live in 
your household (remittances sent)? (include both 
monetary and value the in-kind goods received) 
 
„000VND 
6.12. 
How much did your household spend in the last 12 
months on Other expenditures (e.g. social events, 
leisure, gifts given, and taxes)? 
 
„000VND 
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7. Vulnerability and reliance to network in case of shocks – social capital 
7.1.Occurence of positive/negative events in the past five years? 
We want to ask ow about the events that affected your life in the last five years. 
Enumorators, please be careful to fill the answers which reflect NO, some of them are 0, and others are 2. 
 
7.1.9. Occurence of serious chronic illness or major disability (e.g. blindness, loss 
of arm because of accident, etc.) 
 Yes................................... 1 
 No.................................... 2 
 
7.1.10. A major working, income earning adult member left the household forever 
 Yes................................... 1 
 No.................................... 2 
 
7.1.11. Death of a dependant member (child or eldery person) 
 No = 0 
 If yes, how many deaths ?  
 
7.1.12. Relocation of residence because of a natural disasters (flood, landslide, 
etc.) 
 Yes................................... 1 
 No.................................... 2 
 
7.1.13. During the last 5 years, did your househld experience a complete failure in 
your own crop production (e.g. sickness of plants causing failure of harvest, 
7.1.1. Marriages of a first degree relative to household head or spouse?  
No = 0 
 Yes, how many mariages ? 
 
7.1.2. Birth of own child 
 No = 0 
 If yes, how many birth ?  
 
7.1.3. Adoption of child 
 No = 0 
 If yes, how many adoptions?  
 
7.1.4. We inherited major funds or assets 
 No = 0      
If yes, what is the value? ‘000 dong 
  
7.1.5 Did your household received dowry? 
 Yes................................ 1 
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7.2. Membership in association, group or organization 
We want to ask now questions about the associations in which you or members of your household 
participate and has membership, including communist party, mass organisation or any other kind of 
organisation. 
 
(interviewer, ask the question for each member over 15,  to be sure to enter in the table below all the organisation 
the household participates in. If a member has membership in several organizations, then enter his ID several time 
in the first column and fill a line for each organization he participates in) 
 
7.2.1. 
ID of hh 
member (use 
ID from 
family roster) 
7.2.2. 
Type of 
organization 
 
 
 
(code 1) 
7.2.3. 
Degree of participation 
 
1-Leader 
2-Very active (other responsibility than leader 
3-Active 
4-Give help from time to time 
5-Not active 
7.2.4.  
During the past 12 months, did 
you make contributions to this 
organization... 
 
0-No Contribution 
1-In cash 
2-In kind (e.g. labor, etc.) 
3-Both in cash, in kind 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
Code 1 type of organization  
Mass organisation 
Farmer Union........................................... 
Women Union.......................................... 
Youth Union............................................. 
Veteran Union.......................................... 
Fatherland Front....................................... 
Eldery Union............................................ 
 
NGO, Governmental services 
NGO........................................................ 
Vietnamese Governmental Organization … 
ForeignGovernmentalOrganization…….. 
VBSP Credit group................................... 
Other formal Credit group......................... 
Other informal credit/finance group……… 
Environmental group................................. 
  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
 
 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Agriculture/trade organization 
Extension club....................................  
Cooperative......................................  
Traders association...........................  
Professional association...................  
Trade union......................................  
Hobby club…...................................  
 
Political organization 
Communist Party.............................  
People‟s committee..........................  
Ethnic committee................................ 
 
 
 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
 
20 
21 
22 
 
 
 
Other local groups/organization 
Religious group................................  
Cultural association..........................  
Parent group.....................................  
School committee............................. 
Health committee.............................  
Sport group........................................ 
 
Other (specify) ................................. 
 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
29 
  132 
7.3. Access to services and safety nets 
7.3.1. How would you qualify your access to the services listed below on a scale from 1 to 5 ? 
(1= very poor access, 5= very good access) 
 
a. Education/schools  
b. Health services/clinic  
c. Housing assistance  
d. Job training/employement  
e. Credit/finance  
f. Transportation  
g. Drinking water distribution   
h. Water distribution for irrigation  
i. Agricultural extension  
j. Sanitation service  
k. Justice/ conflict resolution  
l. Security/ police services  
 
7.3.2. Here are listed some services offered by the government to reduce poverty, 
Name of the service 7.3.2.1.  
Do you know 
about it ? 
 
 
 
1= Yes 
2= No>> next row 
7.3.2.2. 
If yes, have you 
received such 
support in the last 5 
years (since 2002)? 
 
1= Yes 
2= No>> next row 
7.3.2.3. 
If yes, in which years 
did you receive it?  
(write several years 
if received more than 
one) 
 
Year(s) 
7.3.2.4. 
Amount received in 
the past 12 months? 
 
 
 
 
„000 dong 
a. Provision of Household 
Poor Certificate 
    
b. Access to loan with low 
interest rate 
    
c. Free health care/insurance 
    
d. Education tuition 
exemption and reduction/ 
free textbooks 
    
e. Kids are studying in new 
schools and classrooms 
    
f. Receiving support of 
accommodation or in house 
repairs/construction 
    
g. Monetary assistance 
    
 
7.3.3. How was your household classified by the commune in… 
 Hungry................... 1 
Poor........................ 2 
Medium................... 3 
Better-off................. 4 
Rich........................ 5 
Do not know........... 6
…2002?  
…2003?  
…2004?  
…2005?  
…2006?  
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8. LAND USE and SOURCE OF CASH INCOME 
 
8.1 
Please List the crops 
currently  
cultivated by HH 
 
1- tea,  
2-rice 
3- maize,  
4- cassava, 
5- sweet potato,  
6- potato,  
7- beans,  
8- vegetable,  
9- other crops (specify) 
10- lichi,  
11- longan,  
12- other fruit (specify) 
8.2 
What is the 
total area 
cultivated by 
that crop 
(which 
period)?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
m
2 
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
Now, I want to ask about your source of CASH INCOME.  
8.3 
What are the sources of 
income to the household in 
last 12 months?  
 
1- tea,  
2-rice 
3- maize,  
4- cassava, 
5- sweet potato,  
6- potato,  
7- beans,  
8- vegetable,  
9- other crops (specify),  
10- lichi,  
11- longan,  
12- other fruit (specify) 
13- Livestock 
14- fisheries 
15-forest products 
16-agricultural trade 
17-agricultural wage 
18-non agricultural wage 
19-non agricultural business 
20-remittances 
21-government aid, 
22-others(specify) 
8.4 
In percentage, how 
much did [source] 
represent in your 
total income (i.e. 
gross revenue- 
production costs) 
in past 12 
months?  
8.5 
How many 
people of your 
HH involved in 
these activities?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of 
people 
8.6 
Now I want to ask 
about the year in 
1997(10 years 
dimension). 
What was theincome 
[SOURCE]of your HH 
in 1997? 
 
8.7 
Estimate please, the 
proportion of each 
income [SOURCE] 
of your HH in 1997. 
 
 
 
8.8 
Has your income 
of past 12 months 
increased 
compare to the 
income of year 
1997? 
 
1-yes 
2-no 
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9. Tea Production 
General Information 
 
9.1 
Have your Household grown any kinds of tea for sale? 
 
1-yes  
2-no >> go 9.6 
 
 
9.2 
In what year did you or your spouse start growing tea? 
YEAR 
9.3 
Since this year, have you regularly (every year) grown tea? 
1-yes 
2-no  
 
9.4 
Which of the following are benefits you enjoy from tea farming? 
 
1-Timely input provision 
2-Lower prices for inputs 
3-Higher profit 
4-Stable product price 
5-Extension advice 
6-Easier transportation access to the market 
7-Easier processing procedure 
8-Other (specify) 
 
9.5 
Are you contracting tea farmer or independent farmer? 
 
1- Contract 
2- Independent 
 
 
9.6 
Why have you not grown tea? 
 
1- Not enough land 
2- Not enough labor 
3- No credit available 
4- No inputs available 
5- Inadequate transport 
6- Price too poor 
7- Tried other cash crop instead 
8- Don‟t prefer 
9- Not enough knowledge 
10- Other (specify) 
End the 
interview,here. 
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9.7 Plot Information and Land acquisition (land cultivated by tea) 
 
9.7.1 
 How many tea plots do you plant at present time?         Number of Plots 
 
9.7.2 
Plot 
ID 
9.7.3 
Plot 
area 
(m2) 
9.7.4 
% area 
titled with 
red book 
in each 
plot. 
 
9.7.5 
During past 
12 months, 
area of 
planted tea 
rented out 
to other 
households 
(not 
cultivated 
by owner) 
 
m2 
9.7.6 
During past 
12 months, 
Kg of tea 
leaves that 
the HH 
produced 
(both for sale 
and non-sale) 
in each plot. 
9.7.7 
Since when 
these trees 
are planted 
in average? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YEAR 
9.7.8 
Variety 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Code 
1-Shan 
2-Trung du 
3-Trung 
Quoc 
4-Other 
9.7.9 
What is the 
slope of this tea 
plot? 
 
1-Steep, hilly 
2-Moderate 
slope 
3-Slight slope 
4-Flat 
9.7.10 
How long have 
you plucked tea 
from this plot?  
 
Exclude 
vegetation 
period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total YEAR 
9.7.11 
How long 
these trees 
will give 
leaves? 
 
If 
unlimited, 
write ∞. 
 
 
 
 
 
YEAR 
9.7.12 
Name of the 
company you 
signed the current 
contract with.  
 
If its independent 
farmer, put /   in the 
cell. 
 
Code: 9.7.12 
1-MCTC 
2-Cooperative 
3-Private company 
4-other (specify) 
9.7.13 
From when to 
when do you have 
contract with that 
company? 
 
If unlimited, write 
∞. 
From 
YEAR 
To 
YEAR 
1 m2 % m2          
2 m2 % m2          
3 m2 % m2          
4 m2 % m2          
 
Note: 9.7.13 
Please fill the year, when the year you got involved in the contract. E.g. the year your village deicide to make contract with MCTC, but 
not the year you individually signed or make or oral contract.  
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Plot 
ID 
9.7.14 
Is this plot 
irrigated or not? 
1-irrigated 
2-non-irrigated 
9.7.15 
How did you first 
acquire this plot? 
 
>>SEE  
CODE 9.7.15 
9.7.16 
When did you 
acquire this plot? 
 
YEAR 
9.7.17 
If you purchased this 
plot, how much did you 
have to pay? 
(or ask purchased price 
when they acquired this 
plot) 
 
„000VND 
9.7.18 
If you leased this plot from 
others (out of HH), how much 
did you pay for last 12 
months? (for 1 year) 
 
1-at once 
2-yearly 
3-monthly 
4-others 
 
„000VND 
9.7.19 
Is currently, 
possible to rent out 
your land which is 
cultivated for tea 
production? 
 
1-yes 
2-no 
9.7.20 
Suppose you would rent this plot for one year. 
What price could you get for this plot? 
 
 
„000VND (please ask this question for all plots, 
including plots not owned by the household). The 
price of land can be an indicator of quality.  
1    „000VND „000VND   „000VND 
2    „000VND „000VND   „000VND 
3    „000VND „000VND   „000VND 
4    „000VND „000VND   „000VND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CODE 9.7.15 
1- from cooperative  
2- Allocated by the government with Red Book  
3- Inheritance 
4- Leased from Moc Chau Tea Company  
5- Purchased with title,  
6- Purchased with no title,  
7- Leasehold,  
8- Leased for short term,  
9- Converted forestry or wild land into agricultural land,  
10- Share tenancy, 
11- Other (specify) 
Comment: on 9.7.17 
 If one purchases a plot, one has to pay the price, or at least agree on the price at purchase date. Part 
of the purchase could be financed by a loan (even from a previous owner). But you should ask here 
only the purchase price. 
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9.8 Variable Costs 
 
Now I will ask about last 12 months. 
How much did you pay for following items in total last 12 months? 
9.8.1 
STT 
Plot 
ID 
9.8.2 Seeds 9.8.3 Manures 9.8.4 Fertilizers 9.8.5 Insect-Herbicides 
1.Self-payment 2.Paid by company 
through contract 
1.Self-payment 2.Paid by company 
through contract 
1.Self-payment 2.Paid by company 
through contract 
1.Self-payment 2.Paid by company 
through contract 
1 
„000VND „000VND „000VND „000VND „000VND „000VND „000VND „000VND 
2 
„000VND „000VND „000VND „000VND „000VND „000VND „000VND „000VND 
3 
„000VND „000VND „000VND „000VND „000VND „000VND „000VND „000VND 
4 
„000VND „000VND „000VND „000VND „000VND „000VND „000VND „000VND 
 
9.9 Fixed Costs 
Machines and tools used for tea production 
9.9.1 
Items 
9.9.2 
Number of tool or machine 
9.9.3 
How long have you bought it? 
(Nb. of years) 
1Plow 
  
2 Deep Plow 
  
3 Hoe  
  
4 Mattock  
  
5. Shovel 
  
6. Sprayer 
  
7. Cutter 
  
 
9.9.4 
How much did you pay for that for last 12 months? 
If they don’t pay, write “0”. 
 
_______________‟000VND/ 12months 
9.9.5 
How often did you have extension advice? 
Ask time period in last 12 months. 
 
Once/_____________________ / 12months 
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9.10 Labour Costs 
9.10.1 
9.10.1.1 
HH 
member 
code 
9.10.1.2 Regular work except plucking 9.10.1.3 Tea Plucking 9.10.1.4 Do you have opportunity to 
get other occupation? 
a.Nb of 
month/last 
12months 
b.Nb of 
Days/month 
c.Nb of 
hours/day 
a.Nb of terms(6-
8days)/year 
b.Nb of Days/harvest 
period 
c.Nb of 
hours/day 
d.Experienced 
year of Plucking 
a.During regular 
working  
1-yes, 2-no 
b.During 
plucking 
1-yes, 2-no 
          
          
          
          
          
9.10.2 Did/do you hire wage labour for tea production last 12 months? 
1-Yes, 2-No (>>go 9.10) 
 
9.10.3 Cost of hired labour during last 12 months. 
9.10.3.1 
Hired 
Labour 
ID No. 
9.10.3.2 
Nb. of days per 
last l2 months 
9.10.3.3 
Wage per day 
 
„000VND 
9.10.3.4 
Total 
 
„000VND 
9.10.3.5 
Type of work 
1-Tea fostering 
2-Tea plucking 
3-Other (specify) 
1  „000VND/day „000VND  
2  „000VND/day „000VND  
3  „000VND/day „000VND  
4  „000VND/day „000VND  
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9.11 Credit 
9.11.1 
During the past 3 years, have you borrowed money for tea production? 
1-Yes 
2-No >>9.12 
 
9.11.2Details of Loans 
9.11.2.1 
Items 
9.11.2.2 
Who lend you? 
1- Bank  
2- Friends  
3- Relatives 
4- Farmer‟s association 
5- Women‟s association 
6- Small local lender 
7- Others (specify) 
9.11.2.3 
Amount of 
loan  
 
 
 
 
 
 
„000VND 
9.10.2.4 
When did you 
borrow?  
Year /Month  
9.11.2.5 
When is the loan due 
(i.e. when must the 
loan completely be 
repaid)? 
Fill 55 if there is no 
such date 
 
Year Month 
9.11.2.6 
Interest (% per year) 
 
Interviewer: 
Note, if borrower does not 
know interest, ask who the 
lender is, and write it 
down. 
 
%/ YEAR 
9.11.2.7 
Which frequency you have 
to pay back your credit? 
1-every month 
2-every year 
3-when you finish harvest 
4-whenever you have money  
5-other (specify) 
MONTH YEAR MONTH YEAR 
1       %  
2       %  
3       %  
 
9.12 Tea Leaves processing, grading  
Now I will ask about last 12 months. Interviewer, please don’t forget the questions to be asked differentiating among each buyers. 
9.12.1  
Who grades your tea leaves? 
1-By collector 
2-By themselves (by household) 
3-No grade 
4-Others 
9.12.2 
Did you process  fresh tea by 
yourself? 
 
1-Yes(next row) 
2-No (>>9.13) 
9.12.3 
How many days did you spend to 
process tea during last 12 months? 
9.12.4 
How long (much time) did you spend 
to process tea per day last 12 
months? 
 
HOURS/Day 
  
Days Hours/Day 
  
Days Hours/Day 
  
Days Hours/Day 
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9.13 Tea leaves (fresh tea) Selling 
Now I will ask about last 12 months.Interviewer, please don’t forget the questions to be asked differentiating among each buyers. 
9.13.1  
To whom did you sell your fresh tea 
leaves last 12 months? 
 
1-Company you signed contract with  
2- Self selling at market 
3- Other company 
4- Individual trader 
5- Other (specify) 
9.13.2 
Why did you choose to sell 
this buyer? 
 
1- contract forced 
2- closest relationship 
3- closest (distance) buyer 
4- best price 
5- stable price 
6- other (specify) 
9.13.3 
At which location did you 
sell (passed away) the tea 
leaves to the buyer/collector? 
 
1- Local collecting point  
2-In your field 
3- Nearest local market 
4- at the contracted company 
5- at the non- contracted company 
6-Other (specify) 
9.13.4 
How far is the distance to 
the sales point from where 
the tea harvested? 
 
m 
9.13.5 
How did you carry there? 
 
1-Walking 
2-Bicycle 
3-Motorbike 
4-Other (specify) 
   
m 
 
   
m 
 
   
m 
 
   
m 
 
 
9.13.6 
How much did you 
sell last 12 months? 
 
Quantity Kg 
9.13.7 
How much did you sell per 
kg? 
 
Average Price per kg with 
this buyer during past 12 
month („000VND) 
9.13.8 
How much in total you sell last 
12 months? 
 
Total („000VND) 
Kg „000VND „000VND 
Kg „000VND „000VND 
Kg „000VND „000VND 
Kg „000VND „000VND 
 141 
 
 
 
 
Questionnaire for Village survey 
 
 
 
1. Identification 
           
1.1. Date of interview :  
 
Code 
 
1.2. Commune name :___________________________________ 
 
 
 
1.3.Village name:______________________________________  
 
 
1.4. Interviewer: _______________________________________________ 
 
 
1.5. Repondent name: ___________________________________________ 
 
 
1.6. Repondent occupation:_______________________________________ 
 
 
1.7. (if not respondant) 
 Village head name:_____________________________________________ 
  
Vice village head name:_________________________________________ 
Day Month Year 
 
0 7 
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2. Demography: 
2.1.Village composition 
How many hh in total in this viallge?       ______________________ 
 
Ethnic Number of households  Proportion  % 
a.Thai   
b.H‟mong   
c.Kinh   
d. Dao   
e. Muong   
f. Other   
 
2.2. When was the village created? ________________ (ideally year, or approximative answer if doesn’t know 
exactly) 
 
2.3. What is the ethnics, and name of the first household in the village (or first village head if there were several 
households)?_____________________________________________ 
 
2.4. Governance: 
2.4.1. Union and organisations 
Organisation 
2.4.1.1.Number 
of members 
a. Farmers union  
b. Women Union  
c. Youth Union  
d. Veteran Union  
e. Fatherland front union  
f. Eldery Union  
g. Communist party  
 
2.4.2. Cooperatives:  
2.4.2.1. Is there still a cooperative in the village? Yes/ No 
 
2.4.2.2. If no, in which year did the cooperative of this village stop to exist? ________ year >>2.4.2.6 
 
2.4.2.4. How many members are actually  in this cooperatives?_____________ 
 
2.4.2.6. When was the village head first elected?______________year 
 
3. Access to facilities 
3.1.  Generalities 
3.1.1 Services 
Is there any [service] 
available in this 
village ? 
3.1.1.  
Number 
(if there is 
not, write 0) 
3.1.2.  
If the answer is no, how 
far is the closest [service] 
 
km 
a. Shops   
b. Post office   
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c. Market   
d. Fertilizer depot   
e. Health center/clinic   
f. Kinder garden   
g. Primary school    
h. Secondary school    
 
3.1.2. Road 
3.1.2.1. Is there a paved road passing by your village? Yes / No 
 
3.1.2.2. If no, how far is the closest paved road in walking minutes? ________________min 
 
 
3.1.2.3. For how many months in a normal year is your village accessible…. 
 …by motorbike?  _____________months/12 
 …by truck?   _____________months/12 
 
3.1.3. Electricity 
3.1.3.1. Is there electricity accessible in the village? Yes / No 
3.1.3.2. How many households(or % of hh) have a private access to electricity?____________ 
3.1.3.3. How many households have a shared access to electricity?____________ 
3.1.3.4. How many households do not have electricity?_____________________ 
 
3.2. Agriculture: 
3.2.1.5. How many households were rice sufficient (didn‟t need to buy rice) in 2006?______in 2005?______ 
3.2.1.6. Compared to other villages from this  commune how would you say that this village is…?_______ 
1= …richer 2= …average 3= …poorer 
 
4. Land: 
4.1. What is the total area of land that the village (and its inhabitants) dispose of and its current allocation? 
 Total area 
 
Allocated 
under 
individual 
Red Book 
ha ha 
Paddy land   
Upland   
Forest   
Residential land   
Perennial crop   
Pond   
Other   
 
 
4.5. Forestry land 
4.5.1. How many households have an individual red book for forestry land? ________hh 
4.5.2. How many households share a red book for forestry land?   ________hh 
What kind of Red Book are there in this village? 
i.e, 
-Indivisual, property shared,  
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5. Access to credit  
5.1 Are there some tea household lend money for first investiment of their tea producttion? Yes / No 
 
5.2 How many households are they? ______________________________________ 
 
5.3 Do you know from which credit sector they lend money? 
 
a. VBARD 
b. VBSP 
c. Farmer union 
d. Woman union 
e. Youth union 
f. Veteran union 
h. Elderly union 
i. Village board 
i. NGO (specify)_______________________________ 
k. Government company 
l. Private company 
m. Other (specify)_____________________________ 
n. Money lender (where are they? In this village?) 
o. Shopkeeper (food, and basic consumption items) 
p. Agricultural inputs dealers (shopkeeper, private/ government companies, etc…) 
q. Trader 
r. Informal credit group (Ho Hui) 
s. Other 
 
6. Provision of services : 
6.1. Classification 
Status 
6.1.1. How many households were classified as [status] in… 
..2002? ..2003? ..2004? ...2005? …2006? ..2007? 
a.Hungry       
b.Poor       
c.Medium       
d.Better off       
e.Rich       
Total households       
 
6.1.2. How many poor household certificates were delivered in… 
 Number of hh 
who got the 
very poor 
certificate 
Specify in the 
village list!! 
Number of 
hh who got 
the poor 
certificate 
Specify in the 
village list!! 
Number of 
hh who got 
the poor 
book 
Specify in the 
village list!! 
...2002?       
...2003?       
...2004?       
...2005?       
...2006?       
...2007?       
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6.1.3. What other services are offered by the government/commune/village to reduce poverty?  
(list the service and the conditions of access) 
Describe the service Program 
(if only 
in this 
village 
write 
village) 
Targeted population  
1.   
2.   
3.   
4.   
5.   
6.   
7.   
8.   
a. Provision of Household Poor Certificate 
b. Access to loan with low interest rate 
c. Free health care/insurance 
d. Education tuition exemption and reduction/ free textbooks 
e. Kids are studying in new schools and classrooms 
f. Receiving support of accomodation or in house repairs/construction 
g. Monetary assistance 
Ask for others 
 
6.2. Process of identification of  poor households  
6.2.1. Timing of the classification process in 2006: From _____/______/_____  to ______/_______/______ 
Precise the first and the last step:      First:__________________ Last___________________ 
 
6.2.2. For the year 2007, does your village has processed yet? Yes / No 
 
6.2.3. If „Yes‟, when did it happen?_____/______/_____ 
 
6.2.4. If „No‟, when will it happen? _____/______/_____ 
 
 146 
 
6.2.5. Among the following people, who was involved in the collecting information/ and checking information in the 
last classification? 
 Specify occupation? 
Collects HH 
info 
(X) 
Checks HH 
info 
(X) 
Decision maker 
(X) 
1. Village head     
2. Vice head     
3. Communist party secretary     
 
4. Commune representant ________________________    
________________________    
________________________    
5. Women Union     
6. Farmer Union     
7. Fatherland front union     
8. Veteran union     
9. Youth Union     
10. Eldery Union     
11. HH representatives     
12. Other ________________________    
 
6.2.6. Does your village have a meeting to inform househods about their classification? Yes / No 
6.2.7. Do the households contest or modify the classification? Yes / No 
6.2.8. What are the problems that arise in this process? 
Problem       Reason 
1.___________________________________________  ______________________________________ 
2.___________________________________________  ______________________________________ 
3.___________________________________________  ______________________________________ 
 
6.2.9. What is the importance of the following criteria to classify househoods as poor.  
Make order from 1 to 5, 1 is most important criteria. 
 Order 
1. Family size (or dependent people)  
2. Housing (or condition of house)  
3. Durable goods  
4. Health  
5. Education  
6. Agriculture assets  
7. Livestock possession  
8. Agricultural land  
9. Production capacity (yields)  
10. __________________________  
 
6.2.10. Do you know about the new classification of poor households? Yes/No 
 
6.2.11. If yes, do you apply it? Yes/No   6.2.14. If yes, since when?________________year
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7. Recents improvements on infrastructures 
What recent improvements on infrastructures were made in the village (commune) since 2002? (school, roads, irrigation system, etc.) 
 7.1. 
Description 
7.2. 
Year start 
7.3. 
Year end 
7.4. 
Fund source (if program, 
write the name of the 
program – 135, etc.) 
7.5. 
Total cost of this 
program spent for this 
village 
„000 VND 
7.6. 
Nb of 
beneficiaries in 
village 
1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
6       
7       
8. Prices 
8.1. What is in this village the price of…. (S)selling ,(B)buying 
1 kg of sticky rice? (S) „000 dong  (B) „000 dong 
1 kg of ordinary rice? (S) „000 dong  (B) „000 dong 
1 kg of H‟mong rice? (S) „000 dong  (B) „000 dong 
1 kg of pork? (S) „000 dong  (B) „000 dong 
1 kg of chicken? (S) „000 dong  (B) „000 dong 
1 kg of Tea leaves? (S) „000 dong  (B) „000 dong 
1 kg of maize (dry seeds)? (S) „000 dong  (B) „000 dong 
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Questionnaire of Organization survey 
 
 
Questions for Cooperative, private company and key persons. 
 
1. When did your organization established? 
2. Which commune, and village do you have contract farmers? 
3. What is the distance from your orz to the villages? 
4. When was the harvest season during last 12 months?   
 
2.Name of Commune 2.Name of Village 3.Distance to the village 
(km) 
 a.  km 
b.  km 
c.  km 
 d.  km 
e.  km 
f.  km 
 
5. Contract scheme 
5.1 What type of contract does your organization supply? E.g. paper contract, oral contract, etc. 
5.2 How many contracts do you have in each type? If possible, village b village. 
5.3 When did your organization start to supply this contract? 
5.1 Type of contract 5.2 Number of hhs with contract 5.3 The first year they started this 
contract 
1. 
 
a.   
b.   
c.   
d.   
e.   
f.   
2. 
 
a.   
b.   
c.   
d.   
e.   
f.   
 
5.4 What kind of inputs do you supply to the contract farmers? 
5.5 Which frequency do you supply them? 
5.6 How much do you charge each of inputs to the farmers? 
5.7 Which frequency do the farmer have to pay back them?  
5.4 Inputs 
provision 
5.5 Frequency  
1-every month 
2-every week 
3-every harvest 
season 
4-other (specify) 
5.6 How much you do 
you charge? 
 
„000VND 
5.7 frequency of payback 
1-every month 
2-every year 
3-when harvest finished 
4-whenever they have money 
5-other (specify) 
1.Seeds  
„000VND 
 
2.Fertilizer  
„000VND 
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3.Pesticide  
„000VND 
 
4.Extension 
Service 
 
„000VND 
 
5.Others  
„000VND 
 
 
6.  Tea leaves collecting 
6.1How do you collect tea leaves from farmers? 
6.1.1 If you collect by tracks, how many employees do you have for collecting tea? 
6.1.2 How many tracks do you have? 
6.2 What can be the costs for collecting tea leaves? 
6.3 How much the each costs per 12 months? 
6.4 How often do you collect the tea leaves? (when the harvest season.) 
6.1 
 
1-by tracks 
2-by ox-cart >>4.2 
3-farmer 
brings>>4.2 
4-other 
(specify)>>4.2 
6.1.1 
If you collect by 
tracks…. 
 
Nb of 
employees for 
collecting tea 
leaves 
6.1.2 
Nb of 
tracks 
6.2 
Select all… 
1-rent for track 
2-purchase for 
track 
3-saraly for 
employee 
4-petrol for 
tracks 
5-others 
6.3 
Costs/ 
12months 
(total) 
 
„000VND 
6.4 
 
1-every day 
2-every week 
3-other 
(specify) 
 
 
 
   
„000VND 
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7 Tea leaves pricing 
7.1 How do you decide your tea price? 
 
 
 
 
 
7.2 Working and price in each month 
Please let us know the price of tea (fresh / Kg) in each month and daily works in the tea field. 
M Price of Fresh tea/Kg Main Works in tea field 
1   
 
2   
 
3   
 
4   
 
5   
 
6   
 
7   
 
8   
 
9   
 
10   
 
11   
 
12   
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